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Foreword
In spite of recent reductions, corruption in Serbia is still a serious
problem. It is unfair and undermines social values, it damages the rep-
utation of the state and weakens the economy. 
The Customs Administration remains one of the departments of
state most badly infected by corruption. Under the previous manage-
ment corruption spread widely in the Federal Customs Administration,
bringing many great personal gains, to the detriment of the country and
to tax payers. The new management has succeeded in reducing corrup-
tion over the last two years, but it has been confronted with numerous
limitations that reduce the effectiveness of the fight against corruption.
The aim of this study is to offer an institutional analysis of the caus-
es of corruption at the customs and to suggest a wide and consistent
range of anti-corruption measures aimed at reducing corruption to an
absolute minimum.
The management of the Federal Customs Authority and its director,
Vladan Begoviæ have provided the authors of the study with constant
support, for which we would like to express our gratitude here.
Belgrade, 12th November 2002
Boris Begoviæ
Boko Mijatoviæ
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I Corruption in the Customs Administration
 Main Causes and Mechanisms
THE CUSTOM ADMINISTRATION  FUNCTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES
OF ABUSE
The customs administration has many functions as keeper of entry
to Serbia/Yugoslavia. Therefore it must be stressed that corruption in
the customs administration is a very serious matter. The main func-
tions of the customs administration are:
 to implement the foreign trade policy of the country and to be
responsible for managing the customs rates, quantitative limita-
tions, rules on the origin of goods, antidumping measures etc.
 to prevent import of and general trafficking in undesirable goods
such as weapons, dangerous chemical substances, narcotic drugs
etc. and also to prevent the import of goods restricted by interna-
tional treaties (endangered species, ivory and white slavery) 
 to collect the considerable income accruing from import and pos-
sibly export taxes which enable the country to function 
 to encourage exports through customs rebates (holidays), tax hol-
idays and other measures.
Therefore the proper operations of customs administration is of
the highest social and state interest, both for the reasons mentioned
and also to prevent the least possible interruption of foreign trade
flows. 
In recent decades the rapid development of world trade has
brought new challenges for the customs administration. On the one
hand it has increased the need to facilitate and speed up trade, in
order to benefit as fully as possible from the positive effects of trade
on economic progress. On the other hand the possibilities for corrup-
tion and smuggling have increased markedly; if the customs regula-
tions have not been modernized, corruption itself can present the
means for the facilitation and speeding-up foreign of trade. Modern
information technologies and means of communication, while help-
ing the work of the customs through the increased amount of faster
data processing, also bring with them new difficulties of supervision,
legal practice and crime detection, when money and goods can be
moved internationally, at the push of a button. All these challenges
endanger the integrity of the national border, put the rule of law at
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risk, and increase the possibility of undesirable influence from for-
eign factors on domestic political and economic institutions. 
DEFINITION AND MAIN MECHANISMS OF CORRUPTION IN THE
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
The thorough definition of corruption is given by Vito Tanzi, cor-
ruption exists if there is the lack of application of the arms-length
principle to economic decisions. Corruption exists if arms-length
principle is deliberately violated when making a decision, in order to
acquire certain benefits. The other, often-quoted definition of corrup-
tion as, the abuse of official position for private gain (a definition
often associated with The World Bank and its officials), is completely
consistent with Tanzis definition. Since corruption in the customs
administration involves public office holders, the latter definition of
corruption is entirely applicable for further consideration, although it
is not as widely applicable as the former.
Consequently, the main elements of Tanzis definition of corruption
are: 1) the abandonment of impartiality, in fact, the existence of par-
tiality; 2) the existence of intention; and 3) material gain as a conse-
quence, i.e. the motive of the corrupted.
The abandonment of impartiality, i.e. the existence of partiality in
dealing with a user of the customs administration means that a cus-
toms official has to do something, for example deliberately to misclas-
sify goods with a tariff number that will incur a lower customs tariff
rate or omit to do something he should, in accordance with the existing
customs regulations. In other words, partiality in the context of the
customs administration can be interpreted as the breaking of a rule of
procedure, that is, the unequal interpretation and application of these
rules with different individuals or organizations using the customs
service. Of course this partiality is only offered to certain clients. 
However, in addition to abandoning arms-length principle, cor-
ruption in the customs administration, or of any other state or civil
service must also include;
 the existence of intent;
 the existence of material benefit for the corrupted individual.
If a customs official by mistake, for example, at the end of his shift,
due to tiredness, applies a lower customs rate than required by the Law
on Customs Tariffs, or other regulations, the rules have undoubtedly
been broken, the arms-length principle has been breached, but with-
out intention. This means that the customs official cannot be deemed
corrupt, rather he simply cannot bear the demands of his job or his
shift is too long. 
In addition to this the customs official who does not appropriate
material gain cannot be ranked with his corrupt colleagues. For exam-
ple if a customs official at a border control point levies a traveller of
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different ethnic group higher customs tariff rates than the rules
require it is obvious that the regulations have been applied partially,
and that the partiality is deliberate. However, the hypothetical cus-
toms official is merely a chauvinist and cannot be called corrupt.
All corruption, including corruption in the customs service is a
bilateral activity during which an informal and illegal contract is
enforced between the corruptor and the corrupted. Such a contract
specifies all the details of the transaction: what is expected of a corrupt-
ed customs official i.e. what services or partiality he/she should pro-
vide, and in what time scale, and also what is expected of a corrupter
i.e. how much, in what manner, and when he/she will pay for the com-
pleted service in the form of a partial application of the law. 
It is very important to note that an illegal contract is in question,
consequently a contract that violates the law with very significant con-
sequences for the way it is applied and the possibility of enforcing its
application.1
Accordingly, corruption is a transaction that implies a two-way
flow. On the one hand, there is a flow of services from the corrupted
customs official towards the corrupter (for example the service of vio-
lating customs clearance regulations and applying a lower customs
tariff rate than the regulations require); this can be termed a real flow.
Such services include everything that enables or initiates the violation
of regulations and creates, in any way, a privileged position for the
corruptor. On the other hand there is a flow of returned favour (most
commonly material gain, though not necessarily money) from the
corrupter towards the corrupted customs official; this is termed a
financial flow.
Since two parties are involved in the transaction, it is clear that sup-
ply and demand for corruption exist. In other words there is an offer
the violation of arms-length principle, an offer of inconsistent and
incomplete application of the regulations and procedures, a violation
of the regulations in favour of those who are ready to pay. The supply
curve for corruption services, like ordinary supply curves, exhibits an
upward trend, i.e. the higher the price of the service (bribe), the greater
the supply. For example, let us assume that the corrupt service on offer
is the reduction of the current customs rate, i.e. in the amount of duty
an importer is charged. The higher the price of the service (bribe, or
return favour), the higher the supply of corruption. The supply curve
(curve S, Picture 1.) intersects the vertical axis at a specific point distant
from the origin of the coordinate system. This implies that a minimal
amount of the offered bribe is needed in order for a positive supply of
corruption to exist. In other words there is at least one price (bribe
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1 Because an illegal contract is under consideration i.e. a contract the enforcement of
which violates the law, the legal system cannot supervise the enforcement of the con-
tract. The parties to the contract share the cost of supervision.
amount) lower than the mentioned minimal price at which corrupt
services will not be offered.2
On the other side, there is the demand for corruption (curve D,
Picture 1.). Like every other demand curve, the curve of corruption
exhibits a negative trend. The higher the amount to be paid, i.e. the
higher the price of corruption (service), the lower the demand for that
corruption (service). Such findings were expected and they are consis-
tent with basic principles of economics. For example if the regular duty
on a particular commodity is 150 Euros, it is senseless for a customs
official to ask a potential corruptor to pay 160 Euros for complete non-
payment of the duty. Accordingly, the demand for corruption evapo-
rates if the price is too high, and at that point the demand curve for
corruption intersects with the vertical axis (Picture 1.).
A consideration of the demand for corruption in the customs
administration must enquire into the motives of the corruptor. Why
are corruptors ready to offer bribes to customs officials? The simple
answer to this question would be, freedom from paying duty, but this is
facile. A better question would be, why do corrupters want to be freed
from paying duty3, i.e. what do they gain if they do not pay duty?
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Picture 1.
Supply and demand for corruption
2 Reasons for the position of the curve should be looked for among the factors that deter-
mine the conduct of customs officials, i.e. the level of the offer of corruption especially
among those that refer to penal policy, i.e. the likelihood of conviction.
3 To make it simpler, non-paying of customs service is equaled with the result of corrup-
tion in customs service from the corruptors point of view i.e. the non-payment repre-
sents the service that corrupted customs officials supply. Of course, the services of cor-
rupted customs officials are not limited simply to non-payment of duty. 
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Two main factors motivate corruptors. The first is rent, i.e. the
income above the costs of the resources used. Under normal market
conditions the proportional price is barely sufficient to cover the costs
of the resources used. These costs should include the price of the capital
in accordance with profit appropriated under the so-called normal
profit margin. When customs duty is not paid the possibility arises for a
corruptor to make further, economic profit or rent. This can be seen in
the table below that compares the costs of a company-corruptor with all
other companies that are presumably not involved in corruption.
As can be seen from the table a company-corruptor sells the import-
ed product at the market price i.e. at the same price as all other the other
companies, but in addition to normal profit a corruptor appropriates a
rent equal up to the unpaid customs duty. Of course, the amount of the
rent should be reduced by the cost of all the corruption the company-
corruptor has purchased. In the above model, the company-corruptor
co-exists with other companies. However, the second main motive for a
company to become involved in corruption is the elimination of com-
petitors and creation of monopoly. Namely, through non-payment of
duty, the company gains a cost advantage over its competitors; the com-
pany-corruptor can offer the imported goods at a substantially lower
price than its competitors, i.e. predatory pricing. 
In this way a company-corrupter creates the pre-conditions neces-
sary to eliminate all its competitors, forcing them into
bankruptcy/liquidation or into voluntary transfer to another indus-
try. In this way the opportunity to develop a monopoly arises, which
implies monopolistic pricing and economic profit (rent) on that
basis. Again the aim is to maximize economic profit, but in this case
it also involves the elimination competitors. This motive or source of
demand for corruption in the customs administration is connected
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Table 1.
Corruption at customs administration and appropriation of rent
purchase duty normal rent retail 
price profit price
Non-corrupting companies 100 40 10 0 150
Corruptor 100 0 10 40 150
Table 2.
Corruption at customs administration and elimination of competitors
purchase duty normal rent retail 
price profit price
Non-corrupting companies 100 40 10 0 150
Corruptor 100 0 10 0 110
with the well-known phenomenon of predatory pricing by which
companies seek to eliminate their competitors.
The classification into supply and demand in the provision of cor-
ruption in the customs administration agrees completely with the fre-
quently mentioned division into active and passive corruption in the
customs administration. Users of customs services offer bribes (active
corruption, i.e. demand for corruption) among other things because
they know that certain customs officials are prone to accepting bribes
(passive corruption i.e. offer of a corruption service).4
The level of corruption is set, like every other level on the market, by
the supply being equal to the demand  clearing the market. This refers
both to aggregate and individual supply and demand. The deperson-
alised aggregate supply and demand is made up of a myriad of individ-
ual decisions by participants in the movement of people and goods
across a border  the decision as to whether someone is going to cor-
rupt or to be corrupted.
GENERAL FACTORS OF CORRUPTION AT THE CUSTOMS
The factors influencing corruption at the customs or in the customs
administration, can be divided into general and specific. General fac-
tors comprise all those which, apart from corruption at the customs,
also have an influence on corruption in other areas of public service.
The following analysis naturally focuses on the way in which those fac-
tors affect supply and demand for corruption of the customs adminis-
tration or customs officials. 
General factors influencing corruption at the customs  the
supply of corruption
The supply of corruption depends on the readiness of customs offi-
cials to provide it. Of course, that readiness is itself determined by
numerous factors. The following study examines the issue at the indi-
vidual and the aggregate level, looking into the complete supply of cor-
ruption by customs officials. 
The salaries of customs officials
It is generally believed that the low salaries of customs officials are
the key factor influencing corruption at the customs. It is not difficult
to understand that the low, indeed insufficient salaries of customs
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4 In this research a real flow is considered and demand and supply is defined according to
it. In some other researches financial flow is considered so that customs officials are on
the side of the demand for corruption, those who ask for bribes, and the users of cus-
toms services are on the other side of corruption, those who offer bribes. There is no
essential difference between this approach and the approach taken in this study.
officials represent a significant factor, or at least an excuse for corrup-
tion. Naturally, those customs officials who still have some moral
scruples find moral justification for their corruption in their
low/insufficient salaries.
Although the wage level is, indubitably, an important factor in the
supply of corruption from customs officials, some major questions still
require an answer. The first one is whether the salaries of customs offi-
cials are high enough to cover the existential minimum for themselves
and their families. In other words, how many customs officials would
find themselves below the existential minimum if they relied exclusive-
ly on their regular income? If their number is considerable, then it is
clear that low wages are, or can be, a significant source of corruption at
the customs.
The next relevant question is whether similar posts outside the cus-
toms administration, i.e. outside the public administration, are also
similarly paid. Provided there is at least minimal mobility of labour on
the market, and that salaries in the customs administration are sub-
stantially lower than salaries outside the public administration, then
corruption originates as a natural consequence of the two problems.
Firstly, from the viewpoint of customs officials, there is the dilemma
regarding the job (or the change of job): a post in the customs admin-
istration for a lower salary (with possible additional income from cor-
ruption) or in the private sector (for a higher salary without additional
income). It is apparent that the extent of corruption, as a top-up of low
salaries, is in this case highly relevant for research into the operations of
the labour market and for the formulation of wages policy in public
services, in this case in the customs administration. Secondly, the same
problem can be posed from the standpoint of the state or the customs
administration. If people are to be attracted to jobs in the customs
administration for lower salaries, then the advantage of allowing for a
certain acceptable degree of corruption as a source of additional
income is evident. 
The problem is that if the state tolerates such a policy of employment,
or work discipline, corruption appears, and this in itself leads to the cre-
ation of an image of the customs as a corrupt administration in which a
major proportion of the income of employees is of an improper
nature, originating from corruption. This is the point at which a vicious
circle begins to be established. Namely, if, on account of low/insufficient
wages, customs officials supplement their income from corruption, then
the customs administration acquires a reputation for corruption. Very
often this means that the general perception arises that customs officials
are the most corrupt public officials. Such a widespread opinion makes it
virtually impossible for the government to improve the salaries of cus-
toms officials (which were, in part, the initial cause of the corruption).
The issue can be very risky politically someone, possibly even the pres-
ident of the most powerful opposition party might say, You are raising
the salaries of customs officials, while they are already making a good
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living on corruption!. This rules out the possibility of improving the sit-
uation by raising salaries in the customs administration. 
Furthermore, in the context of this vicious circle, there is also a mul-
tiplying effect. Namely, once the customs administration has a bad rep-
utation for corruption, customs officials are very much aware of the
fact themselves, just as they know (or learn very soon) that it is because
of that very reputation that they cannot count on a salary increase.
Therefore, it dawns on them that an increase of regular, legitimate
incomes cannot be expected. After this it is more than likely that cus-
toms officials will opt to intensify their corrupt practices and increase
of their irregular income. This leads to the reputation of the service
being further deteriorated, and in turn the possibility of an increase in
regular salaries becomes slimmer and slimmer, further strengthening
the incentives for corruption. In conclusion, unless the above men-
tioned vicious circle is broken, a classic multiplication effect develops,
based on the constant undermining of the reputation of the customs
administration, which leads in turn to a constant intensification of cor-
ruption in the administration. 
The deterioration of the reputation of the customs administration
has another very damaging multiplying effect, namely the impact it has
on the quality of the people applying for work in the customs adminis-
tration, to be specific, those who want to become customs officials. If
the service has a good reputation, then only honest people of great
integrity can be expected to apply for employment within it. Thus a
high-quality (in the moral sense above all) structure of the customs
administration is maintained. Deterioration in the reputation of the
administration leads to a change in the structure of people applying for
employment in it. In other words, the customs administration itself,
though unintentionally, gives a signal on the labour market  we are an
organization in which you can make a quick profit in a dishonest way.
Accordingly, the participation of potentially dishonest people, or peo-
ple of questionable integrity, increases. It is people like these who see
an opportunity for their own benefit exclusively in a corrupt customs
administration. This illustrates a typical example of adverse selection,
or producing damaging incentives by sending out the wrong signals. 5
Employing inappropriate people or people of questionable integrity
in the customs administration intensifies corruption and makes it
spread, as well as undermining the reputation of the service. This leads
to further deterioration in the moral scruples of the employees, which
then brings about a renewed expansion of corruption, and, corre-
spondingly, a further decline in the reputation of the administration.6
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5 The stated example of adverse selection comprises not only of the moral of those
employed in the customs administration, but also other human and professional qualities
of theirs, such as, for instance, cognition, or their ability to learn and acquire new skills.
6 Apart from this, deterioration in the reputation of the customs administration causes
honest people or people of great integrity to leave the service, as they do not want to stay
in an organization with a bad reputation, and be labeled as corrupt by the public. 
Therefore, there is another knock-on effect  the customs administra-
tion gets the worst that can be found on the labour market.
If the customs administration has a bad reputation, it acts as a very
powerful lure attracting the most disreputable people in society.
Their credo is  the worse, the better. The customs administration
thus becomes the organization of their dreams, in which they will be
able to prosper and at last realize their aptitude for corrupt practices
successfully.
All the above-mentioned facts increase the significance of a turning
point that is needed for the corrupt customs administration to start
fighting corruption. Such a notable turning point (breaking with the
past) is necessary for improving the reputation, for sending a new,
different signal to the labour market, which is  the dishonest lose
their jobs here. The dishonest on the labour market will get the signal
quite clearly, and will try their luck in other areas.
All the aforesaid must concern a benevolent/sensible government, or
one that does not aim to have a corrupt customs administration.7 Low
salaries for customs officials in that case come as a consequence of a
relatively austere state budget, or low budget revenues of the state. In
other words, even though the government may not want a corrupt cus-
toms administration, its remuneration policy, among other things,
unintentionally leads to corruption at the customs. In certain cases one
cannot say that there is no element of intention involved, but rather
that corruption is tolerated, since it allows the customs administration,
or the customs system to operate at all. 
Nevertheless, one should bear in mind the possibility, which in real-
ity is not so uncommon, that corruption is institutionalised, i.e. that
the government actually wants a corrupt customs administration. In
that case, the basic motive of the regime/ruler is to have a cooperative,
or rather obedient customs administration, and corruption is the only
means of achieving that aim. Thus institutionalised corruption is
established, within which the main or even the sole aim of the ruler is
to maximize personal wealth. The aim being such, low salaries in the
customs administration prove to be a means of initiating corruption in
that service. In order to be efficient (in the sense of initiating, or inten-
sifying corruption), such salaries must be below the existential mini-
mum, so as to force customs officials to become corrupt, that is to
intensify their corrupt practices. This is the way in which the hostage
mechanism is formed. You are either going to be cooperative (obedi-
ent) and do everything required, or I shall produce irrefutable evidence
that you are corrupt. This means expulsion from the service, and loss
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7 The American economist William Baumol claims that many states or governments,
throughout human history, can be interpreted as gangster organizations. In Baumols
opinion governments concerned with the welfare of the governed and constrained by
rule of law from arbitrary and violent measures are the rare exceptions in human histo-
ry, perhaps more realistically interpreted as a curious aberration of a very recent period
in rather limited portions of our planet. 
of income (regular, as well as the supplement from corruption) that
follow. Subsequently, criminal proceedings might be instituted, and
the person might be sentenced to prison (in extreme cases there is not
even a need for legal proceedings). Therefore, a deliberate policy of not
only low, but also insufficiently high salaries results in the blackmail
mechanism being established, which ensures the obedience of the
administration, that is the customs officials working in it. What pur-
pose this obedience serves is not of the utmost importance for this
analysis.
Next, low salaries inevitably bring about a particular feeling in a cus-
toms official; he is looked down upon, and is not adequately rewarded,
as is his service as a whole. When analysing this, one should bear in
mind one fact in particular  that the customs administration provides
the state budget with considerable revenues, which is always far higher
than the expenditures/costs of the service itself. Therefore, many
employees in the customs administration feel betrayed by the state, or
the government, so corruption is, in a sense, their revenge. In this case,
low salaries pose a problem not only from the perspective of customs
officials existence only, but also from the perspective of their relative
poverty. In addition, a certain social status is required, and salary can
often be a restrictive factor. This is particularly present in a situation
when some other public services (the police or army, for instance) have
higher salaries as well as social status. In such circumstances it does not
matter how low a customs officials salary is, but only whether it is
lower than the salary of a police or army official. 
Finally, when considering the salary of customs officials, one should
mention one of the opinions very often expressed: Corruption origi-
nates from poverty, a generally poor society is the cause of corruption.
Since poverty causes corruption, then economic growth will make us
free from poverty, and, consequently, free from corruption as well. It
can be assumed that the advocates of this theory believe economic
growth will lead to higher salaries in general, therefore in the customs
administration as well, and, accordingly, corruption will diminish.
This is a delusion, to put it mildly. There are countries at the same level
of poverty, or affluence, which have significantly different levels of cor-
ruption in their customs authorities, as well as the society as a whole.
Neither economic growth in itself nor a mere increase in the salaries of
customs officials is a complete remedy for corruption.
A corrupt organization
The service of corruption is always supplied by an individual, a cus-
toms official with a first and last name. The total supply of corruption
in the customs administration of the country in question is just the
sum of supplies of services offered by all the individuals in that customs
administration, that is all the customs officials. Still, every one of them,
at the beginning of their professional career at any rate, has certain
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moral scruples. At least at the beginning of his career he is not the per-
son who supplies his services of corruption without restraint.
However, the key question is how long, or rather under what condi-
tions that person will be able to keep his integrity and not become cor-
rupt. The answer to this question, among other things, depends on fac-
tors related to the organization the person belongs to. 
In the customs administration there is a strong team spirit, i.e. the
collective spirit of the group doing the same job together. Therefore,
being part of the team is a factor of great importance influencing cor-
ruption. If the team is already corrupt, a new coming uncorrupted offi-
cial has little chance of resisting temptation, or ignoring the threat.
Namely, an uncorrupted customs official poses a threat to the other
corrupt officials, since he is in possession of information which can be
very dangerous for them. For that reason, an uncorrupted customs
official will find himself under great pressure not to notify others of the
corruption present in his team. The safest way to ensure this is to entice
that person into becoming part of the corrupt team, as then he
becomes a sort of a hostage  if he reports his colleagues, he will also be
held accountable for corruption. Hence, corrupt customs officials have
a very strong motive to involve as many colleagues as possible into the
chain of corruption, so a knock-on effect appears here as well  deep
corruption leads to even deeper corruption. 
In converting an uncorrupted customs official, that is a man of
integrity, into a corrupt one, the syndrome of the first time is of vital
importance. After the first time, once he has received money or accept-
ed another favour done in return, everything changes. One of the fac-
tors determining this is that a corrupt customs official becomes a
hostage of his own corruption. To all intents and purposes he is not in
a position to refuse an offer from the person who corrupted him once.
The corruptor possesses the key information that he can share with
others and thus ruin the professional career of the corrupt official, or
even send him to prison. It is a kind of blackmail, which usually func-
tions very well.8 Hence, the corrupt official is prompted to cooperate,
that is to remain corrupt. 
Apart from the above, another key factor is the attitude of the execu-
tives, or the reputation of the executives in the customs administration,
from the Chief of the whole customs administration, through the man-
agers of custom-houses, to the administrators of customs border cross
points and the heads of shift. Dishonest administrators cannot success-
fully manage an honest service, let alone fight corruption. 
An analysis of salaries and corrupt organization as factors influenc-
ing corruption at the customs indicates the presence of substantial
multiplying effects. Initial deterioration on one of these two fronts
and the establishment of corruption inevitably lead to a vicious circle
of deeper and deeper corruption. Therefore, a turning point in the
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8 The American economist Oliver Williamson calls this the hostage mechanism.
customs administration is essential, as a precondition for fighting cor-
ruption. Such a turning point, on account of the substantial multiply-
ing effect it has, facilitates relatively rapid progress in subduing cor-
ruption in the customs administration. In other words, there is a
change in the direction of the multiplying effects of salaries and cor-
rupt organization as factors influencing corruption at the customs. 
Unfortunately, however, for a certain number of corrupt officials,
there is little chance of turning back, and returning to normal life.
Some corrupt officials have experienced serious psychological damage
 they have become kleptomaniacs. To their mind, corruption is a
lifestyle, in other words it is a purpose in itself. Apart from these, one
should bear in mind that there are customs officials who have amassed
wealth, or increased their income to such an extent that they cannot
change their lifestyle anymore, but remain corrupt in order to retain
their enormously high incomes, which exceed by far regular expected
incomes in the customs service.
The penal policy on corruption
The penal policy on corruption is very often highlighted as the key
factor of corruption, or the crucial element of waging a fight against it.
According to this, rather widespread opinion, a stringent penal policy
and stringent implementation are sure to diminish the extent of cor-
ruption, whereas a liberal penal policy or inconsistent implementation
lead to the strengthening of corruption at the customs.
In order to gain a better insight into the effects of the penal policy on
corruption at the customs, one should study the behaviour of a poten-
tial offender, i.e. the behaviour of a potentially corrupt customs official.
Beckers economic model of crime and punishment serves this purpose
best, as it defines the relations between expected utility produced by
committing an offence (corruption in this case), and expected disutility
of punishment. The chief aim of the model is to determine what deter-
rent effects (the function of discouragement) punishment has on a
potential offender. The odds that an offence will be committed are
determined by the ratio of the expected utility produced by committing
an offence to the expected disutility of the punishment. If the ratio is
positive, a potential offender will become an actual criminal, that is he
will commit the offence. In the case of customs officials, just as any
other public officials, corruption may originate if the ratio is positive.9
The afore-mentioned relationship indicates that the following four
factors determine the supply of corruption at the customs:
1 Probability of an offer of expected bribe or suitable favour done in
return;
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9 The issue of whether corruption will actually develop or not is determined by some
other factors that are not discussed in this model. It is positive, though, that if the stat-
ed ratio is negative, corruption will not develop.
2 The value of the bribe, or favour, estimated in terms of utility for
the customs official;
3 Probability of disclosure and conviction for the offence of corrup-
tion;
4 The value of disutility of the anticipated punishment.
The first two elements refer to demand for corruption. The value of
the money, or the return favour, offered by the corruptors, depends on
how much they are willing to pay to be granted a certain favour by the
corrupt customs official. Thus, demand for corruption becomes a fac-
tor of its supply, since an increase in demand leads to a corresponding
increase in supply as well.10 The greater the demand for corrupt servic-
es, the greater the amount of money, or the more valuable the return
favour clients are ready to offer. This, unless the penal policy is
changed, will lead to an increase in the supply of corruption. 
The last two elements represent the impact of the penal policy, and
the way of its implementation. A stricter penal policy, in view of the
stipulated punishment11, as well as its enforcement (primarily by
means of a greater number of convictions), leads ceteris paribus to a
decrease in the aggregate supply of corruption. Although this view may
initially seem convincing, and in accordance with the results of
Beckers model, one should point out certain implications which are
not, perhaps, immediately apparent. 
As the expected disutility of punishment rises, corruption will only
be supplied in cases when the expected utility of the bribe, or the
favour done in return is extremely high, high enough, in fact, to com-
pensate for the high expected disutility of punishment. This means
that a strict penal policy will prevent the supply of minor corrup-
tion, i.e. instances of corruption in which both the service of the cor-
rupt and the bribe (favour) of the corruptor are small. However, a
strict penal policy will not induce a decrease in major corruption, i.e.
corruption in which a lot of money, or big corrupt deals are involved.
Furthermore, one cannot say with certainty what will be the reaction
of those customs officials who, on account of the strict penal policy,
will no longer be included in minor deals. Some of them will choose to
become straight, that is they will desist from their corrupt practices (as
the risk of punishment and its negative utility is far too high), whereas
others will start dealing exclusively with major corruption. What pro-
portion of the customs officials will go over to the category of the
straight, and what proportion to the category of those dealing with
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implied, that is the formation of a new supply curve rather than a change alongside the
existing curve.
11 The concept of punishment comprises imprisonment, fine and dismissal. In effect, the
punishment of dismissal is a fine, since not only does the customs official lose his wages
(regular and irregular), but also his reputation at the labor market is undermined.
Therefore, the chances of his getting a well-paid job outside the customs administration
after the dismissal become all the slimmer. 
major corruption, is an issue determined by numerous factors, the
most important of which is their attitude to risk, i.e. the degree of their
aversion to risk. In other words, though it is apparent that a stricter
penal policy will diminish minor corruption (or the corruption char-
acterized by the small value of the favour done in return), its effect on
major corruption is far from clear. It is not evident that the latter form
of corruption will not be diminished, but it is uncertain whether and
to what extent it will grow.
Regardless of the aggregate effects of a stricter penal policy on cor-
ruption at the customs, i.e. the effects it will have on the extent and
structure of corruption, it is obvious that in many countries (particu-
larly developing countries, or those going through a period of transi-
tion) there are considerable restrictions on its implementation. For
instance, countries going through a period of transition, in which a
communist regime was in power for decades, are eager to adopt, as
soon as possible, legislation that will facilitate the liberalization of eco-
nomic life and improvement of resource allocation on the market.
Legislative bodies are overburdened, due to the need for the adoption
of a great many regulations which will bring the economic system of
the country closer to the free market model. This means that relatively
little attention is focused on the legislation necessary for an efficient
penal policy in the case of any form of corruption, and therefore as
concerns corruption at the customs as well, or in the case of any crimi-
nal offence. Furthermore, effective implementation of a penal policy
requires the existence of powerful and efficient institutions of the judi-
cial system, which is still a rather far-fetched idea for developing coun-
tries and transition economies. As regards developing countries, in
most of them corruption is an omnipresent and common affair, so the
legislative authorities are not too concerned about it either. To be spe-
cific, they do not place on their agenda regulations which would initi-
ate a fight against corruption. As regards legislation itself, however, not
even Western countries are provided with regulations which assist in
waging an efficient war against corruption. Among these powerful
countries, the United States of America is the only one which has
enacted a law stipulating that a legal entity, registered by the state must
not offer a bribe to foreign public officials. Not even this law has been
successful in making a distinction between legitimate transaction facil-
itation payments and bribes, or corruption.
Apart from this, in many countries, judges or the judicial system as a
whole are still not organized in a way which would help an efficient
legal fight against corruption at the customs, that is efficient imple-
mentation of the penal policy. Quite often the judges conducting the
proceedings in a case of corruption at the customs are unfamiliar with
the specific customs regulations and procedures. This particularly
refers to the lawsuits brought before regular, or general courts,
although special courts (commercial trade courts, for instance) are not
familiar with the customs regulations and procedures either. One of
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the reasons for this is explained by the fact that the adopted customs
regulations and procedures are based on certain international conven-
tions, that is the agreements the country in question has concluded,
and are not a result of the domestic judicial system, so they differ
greatly from the domestic legal norms. Due to a lack of knowledge of
specific customs procedures, the courts can sometimes overturn, in
the second instance, completely valid disciplinary measures of the cus-
toms administration.12 All these limitations of the judiciary in com-
bating customs corruption are based on the presumption that the
judiciary is not corrupt, i.e. that there is no connection between cus-
toms corruption and corruption in the judiciary. In many countries in
transition this presumption is very far from reality, which reduces the
likelihood that efficient penal policies can be applied to corruption at
the customs.
There are very few cases in which customs corruption produces
direct material evidence usable in criminal proceedings, i.e. in a trial.
One of the basic problems of effective implementation of a penal poli-
cy is thus the gathering of evidence. In doing this, the behaviour of the
corruptor is of the highest importance, as he is the key (most often also
the only) witness to the transaction (corruption), or the only witness to
the transaction with some (even very slight) incentive to talk about the
transaction. However, corruptors, or victims of corruption, very often
decide not to talk, thereby depriving the investigating or judicial organs
of the ground for trying and punishing corruption. There are several
reasons for such behaviour in corruptors and/or victims of corruption.
The first impression one often gets is that the whole organization (the
customs administration, but also the judiciary) is corrupt and that
there is no sense in reporting corruption to someone who is complete-
ly corrupted. A lack of knowledge of customs and state administration
often ties in with this, so that the victim of corruption does not know
which administration to turn to. The second factor is the feeling of
guilt because a bribe was paid, and in some cases there are also legal
grounds for the corruptor to be prosecuted, so that they have no incen-
tive to embark on the process of reporting corruption. Thirdly, compa-
nies as corruptors have very often gained certain advantages over the
competition through the corruption they entered into. Fourthly, cor-
ruptors are very often satisfied with the result and wish to continue
relations of corruption, so that any effort to report corruption is
against their interests.
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12 For example, in one country in transition, a corrupt customs official acted with bias
with relation to a client of his while determining the value of goods, i.e. the customs
tariff base. This went so far that the value of a new combination cooker was set at two
euros. The court overturned, in the second instance, a decision of the disciplinary
commission that the customs official in question should be dismissed, with the expla-
nation that, according to the law, customs officials were entitled to assess the value of
the goods (the customs tariff base) and that they were at liberty to assess them in any
way they saw fit.
All of the above shows that there are great difficulties in establishing
an efficient penal policy on customs corruption. Even when such a pol-
icy is established, it is very doubtful that it will be effective, i.e. if its
implementation will lead to a reduction in corruption, or merely to a
change in its structure into, possibly, an even more dangerous form of
corruption. An efficient penal policy may only disperse the small fry
among corruptors, and may well strengthen major, well-organized cor-
ruption.
General factors of corruption at the customs  demand for
corruption
Insufficient supply of customs services
The insufficient supply of regular customs services can very often be
the cause of demand for customs corruption. The basic occupation of
the customs administration is to ensure the unimpeded flow of goods
across borders. If the customs administrations capacity is insufficient,
or is used to an insufficient degree, there is a long queue at the border
cross points, which significantly increases importers costs. This creates
an incentive to jump the queue by bribing the customs officials, i.e. to
obtain perfectly legal services in that way  services which, in principle,
belong to everyone: the rapid transit of goods across the border, i.e. an
efficient customs inspection and levying the customs duties. Therefore,
insufficient resources lead to queues, and certain customs users are
ready to pay to jump the queue, i.e. in order to obtain a perfectly legal
service provided by the customs administration ahead of the queue. 
However, in some countries things have gone so far that regular cus-
toms inspections cannot even be performed unless the customs offi-
cials are bribed. In other words, customs users are illegally charged for
the legal customs service. Instead of the costs of this service being met
by the budget, as is provided for by law in all modern states, the greater
part of the customs administrations costs, above all the salaries of cus-
toms officials, are effectively met by revenue from corruption. In sever-
al countries, all revenue from this kind of corruption flows into a com-
mon fund, most often the fund of one customs post, and the total cor-
ruption revenue is then divided among all the employees. Therefore,
we are dealing with a type of institutionalised corruption. However, it
is important to recognize that this type of corruption relates to the pro-
vision of perfectly legal services by the customs administration, which
would not even be provided if it were not for the corruption.
A question arises as to the reasons that cause the capacities or
resources to be insufficient to meet the demand for regular customs
services. Generally, two answers, or corresponding situations, are
possible.
The first situation relates to actual circumstances, or the objectively
low probability of providing enough assets from the national budget
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for the efficient operations of the customs administration. In other
words, the limited budget causes limitations in the customs adminis-
trations nominal capacity, but these capacities are used to the fullest
degree. This may be the case in a fair number of developing countries 
poor countries with small budgets. Especially recently, as part of the
process of globalisation, there has been an increase in the volume of
foreign trade, and imports and exports of these countries have risen
significantly. There has thus been an increase in demand for customs
services, but the capacities of the customs administration have
remained unchanged.
The second situation arises if the existing capacities of the customs
administration are intentionally under-used, without regard to
whether these capacities are nominally sufficient to ensure the unim-
peded and rapid flow of goods across borders, i.e. for the efficient per-
formance of the entire customs procedure. The intentional under-use
of capacities in this case represents only a means of extorting bribes, or
a way of producing demand for corruption. If everything functions
without problems, for example, if there is no waiting/delays involved at
the border crossing, users of customs services have no need to bribe
anybody in order to get the regular service they are entitled to. Thus it
is necessary to create an incentive for customs users to, due to a long
wait for regular service, bribe customs officials in order to get such
service ahead of the queue. Therefore, it is the intentional creation of a
shortage, in order to produce demand for customs corruption.
Protectionism
A policy of protectionism represents the strongest source of demand
for corruption of customs officials. A policy of protectionism implies a
high level of customs protection of domestic products (high customs
duties on imported products), as well as the existence of numerous
non- tariff barriers to import (contingents, licences and quotas).13
Without looking into the reasons why states employ the protection-
ist policy of high customs rates, it must be said that such a policy gen-
erates significant demand for the corruption of the customs adminis-
tration, i.e. the higher the duty charged on an imported product, the
greater the incentive to the importer to evade payment of the duty or to
reduce it by corrupting a customs official. If, for example, the customs
tariff rate is 40%, for a consignment worth 1,000, 000 EUR, generally
speaking, it is profitable for the importer to pay any amount smaller
than 400,000 EUR, in the form of a bribe, in order to evade paying the
customs duties, since this increases profit. If the customs tariff rate goes
up to 50%, the mentioned amount of potential corruption, i.e. of
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requests for technical tests, as well as the extensive phyto-sanitary and veterinary pro-
tection when it comes to agriculture
potential demand of corruption goes up to 500,000 EUR. And with the
increase in this amount, the number of customs officials willing to sup-
ply the service of corruption rises as well. The level of corruption
increases, both in terms of the number of transactions and in the total
amount of bribes paid.
The lowering of the customs tariff rate, of course, produces the
opposite effect. For example, if it is 1%, it is most probable that there
will be no demand for corruption at all, since the importer would be
ready to pay up to 1,000 EUR in order to have the consignment
exempted from duty. If we take into consideration the transaction costs
of corruption, as well as the possibility of a sanction it would make
unreasonable for people to expose themselves to such a risk for such
small profit. Of course, in the case of imports without customs duties
(a regime of free trade) even the theoretical ground for the demand for
corruption disappears, since there is no potential rent, nor the possibil-
ity of elimination of the competition by means of corruption. 
Everything mentioned above is also true for non-tariff barriers to
import, bearing in mind that they offer, by their very nature, even
more scope for corruption. A regime of licences for the import of cer-
tain products inevitably leads to a decrease of their supply, i.e. a restric-
tion on the total quantity of those particular goods imported. Only
importers with licences specifying the quantity of imported merchan-
dise per transaction can import the allowed quantity of merchandise.
Thus the licences for import are unconditional and not transferable,
and they are issued in a non-transparent and non-competitive way.
Since such licences lead to the restriction of import an artificial
(administrative) fall in the total supply occurs (supply is below the
equilibrium level at the free market), which gives the importers who
possess a licence the possibility to appropriate economic profit. Issuing
import licences has not been the responsibility of the customs adminis-
tration (it is usually the job of the Ministry for Foreign Trade, or the
Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations), but the responsibilities of
the customs administration include monitoring, during customs
inspection, of whether the importer possesses a valid license for the
import of the goods (and quantity of goods) in the consignment. If the
importer did not manage to obtain a licence for import (regardless of
the way in which that licence can be obtained  legally or by corrup-
tion), the problem can be solved in a very simple way; by corrupting
the customs official who will not, afterwards, evaluate the real situa-
tion, but let the consignment pass, although the import licence is miss-
ing from the paper work. 
The same conclusions, more or less, refer to contingents, which by
their nature as non-tariff barriers to import are similar to import
licences, at least from the standpoint of corruption in the customs
administration. Namely, the distribution of contingents i.e. the right to
import a certain amount of a particular commodity, results in the issu-
ing of a specific licence for import within that contingent. If the
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importer did not manage to obtain such a licence, the only option left
is to import the merchandise, contrary to the actual legislation by cor-
rupting the customs official.
Finally, quotas also represent a non-tariff barrier to import. They
can be conditional and unconditional. Conditional quotas allow the
import of certain goods even above the amount specified by the quota,
but on that import a multiplied customs tariff rate is applied.
Unconditional quotas simply ban the import of certain goods above
the quantity or value specified by the quota. It is customary that gener-
al quotas (which refer to the total quantity of import, measured by
quantity or value) are applied, but special quotas can also be applied, as
part of the general quota, which refers to the single importer. In this
case too, the possibility to import certain goods is obtained by corrupt-
ing a customs official.
The elimination of non-tariff barriers through corruption, as a rule,
takes the form of letting the consignment pass. This is because, if duty
were levied on the consignment, written proof would remain that the
procedure for examining the import licence, i.e. the quotas had been
violated. Because of this corruption in these cases almost unavoidably
leads to passing the consignment, not registering the import, and not
charging customs duties on the consignment in question.
Of course, the greater the non- tariff barriers to import, i.e. the more
restrictive the policy of licences and quotas, the greater is the potential
rent that importers stand to retain. This results both in an increase in
the demand for corruption, and in the amount of the bribe which
importers are ready to offer to the customs officials for allowing the
consignment to pass illegally.
The high degree of regulations and complicated procedure
A protectionist external trade policy, as a rule, leads to proliferation
regulations on foreign trade activities. However, the high degree of
regulation, complicated procedure and non-transparent decision-
making process stimulate the generation of demand for corruption of
the customs officials even with a given level of protectionism. The
problem is that the customs administration is the key point in foreign
trade procedures which enables the application of the entire body of
foreign trade regulations. Thus, by corrupting the customs officials
that legislation is evaded and shortcuts are found within the compli-
cated regulation.
A typical example of this kind is restrictive legislation on the regis-
tration of foreign trade companies. If restrictive conditions for the
registration of foreign trade companies are introduced i.e. a regime of
compulsory licences for work related to the fulfilment of certain con-
ditions (licenses), foreign trade companies will be obliged to produce
such a license whenever they pass customs. Thus the incentive is cre-
ated for all companies which do not fulfil the mentioned restrictive
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conditions, that is for the companies that do not have a license, to
bribe the customs officials when performing an activity for which
they are not registered. In this way, the corrupted customs officials
overlook the fact that a certain foreign trade company does not have
all the paperwork necessary for the merchandise to receive clearance
in accordance with all the regulations.
Complicated procedure which stimulates corruption is associated
with the existence of a large number of different tariff rates applied
to similar products (HS tariff numbers). Under such conditions, the
temptation is great to offer a bribe to customs officials in return for
the misclassification of the goods under a different (inappropriate)
HS tariff number where the level of customs duty (tariff rate) is
much lower.
Complicated and non-transparent procedures for decision making,
and performing customs work, inevitably leaves great discretional
rights to the customs officials, and thus also creates space for their cor-
ruption, so that they will engineer a favourable outcome for the
importer using their discretional decisions.
SPECIFIC FACTORS OF CORRUPTION AT THE CUSTOMS
Most research on corruption, especially in countries in transition,
has demonstrated that the public has perceived the customs adminis-
tration as one of the most corrupted public services. Therefore, it is
necessary to examine the factors of corruption which are specific for
the customs administration i.e., the factors which do not exist in the
case of other civil services, and can be an additional reason for the
more widespread corruption at the customs.
Without disputing the existence of widespread corruption in the
customs administrations of various countries, especially of countries in
transition, it is necessary to point to the several factors which can lead
to an exaggerated assessment of the magnitude of corruption in the
customs administration. There are many situations in which the
unquestionable corruption is wrongly ascribed to customs officials.
Firstly, at each border crossing, travellers or the people who accompa-
ny the goods encounter a large number of civil servants who are not
customs officials. The first contact with the officials of a country is not
with the customs officials but with the border police. In the case of
shipment of goods, the procedure of crossing the border may include
sanitary, phyto-sanitary or veterinary inspectors. The officials of these
administrations are in a position to offer corruption i.e. to violate arm-
length principle in the conduct of the procedure of crossing the border.
Still, almost always, all these services are labelled as customs services
and the whole burden of the bad reputation of a corrupted service is
placed on the customs administration. Leaving aside the fact that, in
some cases, cooperation exists between the services mentioned, the
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customs officials are not necessarily the coordinators in the business
of supplying corruption. 
Furthermore, the contacts of the users of customs services with the
customs administration are often not direct, but carried out through
an intermediary. This especially refers to freight traffic i.e. the flow of
goods across the border, where the owner of the goods i.e. customers
of the customs administration is not directly in contact with the cus-
toms officials, but the whole procedure is carried out by a forwarding
agency (customs broking company), on his behalf. There is asymmet-
ric information between the clients of the forwarding companies and
the companies themselves i.e. the clients do not know all the details of
the activities of the forwarding company and the way it represents the
clients before the customs administration. The most important thing
for the client is that the goods cross the border quickly and therefore he
allows the forwarding agency a contingency fund to facilitate the
flow of goods i.e. to bribe customs officials. The clients do not know for
sure if their money was really used to bribe the customs officials, but
they take this for granted regardless of the fact that the forwarding
agency may have appropriated the money for themselves, there being
no need to bribe the customs officials. Nevertheless, in this way the
customs administration gains the reputation of being corrupt, regard-
less of the real magnitude of the corruption.
Finally, many users of the services of the customs administration,
especially when it comes to the travellers, were forced to leave their
belongings at the border (if they refused to pay the duties which were
above their expectations) or the goods were simply confiscated because
of infringements of the customs regulations. They wrongly belief that
customs officials keep the goods for themselves, which incorrectly
increases the perception of the customs administration as the most
corrupted civil service is perfectly natural (due to the loss of their
goods), even if incorrect.
Even bearing these errors of perception in mind, however, it is cer-
tain that the customs administration is among the most corrupted of
public services, at least in developing countries and countries in transi-
tion. Therefore, it is necessary to point to the specific factors which
govern supply and demand of corruption at the customs.
Specific factors of corruption supply at the customs
A consignment of goods and the people accompanying it cannot
avoid an encounter with the customs officials on entering the country.
The customs officials have the right to stop travellers and consign-
ments of freight at the border itself, and in some countries this right is
extended to the interior of the country. Avoiding such an encounter
with the customs officials i.e. avoiding the customs examinations rep-
resents the violation of the law. The inevitability of direct contact with
the potential supplier of a bribe places the customs officials in a very
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favourable position to demand such bribes i.e. to offer the service of
corruption. In this aspect the customs administration is significantly
different from other civil services where the probability of direct con-
tact with so large a number of people prepared to demand corruption
does not exist to such an extent. 
The next factor of corruption among customs officials is related to
the fact that they have physical contact with very valuable goods on a
daily basis, both in the case of travellers and cargo traffic. Often, in pas-
senger traffic, the customs officials meet very wealthy people. This cre-
ates additional temptation to offer the service of corruption i.e. to
accept bribes in return for preferential treatment when applying the
regulations. No other public service comes so regularly into contact
with such valuable goods and potential sources of bribes. Due to these
factors the supply of corruption at the customs is greater than in other
public services.
When it comes to passenger traffic, the customs official has a certain
psychological advantage over the traveller. That is, in the customs pro-
cedure itself the customs official has nothing to lose, whereas the pas-
senger, in a large number of cases has something to lose, i.e. the cus-
toms official can compel them to pay duties which will decrease his
welfare. So, the superior position of the customs official during the
encounter encourages him to offer biased treatment i.e. to offer cor-
ruption to the user of customs services. 
The geographical or regional element in staff-employment policy
of the customs administration certainly represent a significant factor
in the supply of corruption. Many of the customs officials come from
the border regions where they serve. In addition, very often the son
inherits position at the customs from the father, blood relations are
very strong, and sometimes there are relatives on the other side of the
border. Even if the customs official is a newcomer to the border
region, he easily finds his way around in the new surroundings. All
connections of this kind represent a suitable environment for the cre-
ation of corruption networks which facilitate procedures such as the
separation of the act of offering the service of corruption and paying
for the service. The mentioned strong network, which very often
reaches across the border, rarely exists within other public services,
which leads to the additional factor of corruption in the case of the
customs administration.
Finally, in a certain number of cases the services corruption at the
customs are paid in-kind, by goods from the consignment which was
the subject of preferential treatment by the customs administration.
The customs officials which charge their corruption services know very
well that, as a rule, such goods are insured, so that taking a certain
amount will not disadvantage the forwarding company or transport
operator with whom they are in direct contact, but only some anony-
mous insurance company which insured the cargo. Such depersonali-
sation of the costs of corruption leads to the increase of its supply.
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Specific factors of demand for corruption at the customs
The considerable powers of discretion of the customs officials are a
significant factor in creating demand for corruption at the customs.
Customs officials can undertake the search of any passenger, they can
bring about their arrest (by cooperation with the police), or they can
confiscate all property in the possession of a person who committed an
infringement of the customs regulations. Generally speaking, customs
duty should/could be levied on all goods that cross the border. All that
shows that the authorities (powers) of the customs officials are large,
and that application of these powers can lead to significant loss of the
income/wealth of the person crossing the border. Since the users of the
customs administration know all this, they have the incentive to pre-
vent the application of these authorizations by bribing the customs
officials.
That can best be seen by comparison of the authorizations of the
customs officials and border police who are in charge of passport con-
trol. In the case of customs control, generally speaking, there is a possi-
bility of levying duties at every crossing of the border which leads to
material losses of the people who cross the border. As opposed to that,
the border police is in charge of passport control, the only thing they
can do is to prevent somebody from entering the country, and for
something like that they need to have a very strong reason. The police
simply does not have the opportunity to charge any duty, therefore the
demand for corruption of the border police in charge of passport con-
trol does not exist.
Finally, all the people who cross the border in passenger traffic or
who are involved in the import of freight traffic know very well that the
customs officials have the discretional right to assess the value of the
consignment, i.e. to determine its market value, on the basis of criteria
defined in advance. In other words, there is an incentive to affect the
discretional decision by bribing the customs official i.e. to encourage
their biased decisions, which inevitably leads to an increase in the
demand for corruption. It is hardly possible that any other civil service
has such scope for making discretional decisions; this therefore consti-
tutes a specific factor in the demand for corruption at the customs.
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II Customs Officials on Corruption
in the Customs Administration
INTRODUCTION 
In the context of the general, burning problem of widespread cor-
ruption in Serbian society as a whole, corruption in the customs
administration has a special place. In several extensive public opinion
surveys carried out in the past few years, the customs service (together
with the police, the judiciary and the health service) was designated by
a majority of those questioned as the main bastion of corruption and
those employed in it as its major carriers. Some expert studies also
describe the customs administration as an important neuralgic point
from this point of view. 
Several major reasons that make such assessments plausible can be
suggested. The past ten-year period, marked by the disintegration of
the previous federation and the outbreak of inter-ethnic conflicts in the
region, the introduction of economic sanctions, high inflation and the
general impoverishment of citizens in Serbia proper, stimulated the
kind of economic activity naturally associated with corruption. State
representatives and citizens played an equal part in this. The reaction
of the governing regime to the countrys international economic isola-
tion was to suspend the internal legal order, that is to blur the borders
between legal and criminal activities in the economic sphere, justifying
their actions with economic and political expediency. Special state pro-
grams were designed to provide certain strategic products and main-
tain control over their trade through a more or less formal bond
between the heads of executive state authority (government, police,
customs, inspection and financial agencies) and a number of state
companies. The fact that some of the representatives of the interna-
tional community in charge of maintaining the wall of sanctions,
that is the economic isolation of the FRY, also played a part in this,
should also be borne in mind. Thus, corruption became one of the
levers in the conduct of the countrys economic policy (Medojevic,
2001)1. In turn, the societys defence reaction to the state of general
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(Customs Services), discussion at the round tale on corruption in Serbia, Firedrich
Ebert Stiftung, Belgrade 2001. 
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economic decline and adjustment to the conditions of social and legal
anomy was to escape to the grey zone of the economy and para-eco-
nomic activities. Most of these grey economy activities  unregulated
trade, smuggling, re-sale, speculative currency trading, money laun-
dering  were conducted with open or concealed, premeditated or
opportunistic corruption on the part of all civil servants, and most of
all (which is only natural) of those in the customs administration.
Corruption accompanied commerce in a wide range of primarily
strategic commodities (petrol), and other scarce goods for mass con-
sumption (coffee, cigarettes, toiletries and textiles). This kind of econ-
omy, in the previous period, not only met the needs of the state, allow-
ing some individuals to make enormous profits, but, for a large seg-
ment of the population, it was, (and indeed, still is) necessary, in order
for them to meet their basic needs. In this sense, both from the point of
view of the successful businessmen of our time, and the ordinary
citizen, bribing a customs official (and all those who participate in
cross-border trade) acquired major, even existential, significance. It is
therefore clear that this class of civil servant is open to extremely strong
corruption pressure.2
The second reason is connected with the nature of the political-eco-
nomic system. The continued survival of the decades old system of for-
eign trade inherited from the socialist period  characterised by exag-
gerated red tape, proliferation of regulations and paper-filing and
above all, the bureaucratic logic of import-export quotas  has legally
generated the phenomenon of bribery and corruption in the last ten
years. Such a system implies very extensive discretionary rights of civil
servants which, particularly under conditions of political voluntarism
and social anomy, and creates new openings for their enormous abuse.
In such circumstances a corruption problem becomes a systematic
problem in that it is connected with the dysfunction of the regulations
and institutions of the rule of law. This leads to the conclusion that the
phenomenon of corruption in such a specific state service as customs,
necessarily originates in the political sphere. Some analysts point to the
fact that a crisis in the system and government legitimacy is always
accompanied with the creation of clans, interest groups and godfa-
ther-connections, and this, in turn, results in the contamination of
institutions on all levels with corruption.3 The abuse of the existent for-
eign-trade system, import-export licences and customs regulations in
general always entails the existence of a bond between civil servants on
different levels and in different spheres, and crime. In such a bond cus-
toms officials naturally play a significant part; indeed they represent
one of the key links.
2 A public opinion survey in Serbia on the occurrence and practice of corruption carried
out at the beginning of 2001 revealed that citizens are most ready to give a bribe in case
of health services, getting employment and customs services, Corruption in Serbia,
CLDS, 2001.
3 N. Medojevic  ibid.
The last but not least important reason, is that the collapse of the
state sector as a whole, in the wake of transition, has led to the sudden
impoverishment of state employees. This was the case with the once
prosperous customs administration. This group of civil servants
(which is, as a whole, characterised by significant inertia in view of job
mobility) was, more than others, caught unprepared by social
change, precisely because they to they lacked the abilities and/or
opportunity to redirect quickly to other existential solutions.
Although they were, on average, less well educated, they were always
more secure in their employment and better-off than others employed
in the state sector. As a result they experienced more severely the effects
of so-called relative deprivation. Therefore, in the context of general
social deregulation and the immediate circumstances that their spe-
cific employment offers, they are often additionally motivated to resort
to para-legal ways of improving their relatively unfavourable position.
The three reasons described above which bring the customs admin-
istration into close connection with the temptations of corrupt behav-
iour  the nature of the conditions in which customs work is per-
formed, the characteristics of the political-economic system (in the
form of the rules and regulations under which the customs administra-
tion operates) that is, specific motivational factors, present among
Customs officials  are clearly not the only sources of this socially path-
ogenic phenomenon. Nonetheless, they are among the most important
in promoting the establishment and expansion of corruption in this
particular area of activity.
CORRUPTION IN THE CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDES OF
CUSTOMS OFFICIALS
A necessary part of a comprehensive study into the causes, manifes-
tations and development of corruption in the customs administration
is the investigation into its subjective (motivational) aspects. This will
supplement the analysis of the part played by the current economic
system, organisation of customs activity, positive customs regulations,
the general rules of the customs administration (such as organisation
and conditions of work, staff policy, disciplinary measures) and some
other non-psychological factors. This conclusion originates in the sim-
ple fact that the input of all the external factors influencing the appear-
ance and expansion of corruption in the customs administration, even
those which operate on the systematic or macro social level, is neces-
sarily refracted through the subjective experience of individuals
engaged in customs activity, which ultimately determines their behav-
iour in the real situation. It is our position that an investigation into the
subjective aspects of corruption in the customs administration must
entail an examination of a wide spectre of the attitudes, assessments
and opinions of customs officials that may, directly or indirectly, affect
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their susceptibility or resistance to the temptation of corruption. For
this purpose approximately 300 randomly selected customs officials4
were interviewed, in order to test not only their attitudes and opinions
on the phenomenon of corruption itself, but also other issues of poten-
tial significance in the context of the analysis and prevention of corrup-
tion among customs employees. 
The interview of the customs officials covered the following topics
or areas:
a. Knowledge and assessment of customs regulations;
b. Assessment of the scope of discretionary rights (powers in the
application of regulations);
c. Opinions on regulations governing the conditions of work and
employment in the customs administration;
d. Attitudes to and opinions about work motivation and work disci-
pline;
e. Attitudes to and evaluation of staff policy;
f. Attitudes to and opinions about staff training in the customs
administration;
g. Opinions about measures for the improvement of customs opera-
tions;
h. Assessment of opportunities for the abuse of powers and exposure
to corruption pressure;
i. Attitudes to and opinions about corruption occurrences and
measures for its suppression.
What follows are the surveys major findings and conclusions.
The knowledge of existent customs regulations and the evalua-
tion of their enforcement
At a general level, corruption is defined as a violation of the arms-
length principle by a civil servant with a high level of discretionary
rights, at the time of making a decision. The level of discretionary
rights vested in civil servants, generally speaking, is largely determined
by the very nature, clarity and quality of existent rules and regulations.
Consequently the spread of corruption in the customs administration
will be conditioned, among other things, by the very efficiency of cus-
toms officials in their work, in other words, how capable they are of
interpreting the existent customs regulations correctly and applying
them uniformly. Two factors make the problem of knowledge and
appropriate enforcement of regulations on the procedure for levying
duty pertinent. One is the present level of qualifications among those
employed, most of whom are high school graduates. The problem is
further complicated by insufficient and inappropriate training which
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4 The survey was carried out among 293 officials employed in the customs service: 31 of
whom are employed in federal customs administration, 55 in the customs and 199 in
customs control points. 
would suit the changed social circumstances and new forms of crime in
the customs zone, which will be discussed later. The other factor refers
to constant fragmentary changes and supplements of customs regula-
tions, instead of which we should have comprehensive legal reforms in
this sphere in the period of transition towards a market economy. 
When evaluating their own competence, i.e. familiarity with cus-
toms regulations, the customs employees graded themselves, overall,
with medium rather than high marks (Table 1).  The respondents said
that they were familiar with most of the regulations that they needed
for every day work, or that they were familiar with only some of the
regulations, in approximately the same numbers.
Only one fifth of those questioned said that they were familiar with all
customs regulations. Those working in customs border cross points,
who are more directly involved in the procedure of customs clearance,
have more complete knowledge of customs regulations than those
working in non-field areas of the administration. However, the find-
ings on better knowledge of regulations among those working on
immediate customs clearance jobs are made relative by the following
data: 57% of customs officials admit that they learn about customs regula-
tions in the course of work (practice), 35% in the course of specially
organised additional training and only 5% in the course of regular
schooling. Officials from custom-control points more often learn
about new regulations in the course of additional training, and those
from the central office on the basis of everyday practice. Constant
changes in customs regulations are one of the causes which do not
allow systematic adoption of knowledge from this sphere (in the course
of regular schooling). However, the data points to the problem that
there are no specialist schools (courses) for customs officials who are,
therefore, recruited from among secondary school graduates (of gener-
al course) or possibly, from among lawyers or economists. 
The customs officials positively evaluated the appropriateness of the
enforcement of customs regulations. 47% of those questioned believed
customs regulations were implemented in an appropriate manner in
most cases and 40% believed this was true in all cases in the service they
were employed, while only a small number of them were ready to
admit failings in this domain. 
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Table 1
How much far are You personally familiar with valid customs regulations? (in %)
With all 20
With majority 40
With some of them 35
Dont know 5
Total 100
Assessments of the scope of discretionary rights
The highly positive general assessments on the appropriate enforce-
ment of customs regulations are somewhat conflicting with the data
that a large number of customs officials (36%) believe that the existent
regulations and directions for work are relatively flexible, i.e. that they
allow a significant level of freedom in interpretation and enforcement.
As a matter of fact, only a little under 50% of those questioned believe
that the regulations are so uniform and precise that they do not allow
arbitrariness at the moment of making a customs decision. Customs
officials are also of the opinion that discretionary rights play a significant
role in enforcement of customs regulations. Nearly 42% of those ques-
tioned in the survey said that the authorisations of customs officials in
the interpretation of customs regulations and determination of cus-
toms procedure were very large or large, and only a little more than a
third that they were small or very small, while a fifth could not estimate
or did not want to answer this question. Customs officials working in
customs border cross points tend to underestimate the degree of their
discretionary rights. 
Two thirds of those employed in the customs administration admit that
they have difficulties in the enforcement of customs regulations. Three
equally important reasons are given which cause these difficulties: first-
ly, the imprecision of customs regulations (which, by rule, require
additional clarification), secondly regulations lumbered with guide-
lines and decisions within each customs border cross point which fur-
ther complicate their application and thirdly, the fact that the resources
available to the customs administration are insufficient to allow suc-
cessful performance of the job. Among the causes of difficulties in the
application of regulations, the shortage of resources available to the
customs administration is the one that is most often rated second in
importance (Table 2).
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Table 2
The most important causes of difficulties in the enforcement of customs regulations
I class II class
They are not precise 20.1 3.4
Too rigid 4.4 4.8
Burdened with additional guidelines and decisions 19.5 13.0
Burdened with political directives and pressures 4.8 7.5
Insufficient resources 19.5 24.9
Not enough employees 1.7 4.8
Not all regulations are available 2.0 5.5
Other 1.7 3.4
I have no difficulties in the enforcement of regulations 26.3 32.4
Opinions on regulations governing work and employment
conditions in the customs administration
The manner of regulating work and employment and in particular
measures designed to increase motivation for work and work discipline
play a significant role in the creation of conditions which will not allow
the occurrence of abuse and corruption in the service as a whole. Are
working conditions in the customs administration properly regulated
by rules and regulations and to what extent are they applied? 
In the context of current discussion on whether a pay-rise for those
employed in state sectors (in the judiciary, for instance) can help to
reduce corruption, the survey offers an important finding; namely, the
customs officials believe that the sphere of stimulation for performance at
work, that is different additional and stimulating forms of evaluation and
rewards for results, is totally unregulated. The institutions of premiums,
other benefits, different rewarding forms of promotion, standardisa-
tion and evaluation of results  do not exist in the work units in which
70  80 % of those questioned work. Disciplinary procedures and an
ethical codex are predominant instruments in motivating employees
in the customs administration to achieve better results and resist temp-
tations to abuse their official position. Instead of positively induced
motivation for work and maintaining work discipline in customs activ-
ity, the predominant measures are clearly punishments and the feeling
of guilt (this means, the application of external or internal sanc-
tions). With disciplinary measures not being properly regulated,
according to those questioned, and the adopted rules not being imple-
mented consistently and completely, regular pay (salaries) remains the
only means of differential reward and encouragement for better work
and higher discipline. However, the efficiency of this measure is
reduced by the fact that salaries in budget-funded institutions (today as
in the previous system) are the instruments of unjust levelling rather
than positive stimulation. This opinion is shared by almost a half of the
questioned customs officials who said that neither the sphere of pay-
ment of salaries nor the policy of employment, investment in human
resources and training was properly regulated. These findings lead to
certain conclusions about the prospects and measures for the suppres-
sion of corruption in the customs administration. It becomes clear that
the current measures of rewarding and punishing, and even the con-
cepts such as deserving your job or risking its loss can by no means
be sufficiently effective in this sense.
Motivation for work and work discipline
Methods of positive motivation
The above given conclusions are, to a certain degree, confirmed by
the opinions of customs officials on the best ways to motivate people
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to do their job well specifically in the customs service. A significant
number of the employees believe that measures of positive motivation
are far more efficient than punishment. According to those questioned,
the provision of high basic earnings (good salaries) is doubtless the best
way to motivate customs employees to work better (79% of those ques-
tioned give this first class importance). Although other additional
forms of stimulations (work evaluation and promotion, existence of
bonus and premiums, cash rewards) are more often given second
rather than first class importance, if all given answers are taken into
account almost equal importance is given to them. Other measures
such as training opportunities (8% in total), the existence of competi-
tion in getting employment (6% in total), respect for professional
ethics (4% in total) and others, are mentioned far less. The importance
of disciplinary measures is stressed in only about 4% of cases (Table 3).
In connection with these findings a question may be asked: what fac-
tors, according to those employed in the customs administration, affect
most their position and treatment in the organisation they work.
Judging by the average mark of importance6 given to individual condi-
tions which determine the position of employees, competence (3.2)
and results (3.0) are stressed as the most important, while connections
(2.0) and bribes (1.6) are estimated as the least important. Looking at
the percentages of given answers we can see that the criterion of com-
petence is deemed the most important by 76%7 of those questioned,
good results by 71%, family and political connections by 36% and 30 %
respectively and giving presents and bribes by only 17% (Table 4).
The relationship with superiors is also mentioned as a significant crite-
rion in the treatment of employees with relatively high frequency. 
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Table 3
Which is the best way to motivate customs officials to work better?
I class II class The total number
of answers5
Competition in getting employment 4.1 1.7 5.8
Good salaries 79.2 8.5 87.7
Bonuses and premiums 3.4 17.1 20.5
Other kinds of benefits 8.2 6.8 15
Work evaluation and promotion 0.7 44.0 44.7
Training opportunities 0.3 7.8 8.1
Disciplinary measures 2.4 7.8 10.2
Professional ethics 0 4.1 4.1
Doesnt know. doesnt want to answer 1.7 2.0 3.7
5 The total number of percentages of answers in I and II class. .
Ways of evaluating work performance
The given assessments beg the question whether and in what way the
competence and performance of those employed in the customs
administration are evaluated, i.e. whether their subjective assessments,
that these are the criteria which primarily determine their treatment
and position at work, can be objectively confirmed. The findings on the
procedure for the selection of candidates for work in the customs
administration (which are shown below) reveal that their previous
work experience and qualifications i.e. their competence was not the
decisive criterion. Furthermore, according to those questioned, indi-
vidual work performance in their work unit is evaluated (regularly or
occasionally) in only 47% of cases, while in 22% of cases  it is never
evaluated. In these cases when there is a practice of work performance
evaluation the applied criteria are, in the opinion of the majority of
customs officials, completely clear and acknowledged (50%), but a
little less than a third of those questioned believe that they are totally
unclear and unacknowledged. The employees are evidently divided in
their opinion whether the applied criteria of work evaluation are
completely just (55%) or completely unjust (38%).
Disciplinary measures  means of punishment and their application 
Although the official form of disciplinary measures is worked out in
detail in a significant number of work units, they are, according to the
assessments of those questioned, enforced inconsistently. The discipli-
nary measures most frequently mentioned by those questioned are
transfer (25%), dismissal from work (22%), followed by suspension
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Table 4
What affects most the position and treatment of employees
in the customs administration?
Criteria Very important and Average
fairly important (in %)
Competence 76.5 3.18
Good performance 71.4 3.02
Relationship with superiors 65.6 2.80
Rank 58.7 2.65
Length of employment 47.8 2.80
Family connections 35.5 2.10
Political connections 30.4 2.00
Giving presents and bribes 16.7 1.60
6 Average mark from 1 = totally unimportant to 4 = very important.  .
7 We give total percentage of answers fairly important and very important. 
Corruption at the Customs
(7%), public reprimand or warning (4%) and pay-cut (3%). About one
fifth of the questioned customs officials said that nobody has been
punished in their work unit. Punishment of an employee most often
results from poor performance at work (24%) or accepting a bribe
(12%). Cases of punishment due to absence from work, conflicts with
superiors and embezzlement were also mentioned. The customs offi-
cials are, generally speaking, reluctant to speak about this subject:
almost 1/3 does not know or want to answer the question on the
application of disciplinary measures and reasons thereof. Reluctance to
speak about the instances of sanctioning bad work and abuse of official
position is particularly manifest in the case of starting criminal proceed-
ings against a customs official for corruption (accepting bribe). Although
1/3 refused to answer such a question, the finding that only 1/5 of par-
ticipants in the survey admitted that such proceedings had been insti-
tuted in their work unit in the past several years indicates that the prac-
tice of cooperation with investigative and judiciary bodies in the strug-
gle against all forms of abuse including corruption in the customs
administration is insufficiently developed. 
Additional measures for the improvement of work discipline
The survey also included a question on the possible existence of
additional measures which can help the improvement of work and
maintenance of work discipline among customs employees. The ques-
tion referred to the possibility of a client lodging a complaint or mak-
ing comments on the work of a customs official. According to the
questioned customs officials, the most common form of this kind of
control over their work is the option of lodging a complaint about the
work of a customs official by telephone or in the form of a written
complaint, while the possibility of direct reception of a client by a superi-
or or confrontation of the customs official with the client are far less com-
mon. Users complaints very rarely (0  20% of the cases) lead to a
punishment of those guilty of a failing. 
Attitudes to and evaluations of human resources (HR) policy 
The conduct of HR policy appears to be one of the weakest links in
the organisation of the customs administration. The problem of
employing the new staff became particularly topical after the fall of the
former government, for two reasons. One is of a psychological nature,
since in the previous period the customs administration was almost in
its entirety (justly or not) associated with the concepts of abuse and
machinations. The second reason is the objective fact that the criteria
for employment in the customs administration are arbitrary, which is
testified to by the data obtained from this survey. The most active peri-
od for employing the new staff during the time of the previous regime
was between 1994 and 1999: almost 50% of the questioned employees
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got their jobs in the customs in this period. Judging by their statements
the personnel change was thorough, since as many as 2/3 had never
before worked in similar jobs. This should be compared with the fol-
lowing data, according to 46% of those questioned, only a few employ-
ees from their work unit were removed (transferred to a lower posi-
tion, into another organisation or dismissed) in the period after the
government change, while in 27% of cases none of the former customs
officials were subjected to such disciplinary measures. These estimates
lead to the conclusion that after the last government change no essential
personnel change has been performed, except for the dismissal of chief
executives, in other words the work is still done by the same officials. 
The present period is characterised by a significant stability of person-
nel within the customs administration as a whole. Only in work units
(customs control points) is there a customary simulated manner of
personnel change  the principle of rotation, i.e. periodic transfers into
other work units  this precisely in order to prevent abuse of official
position. According to those questioned, in normal circumstances
transfers are most often carried out without any rules (surprise factor);
in 3% of cases there is a weekly, in 6% monthly, 3% half-annual and in
1% annual rotation. Only about ten of those questioned said that there
were no transfers of employees in their work unit. Rotation is, appar-
ently, one of the most common methods for the prevention of corruption in
the customs. This means that personnel change in the customs
administration is performed primarily on the basis of rotation, i.e. hor-
izontal transfers of employees to other customs units, but far less by
employing new workers. (Table 5)
The scale of the problem of HR change and HR policy in general in
this state institution is also testified to by the data that only 32% of the
questioned customs officials learnt about the job vacancy in the cus-
toms administration from an advertisement in the daily press. A far
larger number of employees were recruited following personal infor-
mation from acquaintances already employed in the customs adminis-
tration (29%), internal information within the customs (27%) or in
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Table 5
The most common ways of personnel change (in %)
Ways %
Employing new people 10.6
Retirement or dismissal 5.5
Transfer to another customs unit 56.3
Transfer to lower position 3.1
Transfer to higher position 3.8
Other 3.8
Does not know 17.1
some other manner (10%). This means that there are serious indica-
tions that connections play a significant part in personnel recruitment
in the customs administration, which naturally implies the possibility of
subjective rather than objective criteria being applied in the selection of
candidates. It was noticeable that a number of customs officials con-
cealed this fact since the answers to the question Did you know any-
body in the customs administration before you got your job? were
divided. 51% of the customs officials said that they had not known
anyone. The other half admitted to having known someone in the cus-
toms administration, these contacts being: 13% - senior managers,
17% - customs officials, 8% administrative workers, 4% junior man-
agers and 6% someone else either in or outside the customs adminis-
tration (in total 47.4%). 
Motivation for employment in the customs administration
A study into motives for choosing the job of customs official may be
useful not only for the analysis of conditions which favour successful
operations of this institution, but also from the aspect of abuse preven-
tion in this sector. Judging by the findings, the customs administration
shares the fate of other state institutions where those who seek employ-
ment are primarily motivated by the desire for a stable and secure job
(56%). Satisfaction in work as a primary motive was given by no more
than 14% and not being able to find any other job by 13 % of those
questioned. This means that the motivation for work in the customs
administration is mainly negative. Indirectly, this affects personnel
selection which is also adverse. People with low ambitions, those who
cannot find a job somewhere else or those who, due to their qualifica-
tions, have no chance of finding employment anywhere, apply for a job
in the customs and get it thanks to their connections. 
Negative motivation is also manifested in the fact that fear of job loss
is not common among those employed in the customs (34% are not
scared at all and 27% not much).
Methods of personnel selection
One of the preventative methods in combating abuse and corrup-
tion in the customs administration is the correct selection of human
resources, i.e. employees. In addition to subjective factors partly
applied in the recruitment of new customs officials, the customs
administration apparently has problems in the correct selection of can-
didates. In just over 55% of cases the appropriate and systematic proce-
dure of job selection based on personal interview was applied.
Primarily people from the customs administration acted as interview-
ers, while in only 9% of cases interview was conducted by an expert and
independent third party. Previous experience and qualifications
were checked in only 57% of cases, while in 41% of cases, according to
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those questioned, there was no check-up of this kind!? A written apti-
tude test was applied in 41% of the cases, and appropriate psychologi-
cal tests in 36% of cases. Only a small number of customs officials were
required to provide recommendations from their previous superior or
teacher (17%), but one tenth of check-ups consisted of recommenda-
tions given by acquaintances (12%). (Table 7)
45Customs Officials on Corruption in the Customs Administration
Table 6
Motivation for work in the customs administration
Reasons First important Second important 
reason reason
Job security 56 18
Salary 3 12
Different benefits 1 1
Working hours 1 4
Moderate workload 0,5 4
Training abroad 0,5 3
Improvement opportunities 4 8
Satisfaction in work 14 21
Social status 1 1
Power 0 0
Helping friends 0 0
Additional income 0 0
Failing to find another job 13 11
Getting a flat 2 9
Spring board 0 2
Other 4 5
Without answer 0 1
Total 100 100
Table 7
When you applied for this job which methods were used to check your aptitude?
Methods used % of cases8
Interview with someone from the customs 55
Interview with an independent third party 9
Insight into qualifications 57
Aptitude test 41
Superiors references 17
Recommendations from an acquaintance 12
Psychological tests 36
8 Those questioned could list all methods of selections used, so the data gives the percent-
age of cases not those questioned. 
Those employed in the customs also believe that competence is not
always decisive in getting the job. This kind of criterion (and all those
related to competence) is stressed in somewhat less than 2/3 of all
answers. 37% of the customs officials believe that appropriate school
qualifications are the decisive factor for getting a job in the customs
administration, 32% believe it is ability and knowledge and 2% work
experience. The existence of certain kinds of privileges and partiality in
getting the job is recognized by nearly 1/5 of those questioned (16%
emphasise connections, 1% political loyalty, 1% bribes and 1% other
kinds of bias). About 10% of those questioned did not want to answer
this question. 
Attitudes and opinions on the personnel training process
The right training for personnel may significantly reduce abuse of
discretionary rights by those employed in the customs. In connection
with this, there are certain problems in the customs administration
which may reflect not only on the occurrence of corruption in this
sphere but also on its operations in general. While giving their opin-
ions on the process of personnel training the questioned customs offi-
cials pointed out several most important problems. Interestingly, the
customs officials did not put emphasis on the quality of the existent
training as much as on limited opportunities for training (33%), main-
ly due to the limited budget resources earmarked for this form of
improvement of customs activity (41%). The problem of inappropriate
primary selection of employees worth investing in through additional
training was placed third in importance. Critical comments about the
successfulness of the existent forms of training were also frequently
made, however, this problem was given a lower level of importance.
(Table 8) 
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Table 8
Major problems in connection with personnel training
in the customs administration
Problems The most Second in 
important importance
Limited training opportunities 33 27
Insufficient budget resources 41 30
Inappropriate personnel selection 17 16
Inappropriate training 3 8
Insufficiently successful training 2 10
Other 2 3
Does not know 2 6
Total 100 100
Priority measures for the improvement of the operations of the
customs administration
The opinions of those employed on measures for the improvement of
work in their work unit or customs control point regard mainly the pro-
vision of better material work conditions. Measures regarding the improve-
ment of personal material position of the employees are given priority (in the
sense of pay-rise, their more regular payment, performance related
reward etc.  which make up 60% of the answers). Far less importance is
given to different measures which would provide for the improvement of
the conduct of work in the customs or its modernisation. Thus 17%
advocated allocation of large budget resources for the customs work as a
priority task, 20% better organisation of the work as a whole (more com-
petent personnel, more employees, better equipment, better work organ-
isation, team work, better training etc), and only 3% of those questioned
advocated more independence in work (in the sense of absence of influ-
ences from outside, more independence in managing customs work,
absence of political influence and employees participation in decision
making). A somewhat clearer picture of priorities stressed by those
employed in the customs is obtained when all the given answers are added
up (since it was possible to give three most important measures for work
improvement). In the second and third class of importance, in addition to
rewarding employees, differential measuring of results is mentioned, as
well as the improvement of the customs equipment and modernisation of
customs procedure. Relative frequency of individual measures, when all
answers are added up, is shown in Table 9.
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Table 9
Three best measures for the improvement of work in customs-control points/units
Measures % of total number of answers9
Bigger budget 10
Regularity in fund supply 3
More employees 2
More competent personnel 5
Better training 7
Higher salaries 29
Bigger independence for managers 1
Absence of political influence 3
Result related rewards 11
Better equipment 13
Better organisation 7
Better staff relations 6
Employees participation in decision making 3
9 Cumulative percentages are given here, i.e. the percentage of individual answers in rela-
tion to the total number of given answers. 
This frequency of answers leads to the conclusion that those
employed in the customs lay three times more importance on the
increase in their salaries (as the major measure for the improvement of
work in the customs administration) than better equipment in the cus-
toms, and four times than on the improvement of work organisation in
it. Obviously, these findings support the view (which was expressed by
the general manager of the customs administration himself) that no
amount of modernisation of the customs will have any effect as long as
customs officials salaries remain at the present level. 
Assessments of opportunities for abuse of powers and exposure
to corruption pressure
It was impossible to measure directly the exposure to corruption
pressure. Namely, this issue is so sensitive that the Customs officials are
unlikely to talk openly about the temptations they are exposed to.
Therefore we resorted to more indirect ways to establish whether cus-
toms officials are exposed to temptations to abuse their rights, that is,
whether their decisions are influenced by structures inside or outside
the Customs. In any case, this subject caused considerable self-censor-
ship in the expression of opinions, and thus a considerable division in
the assessments of those questioned.
A large number of customs officials (1/3) were obviously reluctant to
specify openly the opportunities for abuse in their work, although they
did not want to deny their existence  therefore they avoided a clear
answer to the question if the existent powers of customs officials in the
course customs clearance procedures allow such occurrences ( I do
not know, I do not want to answer). According to one fourth of
those questioned the existing authorisations allow and even increase
(considerably or somewhat) the occurrence of abuse by those who
directly perform the job. On the other hand, a little more than a third
of those questioned believe that present regulations (somewhat or con-
siderably) reduce such a possibility, and about one tenth believe that
present powers allow no abuse at all. 
There is even less readiness to identify some important persons who
can influence decisions on the customs procedure and the course of
customs clearance. Even 38% of those questioned completely rejected
such a possibility (answer never), while 35% avoided answering.
Nonetheless, over one quarter said that such things occurred some-
times (21%), often (5%) or always (1%). Far fewer of those questioned
were ready to identify the structures which try to affect the customs
clearance procedure (only 20%). Among the given answers the most
commonly identified were the high officials of the Customs adminis-
tration itself (8%), then government members or administrators (8%),
party leaders (over 4%) and finally other people outside the customs
(3%). The conclusion that can be drawn from such a distribution of
answers refers more to the fact that different forms of corruption pressure
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still exist in this sphere, rather than to the assessment of its scope and
how deep-rooted it is. 
Customs officials attitudes to and opinions on corruption
occurrences 
Finally, we come to the key question of this survey and that is the
understanding of the problem of corruption and attitudes to it of those
employed in the customs administration. Clearly, opinions on corrup-
tion, i.e. attitudes in principal, never reflect the actual state of affairs in
view of possible participation in the practice of corruption. Their analy-
sis, however, may indicate the degree to which this phenomenon is tol-
erated and thus indirectly shed light on (psychological) conditions
which favour its spread. The assessments of seriousness of the corrup-
tion problem in the country made by the customs officials show that the
degree of their readiness to face it is reduced proportionally to the proxim-
ity of the assessment referential framework. Hence, they see corruption as
a serious problem in the society as a whole (72% of answers), medi-
um to serious problem in the customs in general (39%, that is 36%)
- and as a non-existent problem (51%) or a minor one (23% of answers)
in their specific customs control-point or work unit (Table 10). 
This finding shows, perhaps better than any other, that indeed, we
have a problem with corruption in the customs administration. Be it a
case of concealment of facts or avoiding clear awareness of them, cer-
tainly corruption in the customs will not be reduced as long as the
employees (just as in the case of alcoholism) refuse to face its existence
openly. Most customs officials agree that corruption is a very harmful
phenomenon against which we should fight in every possible way
(65%). But this phenomenon is also something that has always been
and always will be no matter what we think of it or at least 27% believe
so. Customs officials attitudes to this issue are almost exactly the same
as public opinion in Serbia in general10. According to their assessments,
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Table 10
How serious a problem is corruption (in %)
Does not Small Medium Serious Does 
exist not know
In society as a whole 3 3 21 72 1
In the Customs in general 8 16 39 36 1
In your customs control
point/work unit 51 23 16 10 1
10 A similar question asked in a survey on corruption in 2001 almost the same percentages
of answers were received. Corruption in Serbia, CLDS, 2001
corruption in society as a whole is today just slightly less widespread
than five years ago (56% of answers very much and much, compared
to 63% of the same answers given for the previous period). Although
the biggest number of them was unable to assess the scale of corruption
in the future, nonetheless a reduction in corruption is expected in the
coming five-year period (Table 11).
Customs officials were not asked to make assessments of changes in
the scale of corruption in the customs administration itself since they
were quite likely to show the present state of affairs in an unrealistic
and improved way. They were, however, asked an indirect question,
how widespread this phenomenon was among civil servants in general
and the following answers were given (Table 12):
On the ground of the above distribution of answers the conclusion
can be drawn that one quarter of customs officials see civil servants as a
group generally prone to corruption (i.e. believe that in such practice
almost all or a majority of them are involved) while more than half
believe that it is a sporadic occurrence since only some are involved.
A certain number of those questioned (20%) refused to speak out on
this point, which only confirms the previously expressed assumption
that some customs officials are not ready to face this problem. The
received answers are not totally equivalent to those obtained two years
ago in a survey on a general sample of Serbian population (primarily,
due to changes which took place in society in the meantime), so it is
worth remembering that as many as 2/3 of citizens believed that
almost all or a majority of employees in state institutions are prone
50 Corruption at the Customs
Table 11
Opinions on the level of corruption five years ago, today and in five years time
Very Low Medium High Very Dont Total
low high know
Five years ago 2 6 13 30 33 16 100
Today 3 10 28 27 16 16 100
In five years 14 15 13 6 8 44 100
Table 12
Assessments of how widespread corruption is among civil servants (in %)
Almost everybody is involved in it 5
Majority are involved 21
Only some are involved 54
Almost no one is involved 0
Dont know/without answer 20
to corruption.11 Bearing in mind the influence of the changed social
context and the expected biased in self-assessment of those questioned,
they can be said to have expressed a rather high level of (self) criticism.
Such assessments can be interpreted also as warning signals that cor-
ruption is still significantly present in all domains of civil administra-
tion, even in the one closest to the experience of those questioned  in
the customs administration. 
Major causes of corruption were most often seen in the general
poverty of the society (33%) and civil servants small salaries (28%).
This means that corruption was primarily seen as a product of materi-
al deprivation, i.e. as a reaction impoverishment and deprivation. In
such a cause theory ethical reasons (general moral crisis) which
appeal to the personal responsibility of corruption agents, were half
less frequent (16%) (Table 13).
All other possible causes of corruption were mentioned only sporad-
ically. The fact that we live in the economy of austerity, i.e. personal
poverty, for many (including customs officials) is not only an explanation,
but also a justification for corruption in general, even for their own possi-
ble participation in it.
The employees opinions on the most efficient measures for the pre-
vention of corruption are completely consistent with the understand-
ing that poverty is the major motive which forces everyone, including
civil servants, to tolerate corruption. Priority is given to pay rises (67%
of those questioned put this measure in the first place), and consider-
ably less frequent are measures such as better supervision, change in
legislation, more frequent rotation of the employees, education etc.
When the frequency of individual measures in the total number of
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11 Corruption in Serbia, CLDS, 2001 .
Table 13
Opinions on the most important causes of corruption in society
Causes % answers
Poverty 33
Moral crisis 16
Bad legislation 4
Heritage from previous regime 5
War, sanctions 1
Political-economic system 3
Lack of control 5
Civil servants small salaries 28
Human nature 1
Dont know 4
answers is analysed12, bigger salaries also take first place, far ahead of
all others (Table 14). 
Clearly, in this sphere, just like in the judiciary, there is a very wide-
spread belief that the temptations of official position abuse can be sup-
pressed almost exclusively by better remuneration, while all other means
(supervision, education or change in service organisation and rules) have
far less importance and influence on administrators behaviour. Such
attitudes should be viewed in the light of the finding that 80% of those
questioned in our survey say that they have no other income except the
one from their employment in the customs and 89% that their income
is insufficient to cover basic living costs. 
MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
The basic difficulty confronted by the survey of attitudes to corrup-
tion among civil servants (as its subjective determinants) is the large
influence that social desirability exerts on the answers of those ques-
tioned. The conclusions drawn from the answers simply must take into
account the fact that social reality is likely to be shown better that it
objectively is, precisely because corruption (at least at its principal
level) is a phenomenon utterly condemned in society. Specifically, this
means that in such surveys civil servants (in this case  customs offi-
cials) can be expected to show a significant tendency to overestimate
their own competence for the job and at the same time to underesti-
mate significantly the danger from their own abuse of official position.
Therefore, only after reading between the lines, i.e. after refocusing
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Table 14
Which are the three most efficient measures against corruption
(cumulative percentages of answers)
Measures % of given answers
Better legislation 14
More frequent rotation of employees 11
Better control and supervision 17
More confidence in judiciary 3
Better cooperation with the police 3
Bigger salaries for customs officials 34
Better organisation of customs procedure 8
Fewer discretionary rights for customs officials 3
Educational measures 7
12 Each of those questioned could give three measures they believe to be the most effica-
cious. The given numbers are percentages of all the given answers. 
attention to seek out contradictions, which as a rule follow all attempts
to gloss over reality, can one see the real state of affairs. This means to
spot neuralgic points in the functioning of the customs administra-
tion, those which allow or facilitate the occurrence of corruption and
can be significant in planning a future strategy for its uprooting in this
sector of state services. Our findings indicate several such neuralgic
points or problems which are most probably closely connected with
different forms of abuse in the customs administration. 
In the first place we stress the problem of quality of customs rules
and regulations and in connection with this, the knowledge and appro-
priate application thereof by customs officials. There is a symptomatic
discrepancy in the assessments of customs officials which refer to their
own competence in the application of regulations as well as to the
work of the customs administration in general. Most of them, on the
one hand, say that they are reasonably familiar with customs regula-
tions and that they apply them appropriately in practice. At the same
time, however, a large number of customs officials say that in the
application of regulations there is a significant input of discretionary
rights of the customs official himself and that the application of regu-
lations is made difficult due to their imprecision, a multitude of addi-
tional guidelines and lack of material resources. Clearly there are two
inter-connected aspects in the operations of the customs administra-
tion which, due to their shortcomings, may significantly affect and
even stimulate the occurrence of corruption. The first is the inade-
quate quality of regulations passed in this sphere (imprecise, require
additional interpretation, leave too much room for discretionary deci-
sions), and the second is their inappropriate interpretation and appli-
cation. The problem of quality of customs regulations is spoken about
directly by customs offices themselves, while the problem of training
for work in the customs is indirectly pointed to by the surveys data.
The fact that only one fifth of customs officials know all customs reg-
ulations, i.e. that most of them (almost two thirds) get to know the
regulations only in the course of work, and one third in the course of
additional training leads to the conclusion that the training is not
appropriate and systematic enough. The data also indicates that the
problem with the training for customs work is primarily connected
with limited (material) resources.
Human resources policy and employment conditions represent the
next critical moment in the functioning of the customs adminis-
tration which is, at the same time, the weakest link in the organisa-
tion of operations. Our data shows that after the change of govern-
ment no adequate personnel change has been performed as yet,
except for the change of top people. However, personnel discontinu-
ity could be seen as a very important psychological and organisa-
tional premise for the break-up of a corruption chain welded in the
previous period in this sphere. The most intensive intake of new
people took place in the period from 1994 to 1999, when more than
53Customs Officials on Corruption in the Customs Administration
a half of todays customs officials were employed, the majority of
whom had not previously worked in similar jobs. This points to the
arbitrariness in the conduct of personnel policy, which becomes
especially alarming when bearing in mind serious indications that in
the recruitment of workers subjective evaluation criteria (connec-
tions) played a more important role than the objective ones (apti-
tude). Irregularities in the selection of candidates for jobs in the
Customs and the existence of partiality in this process are directly
reflected on the occurrence of official abuse, since they aid the estab-
lishment of clans and cliques without which organised forms of cor-
ruption and crime would not be possible at all. 
Work conditions and motivation for work are also potentially
important factors for the spread of corruption in this activity. The
customs administration shares the fate of all budget funded institu-
tions which do not offer opportunities to their employees to earn
high salaries legally, but instead they offer bigger job security and
various other privileges, the biggest of which is precisely the entitle-
ment to wide discretionary rights. Therefore the employees ambi-
tions may be directed more to try and use these rights and privileges
to their maximum, and less to achieve work satisfaction and self
improvement. It is against this background that we should view the
fact that motivation for getting a job in the customs administration
is today primarily negative; there is considerable dissatisfaction with
salaries and no worked out system of additional stimulation and
reward. The predominant belief among customs officials, that secur-
ing high salaries is the major means for encouragement of better
work and prevention of abuse and that disciplinary measures are not
enough for this purpose, is in obvious collision with the widespread
practice of struggle against corruption in the Customs which boils
down to putting out the fire (the application of disciplinary meas-
ures and punishment) instead of preventative (positive motivation
of employees). Although the treatment of employees, according to
their own statements, is primarily determined by their aptitude and
work results, there are indications that it is also affected by factors
such as the relationship with superiors, family and political connec-
tions and even giving presents and bribes, i.e. the kind of customary
right which is, as a rule connected with corrupt behaviour in the real
sense of the word.
The nature of the existent disciplinary and corrective measures in the
customs administration is such that it does not allow adequate treat-
ment or prevention of the occurrence of corruption. The results of
employees are assessed irregularly or not at all and disciplinary meas-
ures (which are, in most work units, envisaged and defined) are not
consistently applied. The data shows that major reasons for punish-
ment are poor work (whatever is understood by that) and taking
bribes, however, it is difficult to obtain more reliable information on
this, since customs officials are unwilling to talk about the sanctioning
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of corrupt behaviour. The most common forms of punishment are
transfer and dismissal of employees, while a small number of cases of
initiated criminal proceedings can indicate the insufficiently developed
practice of cooperation with investigative and judiciary bodies in the
struggle against all forms of abuse including corruption. The absence
of the kind of corrective measures designed at work improvement and
getting feedback from clients i.e. service users themselves is especially
noteworthy. There are limited possibilities to lodge a complaint against
a customs procedure and the practice of confronting the customs offi-
cial with the client hardly exists at all. In any case, a very widespread
measure for the prevention of corruptive behaviour  rotation of
employees i.e. transferral to other customs control points  has obvi-
ously proved insufficient. 
The assessments on opportunities for abuse of official powers and the
exposure to corruptive pressure may be significant determinants of
corruptive behaviour. Due to a large number of those who
abstained from answering the survey it is impossible to establish
positively whether the above is true and to what degree. Certainly,
opinions among the customs officials on opportunities for the
abuse of official position allowed by the present rules of service are
divided. Generally speaking, this is a sensitive issue which is dis-
cussed reluctantly, consequently as many as one third of those ques-
tioned avoided giving answers. There are, however, some indica-
tions that customs officials are confronted with different forms of
corruptive pressure: most often from their superiors (high officials
in the customs), then from different political agents from outside
the customs and lastly from third parties. These findings should
be viewed in the light of the fact that most customs officials believe
that temptations for the abuse of official position can be suppressed
almost exclusively by better remuneration, while all other means
(supervision, education or changes in service organisation and
rules) are not efficacious.
Finally, the employees attitudes to corruption in general prove, in an
indicative manner, that in this sphere there is not sufficient readiness
to face this phenomenon. The attitudes are inconsistent and ambiva-
lent. Although most customs officials principally condemn corruption
as a very harmful phenomenon which should be fought against in
every possible way, a large number of them believe that it is some-
thing that has always been and always will be no matter what we
think. The degree of readiness to face the corruption problem is
reduced when the referential framework becomes narrower. This
means that customs officials admit that corruption in society is a very
widespread phenomenon and see civil servants as a group prone to
corruption, but they insufficiently recognize the same phenomenon in
their own environment. Moreover, for many customs officials the fact
that we live in the economy of austerity, i.e. their own poverty is a suf-
ficient explanation and perhaps even a justification of corruption in
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general, and even their possible participation in the practice. These
findings show, perhaps better than anything else, that there is indeed a
corruption problem in the customs administration. Only when (in
addition to the introduction of all other external, preventative and
curative measures) the employees become thoroughly conscious of its
existence, causes and severe consequences, will it be possible to uproot
corruption in this sector.
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III Clients on Corruption at the Customs
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will try, on the basis of the empirical data at our
disposal, to investigate the problem of corruption in a crucial civil
service - the customs administration. That is, to look into the basic
motives for corruption, to what extent and where it has expanded, and
through which channels it spreads. These findings are necessary in
order to develop a set of principles and a program of action to sup-
press corruption as much as possible, it being almost impossible to
neutralize completely.
The sample
The survey on corruption at the customs was undertaken from 3rd
to 18th May 2002 involving 290 private and state-owned companies
dealing with forwarding (customs broking) and foreign trade. The
planned sample was realized at the level of 96.7%. The sample includ-
ed companies from 33 Serbian municipalities excluding Kosovo. A
combination of multiple, stratified and simple random sample was
used for the purpose. The regional distribution of the sample is as fol-
lows  Vojvodina 30.7%, central Serbia 28.6% and the city of Belgrade
40.7%. The sample consists of 71.7% of external trade and production
companies (with significant external trade) and 28.3% of forwarding
companies. The ownership structure of the surveyed companies is the
following: state owned 10%, private 72.8%, mixed-majority state cap-
ital 8.3%, mixed-majority private capital 6.2% and mixed-majority
capital owned by foreign citizens 2.8%. The following officials in the
companies were interviewed: president and/or CEO11.7%, owner
23.1%, partner 3.1%, CEO 16.6%, head of the sector 18.6%, manager
9.0%, employee in charge of customs affairs 17.2% and other 0.7%.
The distribution of the surveyed companies on the basis of the num-
ber of employees is: up to 5 employees 17.6%, from 6 to 10 employees
20.7%, from 11 to 20 employees 19.7%, from 21 to 50 employees
14.8%, from 51 to 100 employees 5.5%, from 101 to 200 employees
4.1%, from 201 to 500 employees 7.9%, over 500 employees 7.9% and
no answer 4.1%.
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EFFICIENCY AND TRANSPARENCY
From anarchy towards order
Before we analyse the level and extent of corruption at the customs,
using the data obtained in the survey of business people, it is necessary
to say a few words about the general efficiency of the customs authori-
ty. In other words, we should examine how business people, especially
those in contact with it almost every day, assess the efficiency of the
customs administration. That is particularly important, because the
customs barriers are not only customs duties, licenses and quotas, but
also the formal procedures that are regulated by economic and political
authorities, and interpreted and enforced by the customs administra-
tion. These procedures encompass various technical regulations (the
quality of the goods, sanitary, biological and other regulations).
Corruption, too, could be included into customs barriers, especially
when the customs officials think of it as a tax i.e. as a form of supple-
ment for small salaries, about which we will say more later. It is unde-
niable that strict/rigorous customs regulations can be softened,
which increases the flow of goods. Therefore it is logical that not only
the protection of domestic producers and the speed of the flow of
goods depend on the efficiency of the customs administration, but also,
to a great extent the openness of the countrys economy.
Almost a third (31%) of business people think that the customs admin-
istration is efficient and over half of them (53%) think that it is mostly
efficient. So, it is more than clear that business people, after the democrat-
ic changes in Serbia, considering the situation overall, assess very
favourably the efficiency of the customs administration as a whole. That
does not mean that this is the case when we examine specific situation and
problems, about which we will say more later on. Almost everybody sup-
ports the above-mentioned opinion on the customs administration; so
there are no statistically significant differences related to the type of activ-
ity, type of ownership, or to the size of the surveyed company.
The political changes in Serbia have improved the efficiency of this
public service. That is the consequence, above all, of its own efforts on
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Table 1.
The assessment of the efficiency of the customs administration (%)
Very efficient 5.5
Efficient 25.5
Mostly efficient 53.1
Mostly inefficient 9.0
Inefficient 3.1
Extremely inefficient 2.1
Do not know and without answer 1.7
the one hand, and of abolition of various restrictions by the Federal
Government, on the other. This means the simplification and liberali-
sation of the foreign trade policy (which before consisted of import
and export licences, quotas and applications for export), the reduction
of the number of groups in which products are classified, and the
removal of various administrative restrictions. This fact is unequivo-
cally indicated by the business people themselves, among whom there
is wide accord.
In addition to this overall praise, however, the results of the survey
show that after the democratic changes in Serbia, business people
expected more intensive changes in the contents (clarity and simplici-
ty) of the regulations which affect the conduct of the customs adminis-
tration. This would not only increase the efficiency of the customs
administration, but also reduce their discretional rights, thus also
reducing corruption.
Somewhat more than a third (34.5%) of business people think that
the customs regulations have changed much or a little more than
expected. In opposition to that, there are 44.5% of business people who
say that the regulations have changed a lot or a little less than
expected. So, even beside the significant political changes after the
arrival of the new Government, the expectations of business people
considering the simplification and liberalization of the foreign trade
regime have only been partially met. Expectations are one thing and
reality another. The change of procedure is insufficient, according to
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Table 2.
The level of the efficiency of the customs administration today compared to the
one three years ago (%)
Significantly more efficient 5.9
More efficient 39.0
The same 45.5
Less efficient 4.5
Significantly less efficient 1.4
Do not know 3.8
Table 3.
The expected change in customs regulation during the last year (%)
Much more than expected 9.7
Little more than expected 24.8
Have not changed 14.8
Little less than expected 28.3
Much less than expected 16.2
Do not know and without answer 6.2
the statements of the business people. An increase in efficiency also
requires a change in habits by those who enforce the regulation, both
by the individuals and the services, even by entire social groups. Even
with the existing, partially changed regulations, more could be
achieved with more will and commitment.
One of the crucial conditions for all business conduct is the quality
of the legal institutions, including the customs and the customs regula-
tions. They have to be widely accepted by business people. If this is not
the case, they will be continuously violated. So, for example, almost
three quarters of the business people (72.5%), both from the state
owned and private companies, think that the customs regulations are
fair and impartial, which means that they do not contain discriminato-
ry elements, i.e. that the contents do not give opportunities to treat the
same situations differently. Opposite to this, 16.2% of the business
people have doubts and say that the regulations allow different, and
thus biased interpretation.
According to the statements of the business people, the customs
regulations and specific guidelines are clearly defined and, if uni-
formly applied, enable straight conduct without corruption. In both
cases there a consensus, i.e. there are no statistically significant dif-
ferences considering the activities of the company, its ownership sta-
tus or size.
We tried to assess the business relationship between the customs and
the business people who deal most with it by one additional question:
to what extent are their relations with the customs stable, do they
depend on current political and other changes both in society and at
the Customs? To put it more simply, how large are the problems in
business conduct with the customs administration now and how large
were they three years ago?
The results of the survey show firstly, that the business people
extremely rarely have greater problems in their dealings with the cus-
toms (two thirds say that it is a small problem or that there is none).
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Table 4.
The customs regulations are (%): 
Fair and impartial Just, do not allow
corruption
Always 14.5 19.3
Mostly 45.9 33.8
Often 21.1 12.4
Sometimes 11.7 12.8
Rarely 3.8 4.8
Never 0.7 1.7
Do not know 11.3 15.2
and without answer
This means that the customs administration, as we have seen, func-
tions much better than before.
At the same time, they think that bribing the customs official, about
which we will say more later on, is a moderate problem or that it is nor-
mal. That is, they are so accustomed to it, i.e. they consider it quite nor-
mal. Secondly, the presented data show that there are much fewer
problems of this kind. A fact that was confirmed by the field research,
in the light of their experience, compared to the period three years ago.
Thirdly, almost a half of the business people (49.3%) decidedly stated
that they did not have problems in dealings with the customs earlier
(three years ago) or that their problems were small. This data must be
taken as relevant since on the one hand the respondents were free from
fear when making their statements, and also their statements must be
considered free of rhetoric and the political passions that might have
clouded their judgment at the time.
The business people, both from state owned and private companies
assess positively the efficiency of the customs administration. They also
state unequivocally that its work has been improved. At the same time,
they do not have any serious objections either to the legislative or the
internal customs regulations, of course those governing the business
relationship of the companies with the customs administration. Lastly,
a large majority say that their dealings with the customs proceed with-
out difficulties and that when difficulties occur they are not insoluble,
on the contrary that they are easily solved. We should not forget that
lately, i.e. in the last three years (as was specified in the questionnaire),
their dealings with the customs have been simplified, which has
reduced possible problems.
Transparency of the authorities/governments
The customs administration, like any other service of vital interest,
cannot be observed in isolation from the social context. The quality of
its services, beside its internal organization, depend on the overall
material status of the society, then on the quality and transparency of
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Table 5.
Problems in dealings with the customs (%)
Now Three years ago
Without problems 36.2 18.6
Small problem 29.7 30.7
Moderate problem 27.9 31.0
Big problem 3.4 12.1
Very big problem 1.0 4.8
Do not know 1.7 2.7
the political authorities, both at the general and local level. That in our
conditions means, above all, that it depends on the quality of the feder-
al, republic and local authorities. Therefore, it is necessary to see what
the position of the customs authority is, compared to other crucial
services of the economy. For this purpose we compared the work of
the authority with the efficiency of the federal government, republic
government, municipal and city authorities and their services. To put it
more precisely, whether the difficulties of the business people with
public servants and employees, during business contacts had increased
or decreased over the last year. We have shown the results of this
research in the following Table.
The data speaks very clearly on several matters. Firstly, the difficulties
of the business people during business contacts with government offi-
cials (civil servants) have been reduced, starting with the federal govern-
ment, followed by republic government, all the way to the municipal and
city services. Secondly, that in terms of improvement, the customs
administration got the best reports, compared to other services. On the
other hand, according to the statements of the business people, the
municipal and city services followed by republic government got the
poorest marks. It has been shown that local authorities are far less at the
service of the economy, even though they are much closer to the econo-
my than the big one at higher federal or republic tiers of government.
This is a consequence of the fact that the authorities at the higher levels
define the macro conditions of work, and the ones at lower levels, are
more involved in the minutia and solve the concrete problems of cer-
tain participants in business transactions. Thirdly, this, at the same time,
shows that these empirical findings fully agree with the above stated ones
that the customs administration, according to the statements of the busi-
ness people has become more efficient. Fourthly, high figures in the col-
umn I do not know and without answer, for all services except the
customs, can be explained by the fact that a large number of business
people have not had many business contacts with the agencies involved.
Fifthly, the assessments show wide agreement among business people,
both from state owned and private companies. To put it more precisely,
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Table 6.
Business contacts (difficulties) with public employees (%)
Increased Remained Decreased I do not know
the same and w. a.
Republic government 5.9 38.6 22.4 33.1
Federal government 6.9 38.6 27.6 26.9
The Customs 4.8 54.1 32.4 8.6
Of municipal
and city services 12.1 47.2 16.9 23.8
there is no statistically significant difference in assessments (Cramers v is
between 0.029 to 0.173 for all 4 columns in the chart) on the basis of the
activities, the ownership status or the size of the company.
We can interpret the more positive attitude of the business people
towards the customs administration in the previous tables compared to
the last one by the well-known sociological fact that one segment of
society cannot be radically improved independently of other segments,
and especially independently of the political sphere. Problems in the
political sphere spread like concentric circles to all spheres of society.
This is especially true of societies with underdeveloped institutions, or,
which is almost the same, societies where the institutions were under
the monopoly of the authorities for a long time. For these reasons the
radical improvement of the functioning of the customs authority was
not possible, which is, in the end, clearly seen from the total results of
the survey (not just this, but others too).
It is well known that many services in the previous social and politi-
cal system, and with them the customs administration, were designed
to serve the governing nomenclature on the one hand, and protect
domestic producers from international competition on the other. This
led to the development of certain habits. To change behaviour, even in
more developed societies, is a difficult and strenuous job. In societies in
transition, such as Serbia, the job will take substantially longer and be
more arduous, especially since these changes must be initiated in the
political sphere. The extent of the transformation in society as a whole,
including the customs administration, will depend to a large extent on
the efficiency of change in this central area.
Predictability of the behaviour of the customs officials
Before we analyse the extent and level of the corruption at the cus-
toms it is necessary to see how business people assess the predictability
of the behaviour of customs officials during the procedure of levying
duty. This is particularly important as it indicates how the respondents
view the way customs officials use their discretional rights, especially
since the possibility of abuse increases with the increase in discretional
rights. To put it more precisely, the reactions of the business people to
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Table 7.
The predictability of the behaviour of the customs officials (%)
Now Three years ago
Completely predictable 16.2 13.4
Rather predictable 47.2 32.1
Rather unpredictable 20.7 31.0
Completely unpredictable 6.6 12.1
1Do not know 9.3 10.3
the behaviour of the customs officials in concrete (individual) cases will
depend on the predictability of their behaviour. Namely, the business
people go out of their way to make sure that customs officials do not
alter their behaviour when it comes to the same or similar situations.
The presented data clearly shows that the behaviour of the customs
officials now, compared to their behaviour three years ago, has become
more predictable, i.e. more in accordance with the established norms.
This, in a way, means that the business people can more easily assess
whether they should offer a bribe in the particular situation or not, par-
ticularly because they too (according to their statements) occasionally,
deliberately or unintentionally, violate the regulations. The results of
the survey also show that more than a quarter (27.3%) of the business
people say that the behaviour of the customs officials is still completely
or rather unpredictable. There is no statistically relevant difference on
this point in relation to the activity, ownership status and the size of the
company. We can look for the motive of the change of behaviour of the
customs officials, firstly, in the fact that after the October 2000 political
changes, the public is observing them, secondly, in the better internal
control in the customs administration, and thirdly, that the position of
the customs official is becoming more insecure, after the tens of thou-
sands of workers from the bankrupted companies have appeared on the
labour market. This had to have a sobering effect on at least some of the
employees of the customs administration. Therefore their behaviour in
the procedure of levying duty has become more predictable, and that
means more in accordance with the established regulations.
THE FEATURES OF CORRUPTION AT THE CUSTOMS
The extent of corruption
Among the myriad problems in Serbian society, crime and corrup-
tion occupy a prominent place. Most often they go hand in hand.
Corruption has permeated almost the whole of Serbian society  it has
become systemic.1 Accordingly, it has inevitably affected the customs
administration as well. A number of business people are unwilling to
call attention to the problem, which potentially complicates the assess-
ment of the extent of corruption. This proceeds from a certain fear of
possible sanctions, or as the business people themselves say, a fear that
they might fare even worse in the future. Also, their general attitude
to this social phenomenon is certainly one of the indicators of the
extent of corruption in the service. These attitudes are based on long-
term experience of doing business, particularly for the reason that
many business people come into contact with the customs administra-
tion virtually every day. 
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1 Corruption in Serbia, CLDS, 2001 .
From the presented data we can learn the following. Firstly, accord-
ing to the statements of business people, corruption has diminished
over the past three years (the index was 3.83 then, whereas nowadays it
is 3.00). Secondly, the extent is still considerable. Thirdly, the differ-
ence is statistically not significant, in relation to the ownership status of
a company (Kramers v = 0.123 and 0.101). Fourthly, workers in for-
warding (customs broking) agencies find customs corruption more
widespread than those in foreign trade companies, now (Kramers v =
0.220), as well as three years ago (0.237). This originates from their bet-
ter knowledge of the system itself and the methods of transactions at
the customs, on the one hand, as well as their more frequent contacts
with the customs administration, on the other. Fifthly, the participa-
tion of those who had no comment whatsoever is considerable. The
latter can be explained by the afore- mentioned fear of the conse-
quences resulting from their speaking out.
An illegal sale of public officials services leads to the strengthening
of the hierarchical structure of the authorities, since the superiors have
control over the subordinates regardless of the salary scale. The cost, or
the weight of a particular post in the hierarchical structure of the
rank, is estimated not only on the basis of the salary scale, reputation,
benefits and authority it provides, but also the opportunity for illegal
service charge.2 The customs is one of the services which exercised
that right profusely. Hence, corruption rated high for its extent and
range in public opinion surveys.3 Another reason is that a client offers
a bribe to avoid the expenses, customs duties in this particular case, to
save time (do the job without waiting for his turn), or because there a
shady deal under way. Fieldwork experience provides ample proof of
this. Namely, business people would often (the survey having already
been done) inform the fieldworkers that corruption at the customs
intensifies most when there are some irregularities  from paperwork
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Table 8
The extent of corruption at the customs (%)
Nowadays Three years ago
Very little 7.6 2.8
Little 10.3 2.4
Average 31.4 18.3
Much 12.8 27.9
Very much 6.6 19.7
I do not know 31.4 29.0
Index (1-5) 3.0 3.8
2 See more in Vukovic, S, The Extent and Condemnation of Corruption in Serbia, a
Sociological Study, 35, No. 1-2/2001, p.3-18
3 C.f. Corruption in Serbia, CLDS, 2001, p.33-35 
to the quality of goods, or when the situation is not precisely defined by
the regulations. In such cases, an additional payment is usually
required for the issue to be settled to the satisfaction of the company.
To be more specific, there is a positive correlation between the range
and extent of corruption (and therefore at the customs as well), and the
illegality of the deal concerned. This refers in particular to goods sub-
ject to excise duties (cigarettes, fuels) which are imported in two ways:
either by plain smuggling or with the help of individuals at the cus-
toms. In the latter case, the goods are to be allowed to pass without any
report or proper papers. This, however, is not within the remit of this
study, as it represents plain criminal actions. 
That customs officials need to be bribed on numerous occasions is
no surprise, since the offer of a bribe has become quite a common
occurrence, which all those involved are accustomed to. In nearly half
the instances (49.6%) the business people claim that the one who does
this kind of business makes additional payments at the customs, and
their estimation of frequency ranges from regularly to rarely. There are
no statistically significant distinctions regarding the ownership status
and the size of the business. There is a slight, though statistically almost
insignificant influence of the line of work (Kramers v = 0.228). To be
specific, forwarding agents more often than the others assert that
additional payments are commonplace.  
The extent and range of bribes accepted by customs officials, on the
one hand, and its virtually public acceptance, on the other, can be also
assessed by the following data: somewhat less than a half of the business
people (46.2%), both in state and private companies, can assess from
experience the level of those additional payments at the customs,
only some of them can always assess it, while the others just occa-
sionally. Still, they all know. Conversely, just a fifth (20%) of the
traders claim they never know this cost, which most often means that
they do not make additional payments to the customs officials. 
Fieldwork experience gives us grounds to assume that there is a cer-
tain tariff for particular services, or that after a while a customs offi-
cial should be somehow rewarded for being obliging. That tariff is
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Table 9
Is it usual that businesses dealing in this kind of trade make additional
payments to customs officials (%)?
Absolutely 3.1
Most often 8.6
Occasionally 24.5
Seldom 13.4
Never 36.2
I do not know 14.1
paid by private companies more often than public ones, or, rather,
public companies more often pay for those services by counter serv-
ices, which can range widely  from paying for a meal in a restaurant to
employing a customs officials child. Concurrently, the research data
shows that the additional payments are made by forwarding agencies
with slightly higher frequency than foreign trade companies (Kramers
v = 0.279), as the former deal with the customs administration more
often. 
When one poses a direct question what percentage of the worth of a
concluded deal is paid to customs officials as additional duties, one
gets a somewhat different picture (Table 11). 
The empirical results obtained show that a little more than half of
the business people (52.1%) emphatically claim that they make no
additional payments for special services at the customs. Conversely, all
the others give some figure, do not know or do not want to answer the
question. To be precise, nearly a third (32.4%) state that they bribe cus-
toms officials and say how much it is as a percentage of their profit
from the deal. Another 7.2% declare they give bribes in goods or that
there is no rule, whereas 8.3% have no answer or information.
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Table 10
Do you know how much additional payments at the customs cost (%)?
Always 4.3
Usually 10.7
Often 6.6
Occasionally 15.5
Seldom 9.0
Never 20.0
I do not know 33.8
Table 11
What percentage of the worth of a concluded deal do you give as bribes (%)? 
We do not give bribes 52.1
Small 3.4
Up to 0.5 12.1
From 0.5 to 1 6.2
From 1.1 to 5 5.9
From 5.1 to 10 3.8
From 10.1 to 20 1.0
We give it in goods 2.8
There is no rule 4.4
I do not know and no answer 8.3
Therefore, nearly two fifths (39.6%) of the business people in both
public and private companies claim that the customs administration is
corrupt to a certain degree. The distribution of the answers according
to the line of work and the ownership status of the company provides
the following information. Firstly, forwarding companies bribe cus-
toms officials slightly more often than foreign trade companies, but the
difference is minor (Kramers v = 0.280). Secondly, private companies
bribe more frequently than public ones (Kramers v = 0.303). The pre-
sented data corresponds to a high degree to the data obtained from the
former survey, where almost a half (46.2%) claimed they know how
much the additional payments cost. 
Bearing in mind the fact that not only accepting, but also offering
bribes is a criminal offence, one is not surprised that some business
people either go dumb or try to evade giving an answer when asked
how much they give for bribing customs officials. Quite often it was of
no use stressing that the questionnaire was anonymous. Also, another
reason might be the vigorous anti-corruption campaign launched in
the media at the time of conducting the survey, which had some influ-
ence on their answers, or the fact that they did not answer. 
When even more direct questions were asked afterwards, the prob-
lem became more delicate. Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of empir-
ical evidence can provide us with relevant facts. 
Here only one out of five (20%) business people state when their
company gave bribes at the customs last time, with 1% who says it was
a long time ago. These differences can, as in the previous example, be
explained by a fear of possible criminal liability; therefore, potentially
incriminating statements are evaded. Conversely, a fifth (20%) of those
questioned claim they have never given a bribe at the customs (as in
Table 10). In this case as well, there is no distinction regarding the line
of work and size of the business. In contrast to that, the ownership sta-
tus appears as a minor determining factor, but statistically insignificant
one. In other words, private business people somewhat more readily
than those in public companies (Kramers v = 0.221) state when they
bribed customs officials last. 
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Table 12
The most recent instance of giving bribe (%)
We gave one the other day 3.8
We gave one a month ago 10.0
We gave one a year ago 6.2
We have not given one for a while 1.0
We have never given one 20.0
No answer 10.6
I do not know 48.3
When asked how many times last year they made additional pay-
ments to a customs official (of course, for a job that had to be done
without any), the percentage of those who answered the question
somewhat decreased (Table 13). 
Hardly any more than a sixth of the business people (15.9%) give a
direct answer how many times in the previous year they bribed a cus-
toms official. On the other hand, less than a half (47.9%) claim they
offered no bribe last year. The others give vague answers, say they do
not know, or do not answer at all. The line of work (Kramers v =
0.297) and ownership status (Kramers v = 0.221) of the company act
as determining factors to a slight, but statistically insignificant degree. 
To an even more direct question how much on average they paid on
the occasion, the following distribution of answers was obtained
(Table 14).
The data we have presented here shows that less than a fifth of the
business people questioned (18.5%) report how much money they give
or in what other ways they pay for irregular customs services.
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Table 13
The frequency of giving a bribe (%) 
Never 47.9
Once or twice 2.1
3-5 times 4.8
6-9 times 2.1
10-14 times 3.1
5-20 times 0.7
More than 20 times 2.1
I do not know 10.0
No answer 27.2
Table 14
The amount of bribe per offer (%)
We have never given a bribe 60.3
Up to  25 EUR 3.1
25-59 EUR 5.5
50-100 EUR 1.7
100-250 EUR 2.1
In goods 1.0
There is no rule 5.1
Do not want to say 5.5
No answer 15.5
Twenty-one per cent of them do not want to give an answer. In oppo-
sition to this, three fifths (60.3%) firmly declare they have never bribed
customs officials. The line of work of the company influences this
slightly, but statistically to an insignificant degree (Kramers v = 0.263),
that is the employees of forwarding agencies more often than those in
foreign trade companies state they give bribes (and how much).   
The previous analysis is reinforced by another survey. 
Somewhat less than a third of those questioned (32.5%) claim that a
customs official explicitly demands money, a gift or a favour (the fre-
quency ranging from always to in individual case). Actually, it is
the same number as those who stated that corruption at the customs
exists and what proportion of their total revenue is paid for that pur-
pose. Also, as in the previous example, nearly a half of them (48.3%)
claim that money, a gift or favour are never required from them. 54.2%
of the business people say that customs officials do not demand, but
make it clear they expect money, a gift or favour, the frequency being
from always to in individual cases. There is a minor correlation
(though a statistically insignificant one) between an explicit demand
for money and the companys line of work (Kramers v = 0.227). In
other words, there is a greater proportion of the business people of for-
warding agencies than of foreign trade companies who claim that cus-
toms officials openly demand money from them. This can be explained
by the fact that it is in the nature of their work for the former to have
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Table 15
Customs officials demand and expect bribes (%)
They demand  They do not demand, but
money, a gift, or make it clear they expect
favour explicitly money, a gift or favour
Always 1.7 5.9
Most of times 6.6 12.8
In individual cases 25.2 35.5
Never 48.3 30.0
I do not know or no answer 17.9 15.9
Table 16
The ways of making additional payments (%)
There are no additional payments 19.0
I have no experience 1.3
I do not know 14.5
Specifies one of the ways 30.4
No answer 34.8
contact with the customs more often. Concurrently, the answers indi-
cate no statistically relevant correlation regarding the ownership status
and size of the company. 
It is impossible to build up an overall picture of customs officials
corruption, whatever the extent of it may be, without looking into the
ways they are bribed. 
The data obtained through the survey shows, above all, that only a
fifth of those questioned categorically declare there are no additional
payments at the customs. Simultaneously, slightly less than a third
(30.4%) claim not only that corruption is present, but also enumerate
the ways of giving bribes. The rest either do not know or do not give an
answer. The business people who enumerate the ways of giving bribes
cite one of them: cash in hand, in private; officials are given gifts, or
paid in goods; they demand goods; they are bribed outside the offices,
through the mediation of a middleman; it depends on the situation; a
paid bill in a restaurant for the whole shift; cigarettes and drinks are
paid in duty-free shops (and money is cashed subsequently); money is
folded in paper, and so on. An entrepreneur said that a customs official
made him unload and then load again four tons of goods so that he
could inspect it more closely, and all that just because the former did
not want to give him something he liked.
One must inevitably pose the question how much time, and
resources are wasted in bribing customs officials. 
Nearly a fourth of the business people questioned (23.7%) say they
waste some time in bribing customs officials, and how much it is can
be seen in Table 17. This corresponds to a high degree to the statisti-
cal data on the percentage of the business people who, without fear,
state the amount of the bribe, how often they give it and when they
gave it last. Here as well employees of forwarding agencies state that
they waste slightly more time bribing customs officials, than those of
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Table 17
Time required for bribing (%)
We do not waste time 67.6
A little 3.4
Up to 0.5 0.3
0.5-1 4.4
1-5 2.5
5-10 5.2
10-20 3.1
The forwarding agents do that 1.0
There is no rule 3.8
I do not know or no answer 8.7
foreign trade companies, but statistically there is little significance
(Kramers v = 0.237). Bribery at the customs demands considerably
less time than in other public services4, since, according to the state-
ments of the business people, the costs can be many times higher. For
instance, perishable goods can deteriorate due to a deliberately long
delay (on account of a delayed procedure). Then, there are the costs
of storing goods, the costs of  engaging transport and the like.
A particular problem is when the corruptor, even after giving a
bribe, does not receive the granted service. This is the case of irre-
sponsible bureaucracy and, at the same time, of inefficient corruption,
which increases the transaction costs. Due to the silence of the corrup-
tor (from fear of sanctions), one often loses track of those who do
not do what they have agreed to. Not getting the service even after giv-
ing a bribe makes the business people all the more insecure.
Evidently, according to the data presented here, in this case as well
more than a third of those questioned (34.2%) affirm that the cus-
toms are corrupt. Concurrently, a great majority state that after a
bribe has been given, the granted service is always, mostly, or usually
obtained, that is it is highly likely that the service will be performed
after making an additional payment to the official. To be more pre-
cise, the corruptor is not absolutely, but merely relatively sure he will
get the service he has paid for. The staff of forwarding agencies get
this service a bit more often than those of foreign trade companies,
but the distinction is not statistically relevant (Kramers v = 0.220).
As we have seen, they also pay for that service more often. On the
other hand, a half of those questioned (50.3%) either do not know or
would not give an answer to the posed question. They are the ones
who do not pay for additional services at all, or simply will not or
dare not talk about it. 
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Table 18
Do you get the service if you bribe the customs official (%)?
Always 15.5
Mostly 11.4
Usually 2.8
Occasionally 3.8
Seldom 0.7
Never 4.5
I do not give bribes 10.3
No answer 6.2
I do not know 44.1
4 Corruption in Serbia, CLDS, 2001, p.71 .
Repeat payment for the same service, especially additional payments, is
seldom in bureaucratic societies with settled regulations. This is particu-
larly so in cases where a tariff is settled for the kind of business in ques-
tion. It also indicates the degree to which corruption has been centralized.
The more frequent repeat payments are demanded, the less centralized
the corruption, and vice versa. CLDS previous research5 on corruption of
public officials unquestionably proved that repeat payments to officials
are normal and routine. In other words, nearly two thirds (65%) of pri-
vate business people had to pay for the same service two or more times, at
least on one occasion. The situation is different in the case of the customs. 
Slightly more than a fifth (21%) of the business people claim from
experience that, at least on one occasion, they had to pay for the same
service two or more times. Conversely, one out of five (18.6%) business
people has never had to pay for the same service again. This suggests
that nearly two fifths (38.6%) of those questioned face corruption at
the customs, which corresponds to the previous results. The previous
survey comprised all public services (some paid at one place, others at
another), whereas here is a case of one public service only. Primarily, it
means that every other entrepreneur who was forced to give bribe had
at least once to do it two or more times. In this case no statistically sig-
nificant distinction is made regarding the line of work, ownership sta-
tus or size of the business. 
Based on their experience, business people have little faith in the
possibility of effective protection from corruption at the customs with-
in the service itself. Actually, 13.1% of those questioned absolutely
refuse as a solution to go to another customs official or the manager, in
order to avoid an inevitable additional payment. 18% of them claim
that such an act can spare them expenses, but rarely, whereas 21.4%
believe it to be possible mostly or usually. In opposition to this, a
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Table 19
Repeat payment for the same service (%)
Always 1.4
Mostly 3.4
Usually 2.1
Occasionally 7.2
Seldom 6.9
Never 18.6
I have never paid for one 9.0
No answer 6.2
I do not know 45.2
5 Corruption in Serbia, CLDS, 2001, p.67 .
fifth (21.3%) of them believe they can always avoid bribery by going to
another customs official or the manager. The staffs of forwarding agen-
cies is slightly more likely to state that additional payments at the cus-
toms are inevitable  than  the staff of foreign trade companies, but this
is statistically insignificant (Kramers v = 0.257).
Business people claim that approaching the manager or escaping to
another official does not offer much protection from the corruptible
ones. Apparently, there is collusion within the service. Whether the collu-
sion is open or covert makes no difference in the state of affairs.
Therefore, when asked whether they have made a complaint about cor-
ruption in the service to an official authority, 94.1% of the business peo-
ple gave a negative reply. This led us to pose the following question to act
as a control: why have they never made a complaint to an official author-
ity? The distribution of answers is highly interesting: 24.8% of them said
because it is pointless; those who did not want to complain to avoid get-
ting into even bigger trouble made up 19.7% of the answers;, 5.9% did
not complain because they have own failings and 1.0%. because it is in
their interest to bribe the customs officials. The remaining 48.6% said that
they had no reason or did not know. All in all, more than half (51.4%) of
business people from private, mixed and state companies concede indi-
rectly that there is corruption in the customs administration. Moreover,
they also concede, indirectly, that it cannot be easily eradicated, particu-
larly not by proclamations or by scaring business people or customs offi-
cials, since there is a kind of silent accord between them (this is confirmed
by the data that 80.7% of business people believe that customs officials
small salaries are one of the causes of corruption, varying in the impor-
tance they give to this from very much to very little). 
Corruption and the manner of customs clearance
In previous pages we have seen how business people from state and
private companies evaluate the state of affairs in the customs adminis-
tration on the one hand, and the size, frequency and scope of informal
payments for its services, on the other hand. We have also seen that
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Table 20
Is it possible to establish a proper relationship with another customs official or the
manager without corruption (%)?
Always 21.3
Mostly 11.4
Usually 10.0
Seldom 18.0
Never 13.1
I do not know 26.5
bribery can take different forms. Moreover, corruption in the customs
may be present both for regular customs procedures or for speeding up
customs procedure, and for irregular (illegal) exemption from duty,
that is allowing the passage of certain goods (which are liable to duty
payment) without charging duty. The results of this part of the survey
are given in Table 21.
The results tell us the following: firstly, almost two fifths of business
people confirm their previous statement that there is corruption at the
customs. Secondly, somewhat less than one third of business people
(30.0%) say that corruption is present in the course of regular customs
procedure (from always to seldom). Thirdly, in the case of speed-
ing up a customs procedure, business people are marginally more rig-
orous and almost two fifths of them (38.6%) say that a bribe is a com-
mon occurrence, also from always to seldom. 
Fourthly, as for irregular customs procedure (charging lower cus-
toms tariff or allowing the passage of goods without charging any
duty), that is irregular exemption from duty almost one quarter
(22.5%) believe that, generally speaking, this is possible with addition-
al payment. This is more often, but without statistical significance
(Cramer v = 0.203) the view of the representatives of forwarding com-
panies than foreign trade companies. The data also shows that addi-
tional payment is a normal thing in the customs when it comes to
speeding up a customs procedure. A customs procedure is often delib-
erately thorough to make the customer realize that its speeding up
can be brought about with additional effort which needs to be addi-
tionally paid for. In the case of irregular exemption from duty, or
allowing the passage of illegal goods, experience from the field tells us
that the bigger the value of the cargo, the bigger the expected bribe. 
What the situation is like now and what it was three years ago, in the
cases of regular customs procedure, exemption from duty (which is
contrary to customs rules and procedures) and reduction in customs
rates is shown in Table 22. 
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Table 21
Additional payments for following services (in %):
Always Mostly Often Sometimes Seldom Never Dont 
know
Regular
customs 0.7 1.0 3.4 12.8 12.1 45.2 24.8
procedure
Speeding up
customs
procedure 4.5 5.5 9.3 13.4 6.9 33.1 27.2
Illegal
exemption 4.5 2.8 4.1 5.2 5.9 38.3 39.3 
from duty 
Half of the questioned business people cannot estimate how much
the situation in regard to bribery in regular customs procedure, chang-
ing customs tariff rates and exemption from duty has changed in the
last three years. Those who can, mostly believe that the situation has
not changed significantly, but there are those who see improvement
and they make up 13 to 19%. This tells us that, in the business peoples
opinion, the shift in the overall situation in the customs administra-
tion, starting from its organization, the relations between customs offi-
cials and their clients and the extent of corruption in it is not major,
but it is evident nonetheless. 
CAUSES OF CORRUPTION
The previous research by CLDS showed unequivocally that corrup-
tion had permeated into all pores of society in Serbia, to be more pre-
cise  it had become systematic. The degree and expansion of corrup-
tion in a society depends of many factors, such as the scope and quality
of state regulation, the effectiveness of the penal apparatus, social-his-
torical circumstances, material development of the society and the state
of social values. All these causes are true for Serbian society as well. In
the case of the customs service, the scope and extent of corruption,
may also depend on specific causes, some of which are, the regulation
of foreign trade, the scope and size of discretionary rights of customs
officials, the quality of legal and internal rules and regulations, the
quality of internal control, the level of salaries of employees, as well as
many other, more or less important causes. 
We are primarily interested here in how the business people, who
use this service on a daily basis, see causes of corruption in the customs.
Clearly this can be taken as only one of the indicators of this extremely
complex social phenomenon. Evidently the customs service cannot be
isolated from the context of all other social developments. 
The survey results show unequivocally that business people put
moral crisis in the first place as a cause of corruption. To be more pre-
cise, almost three quarters of  business people (73.1%) say that moral
crisis is the key to understanding this phenomenon. This can be
explained by the fact that many empirical surveys confirm that moral
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Table 22
Present state of affairs in relation to three years ago, in %
Better Same Worse Dont  
know
Regular customs procedure 19.0 29.0 3.8 48.2
The level of customs tariff rates 16.2 27.6 5.2 51.0
Exemption from duty 13.4 31.7 1.7 53.1
(contrary to customs regulations)
crisis is one of several problems in Serbian society. We are witnessing a
general social anomie and the absence of trust in almost all key social
institutions. The closer an institution to the political sphere, the bigger
the mistrust of it. Consequently, it follows directly that the political
sphere is one of the key generators of economic and social crisis, and
naturally moral crisis as well, which directly corresponds with the
political crisis.  Bearing in mind that the corruption problem is, gener-
ally speaking, a problem of the violation of the rule of law and opera-
tions of social institutions, on the one hand, and trust in them, on the
other, it cannot be observed separately. 
Clearly the corruption problem in any specific service, including the
customs service, is induced from the political sphere. This is particular-
ly true in societies in transition. Without political will and commit-
ment there can be no economic or social reforms. That is why the
moral crisis, in the understanding of business people, is at the very top
of the corruption causes. 
In the second place, as we can see, is internal control (62.1% of  busi-
ness people say that it is a factor which affects the occurrence of cor-
ruption very much or a lot). Had we asked a question about the
control of control we would have, most likely, got similar results.
This is the consequence of the long-lasting practice of the Yugoslav
self-management system, where it was important not to make enemies
in the company. The important thing was to satisfy the form. If we go a
step further, the not-making enemies policy is a consequence of
another deep social anomie. Small salaries as a key cause of corruption
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Table 23
Factors which affect the existence of corruption in the customs service, in %
Very A lot Medium Very Not Dont Index 
much little at all know (from 15)
Small salaries 31.7 27.6 18.6 4.8 5.9 11.3 3.84
Moral crisis 37.6 35.5 11.0 3.4 1.0 11.4 4.19
Inadequate legislation 26.6 31.4 16.2 7.9 7.6 10.7 3.68
Inefficient internal 30.0 32.1 16.2 5.9 2.4 13.4 3.95
control
Inefficient judiciary 22.8 28.3 19.7 3.8 3.4 22.1 3.81
Imprecise customs
regulations 12.1 23.1 19.7 15.2 11.7 18.3 3.10
Problems inherited 
from the 17.6 19.0 17.9 11.4 13.4 20.7 3.20
communist past
Inefficient 
enforcement agencies 26.2 30.3 18.3 5.5 2.8 16.9 3.83
Inefficient
prosecution 27.6 29.7 17.2 5.5 2.1 17.9 3.65
was quoted by 59.3% of business people. This is a common place in the
whole Serbian society, where low wages came as a result of a fall in eco-
nomic activity and decreased economic efficiency. The police force, as
a cause of corruption, also have a high place. More than a half of busi-
ness people (56.5%) believe that inefficient  enforcement agencies
affect the occurrence of corruption in the customs a lot or very
much. This primarily means that the enforcement mechanism in the
society does not function or is unreliable. The mistrust of  the enforce-
ment mechanism is a consequence of its partiality. It is irrelevant
whether it is the case of partiality on a political, friendship, family or
patronage basis. Bearing in mind that the enforcement mechanism is
an important segment of power, without its efficient operations there
can be no suppression of corruption, and when corruption is not sup-
pressed it will expand. The  business people did not forget two other
institutions, the judiciary and prosecution service, as causes of corrup-
tion. The judiciary is in the fifth, and prosecution in seventh place. We
come to the rule of law, societys stand  against corruption and its penal
policy, and clearly, the functioning of the enforcement mechanism in
which the prosecution is one of the key links. These are problems
which go beyond the scope of this paper, but it is necessary to stress
that the stronger the rule of law in a society, the less corruption there
will be and vice versa. The rule of law can serve as the key barrier to the
expansion of corruption, with the whole range of conditions (which
need not be detailed here), starting from democracy, an independent
judiciary, to controlled (by citizens) responsible political power. 
CONCLUSION
Corruption is a phenomenon to which no country is immune, both
developed and undeveloped. It may easily, especially in the case of the
customs, just like crime, flow over state borders. Consequently, it is
often a regional problem. This is confirmed by a number of public sur-
veys on the degree and scope of its extent in the region to which Serbia
belongs with is neighbours. 
The business people, both from private and state companies, assessed
the efficiency of the customs service favourably. This means that, com-
pared to the period three years ago, it has significantly improved its effi-
ciency. Both legal and internal rules and regulations have been consid-
erably simplified which means that they allow less and less room for dif-
ferent interpretations on the same or similar matters. Problems which
unavoidably occur in the course of business contacts are not insoluble
and indeed, now they are easier to surpass than before. 
Corruption is still significantly present, but, according to the
respondents, it is smaller than three years ago.  One in three  business
people said how much of an average business transaction went to pay-
ing additional costs to customs officials, and almost one in four, the
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last time they paid a service to a customs official. Also, almost one in
five said how much money went for bribing customs officials. More
often customs officials expect a bribe rather than directly demanding
one. The survey results also show that there is no absolute certainty
whether, even after giving a bribe, the agreed service will be performed.
Moreover, they also spoke about the manner of giving and taking
bribes, which can take the form of direct cash payments,  handing over
attractive commodities and paying for presents, and other different
counter-favours. 
It is perfectly clear that the business people did not give consistent
answers to the questions about the size and extent of corruption in
the customs service. A more precise analysis of the presented data
reveals the following: firstly, from one to three fifths of those inter-
viewed, depending on the question, say that there is no corruption in
the customs service. Secondly, from one fifth to almost a half, again
depending on the question, say that there is corruption in the cus-
toms and specify how much they pay, how many times a year they
have to do it, the last time they gave money, how much each time,
whether customs officials demand directly or expect bribes, how
they usually do it and similar. Thirdly, when a question is formulat-
ed in a more general way, the business people are more prepared to
say that there is corruption in the customs and how big it is; on the
contrary, when questions are more direct (how much money did you
give last time, how often did you give money to customs officials last
year, how much in percentage was it from the value of the business
deal) according to their claims, there is less corruption. Fourthly,
forwarding companies are more often hit by customs officials than
foreign trade ones, because the former are in more frequent contact
with the customs. Fifthly, private companies are forced to bribe cus-
toms officials somewhat more often than state ones, but statistically
insignificantly so. 
The basic causes of corruption in the customs, according to the
entrepreneurs,  should be sought in the overall moral crisis holding
sway in Serbian society, then in inefficient internal control, small
salaries of those employed in the customs service, inefficient policing,
inefficient prosecution and lastly the problems inherited from the
communist past and imprecise customs regulations.
Certain differences in the given answers to some question from the
multitude of those asked, on the scope and extent of corruption in the
customs can be explained by several facts. 
Firstly, the mistrust dominant in the whole society in Serbia and
confirmed by almost all empirical research, could not but be reflected
in the mistrust in empirical research as such, hence the mistrust of
individual researchers in the field. Therefore the researchers said in
their written reports that there are those questioned who doubt the
anonymity of the survey, and one of them even asked if it had anything
to do with a telephone line for reporting incidents of corruption. 
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Secondly, the survey was conducted at the time of an anti-corrup-
tion campaign, so many of those questioned did not find it suitable to
say everything, since criminal proceedings can be started not only
against a corrupted party, but also the corruptor.
Thirdly, a number of those questioned said that the customs service
had improved significantly compared to less than two years ago and
that it should be given a chance  particularly since speedy changes are
not possible.
Fourthly, certain differences in the answers given by the business
people are not important, since the additional analysis, as we have seen,
makes them relative. The survey has decidedly shown what is most
important  that, on the one hand, corruption in the customs service is
somewhat smaller than before the democratic changes in Serbia, but on
the other, that it is still significant.
CORRUPTION IN THE REGION 
It is not our intention in this chapter to give a detailed presentation of
the corruption problem in neighbouring countries, but, primarily, to
show, on the basis of several key points, where Serbia stands according
to the scope and extent of corruption in the customs service in relation
to its neighbours. At the very outset (which will later be confirmed by
the empirical data) we can say the scope and extent of corruption in
Serbia does not differ much from that in the neighbouring countries.
This is logical, since all these countries have the same, communist his-
torical heritage. Now, some slower some faster, they, are passing
through almost the same process of transition to a market economy and
the introduction and stabilization of political pluralism. They are all at
the beginning of the construction and consolidation of legal institu-
tions, which are one of the key prerequisites for the development of
democracy and clearly one of the major barriers to the expansion of cor-
ruption and crime. Similarly all have undergone nearly fifty years under
a variant of the command economy and they are all undergoing owner-
ship restructuring of economy, which leaves room for corruption to
develop. Finally, they are all at a low level of economic development,
they have all recently experienced, a bigger of smaller, fall in national
product and as a result impoverishment of the population. This has
brought about a high level of insecurity among their citizens. Therefore
their problems are, roughly speaking, similar or even identical.
The propensity to corruption is not a specific feature of Serbian soci-
ety. In the case of south-eastern Europe, there is more corruption gen-
erally, with the exception of Bulgaria and Montenegro, than in Serbia,
even though most of these countries were not subjected to ten years of
economic and other sanctions. Also these countries were not subject to
bombardment by NATO (in the year of the bombing the FRY experi-
enced a fall in the national product of 18 to 23.5 index points 
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depending on the estimate). Both facts created a favourable back-
ground for the development of crime and corruption. Crime and cor-
ruption usually go together. The propensity to corruption (measured
on an index of 0 to 10) towards the end of 2000 was 4.3 in Albania, 3.3
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2.8 in Bulgaria, 3.1 in Macedonia, 4.4 in
Rumania, 3.4 in Croatia, 2.8 in Serbia and 2.7 index points in
Montenegro. The data shows that citizens tolerance to corruption, not
only in Serbia, but also in the whole region, is very high. In other
words, citizens readiness both to receive and give bribes is very high.
And where citizens are ready to pay for additional services to public
administrators or managers in state companies, there will be corrup-
tion. Therefore it is often defined as a necessary evil by citizens.
It is perfectly clear that corruption is present, not only in developing,
but also in the developed and wealthy countries of Western Europe and
North America. Especially in the case of the police force (which will not
be discussed here) and the customs service, and in Western Europe in
the case of local government. After the police and judiciary in this con-
text, the customs  authority takes plays a central role, in the function-
ing of an  economy and in generating income for the state. An interna-
tional public opinion survey carried out in 1996/97 (the subject of
which  was bribery amongst civil servants) shows that most countries
in the world are confronted with corruption in general, including cor-
ruption in the customs service.
The above-mentioned survey, carried out in the countries in transi-
tion, also shows that the perception of the extent of corruption in the
customs service is right behind the extent of corruption in the police
and local government. 
It needs to be stressed here that corruption, i.e. the perception of
corruption, largely depends on the citizens perception of public serv-
ices and their trust in them. To be more precise, there is a positive cor-
relation between the perception of corruption and citizens trust in the
authorities or a certain institution. It is known that real corruption is
somewhat lower than the perceived corruption, but, there is also a pos-
itive correlation between the real and perceived corruption. Regardless
of this methodological limitation, we see that, judging by the extent of
corruption among twenty countries in transition, the FRY (therefore
Serbia as well) is very high, it shares the sixth and seventh place with
Hungary. Such a high place was to be expected since at the time of the
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Western Europe 20.3 Countries in transition 16.7
Africa 14.5 New World 33.5
Asia 3.3 South America 9.8
Table 24
Corruption in the customs in different regions (%)
Source: Zvekic, p.53
survey Yugoslavia was  subject to sanctions. Furthermore, the greatest
part of traffic in goods goes over the border between Hungary and the
FRY on the one side and the FRY and Macedonia (which took a very
high third place, according to this survey) on the other side. 
Somewhat later a public opinion survey on corruption, carried out
in seven Balkan countries (in Serbia before the 5th October change)
showed that corruption in the customs service was very widespread.
Varying from country to country, from half to four fifths of those ques-
tioned said that almost everyone or the majority of customs offi-
cials were involved in the practice of bribery. 
The presented data confirms the old rule that crime, hence corrup-
tion as well, easily flows over borders (it is impossible to suppress
crime and corruption in a country while it flourishes in the neighbour-
hood). Therefore these phenomena cannot be observed separately as
the problems of one country alone. This is fully confirmed by the fol-
lowing data as well. The extent of corruption in the customs service,
measured on an index of 0 to 10, shows that there are no significant
differences among the observed Balkan countries.
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Albania 86.6 Rumania 63.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 58.8 Croatia 51.3
Bulgaria 75.2 Serbia 80.9
Macedonia 72.2 Montenegro 27.3
Table 26
The extent of corruption in the customs service in 2000, in %
Source: Corruption Indexes, 2001
Mongolia 37.7 Hungary 21.2
Byelorussia 16.3 Rumania 6.9
Slovenia 37.2 Yugoslavia 21.2
Bulgaria 15.0 The Check Republic 6.5
Macedonia 32.5 Lithuania 21.1
Albania 13.3 Estonia 6.3
Georgia 32.4 Kirghistan 19.3
Ukraine 12.6 Russia 5.7
Lithonia 22.3 Poland 16.9
Croatia 10.3 Slovakia 5.5
Table 25
Corruption in the customs service in the countries in transition 1996/97 (%)
Source: Zvekic, p.53
The presented data also indirectly show that the struggle to suppress
corruption cannot be led by one country alone, but only by all coun-
tries in the region, in this case the region of south-eastern Europe.
Without comprehensive cooperation among between all the countries
of the region there can be  no success in the struggle to suppress cor-
ruption.
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Albania 8.84 Rumania 8.60
Bosnia and Herzegovina 7.88 Croatia 6.90
Bulgaria 8.90 Serbia 8.68
Macedonia 8.80 Montenegro 8.20
Table 27
The extent of corruption in the customs in 2000 (Index)
IV Preconditions and Mechanisms
of Corrupton at the Customs
CURRENT LAWS AND OTHER REGULATIONS: CREATING PRECONDI-
TIONS FOR CORRUPTION
Introductory notes
The survey of legal regulations for this project should point out that
there are an extremely high number of regulations concerning the cus-
toms as an instrument of customs policy (in a broader sense of the
term, including customs duty as an import levy and other instruments
used for determining elements for the estimation of the amount of that
levy), as well as legislative acts which regulate the customs as a service
authorized to be a controlling body of state entrusted with keeping
records on the foreign trade. As the role of the customs as monitor is
often neglected, at first sight it could be thought that the stipulated cus-
toms procedures, if viewed exclusively from the aspect of collecting
duty, are too complicated. However, the large number of regulations of
various legal power that must be applied in an actual customs clearance
result in: 
 it is in direct conflict with the objective of efficiency and speed of
customs procedure,
 it demands highly skilled officials who can easily find their way
about through legal regulations (in terms of the knowledge and
time necessary for successful and proper completion of the cus-
toms procedure),
 in most cases it demands group (team) work, even within the
same department (unit),
 discretionary rights, lacking legal control mechanisms of execu-
tion, are widespread and difficult to keep track of. They become
breeding grounds for corruption.
Apart from this, a few more points need to be mentioned. First, legal
customs regulation is federal in character. Theoretically speaking, the
customs service itself is federal in character, but in practice, its compe-
tencies and responsibilities are limited to the territory of the Republic
of Serbia. While the situation in the territory of Kosovo is the result of
the fact that the Yugoslav customs have no jurisdiction in it, the refusal
of the customs administration of Montenegro to be a part of the
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Federal Customs Administration and to apply its regulations, is the
consequence of a lack of political will and of converging interests of the
political elite.
Then, writing about corruption in the customs administration in
Serbia, at this moment or in the recent past, means researching a phe-
nomenon that can simultaneously entail criminal conduct of different
types, magnitude and level (petty smuggling and organized crime), with
different social consequences. And it is exactly in the area of customs
that it is clearly shown that criminal activity cannot be prevented by
legal regulation only. For the last couple of years, the customs adminis-
tration may have become an example confirming that legal regulation
of the customs has no effect at all, when morality and codes of conduct
are suspended by civil servants, when the court system does not work,
when there are no long-term goals in the economic policy and foreign
trade. Even where legal regulation is set up and well structured, the
whole system is compromised because there is a wide gap between the
legal rules and the reality of the situation. For example, if a customs offi-
cial is legally obliged to ascertain the identity, type, quantity or value of
the goods reported in the declaration, and there may be doubt that he
will do it, or that he might not observe the regulations concerning it,
there is no effective legal instrument to sanction his behaviour.
Although such conduct of the customs officials is stipulated to be a
criminal offence, there is no well-developed internal control service
within the customs administration that would deal with it effectively. 
Apart from their excessive number, legislative acts concerning cus-
toms are also characterized by:
 a wide range in the hierarchy of legal regulations,
 inadequate and antiquated legal and technical apparatus,
 a huge disproportion between what is allowed and what is prohib-
ited,
 high level of discretionary powers.
Large range of customs regulations
The customs are regulated by the following normative acts, the
number of which exceeds those listed, but which have not been includ-
ed in the analysis since their application is provided for in other acts
through inferred competencies, or they do not have a direct influ-
ence on customs procedure and the operation of the customs service:
 laws (18),
 decrees (39),
 bylaws (7),
 resolutions (22), 
 orders (2),
 decisions (28),
 directives (4).
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Such a tangle of legal regulations deserves a short comment. First,
the listed legal acts can be categorized into several groups and sub-
groups. A certain number of legal documents fall into the group of sys-
tematic laws defining institutes which regulate certain areas, for exam-
ple the Customs Law, while the others are lex specialis laws, such as the
Law on the Customs Administration, compared to the systematic laws
which govern the organisation, the operation, the rights and the obli-
gations of employees of the state administration. There are also legal
regulations partly enforced by the customs bodies, for example the Law
on the Sales Tax. Second, a large amount of the legal documentation
consists of international conventions turned into legal acts, the
enforcement of which is to be provided by independent regulation, as
well as agreements between the Federal Government and foreign gov-
ernments on mutual assistance in customs affairs, which provide only
the basis for the cooperation of the customs administrations and do
not influence the customs procedure and the powers of the customs
officials. More to the point, such a large number of sub-statutory legal
texts leads to the conclusion that there is no clear strategy in this area,
so in certain situations, where it was possible, some issues were regulat-
ed by legal acts by executive administration. Although this conclusion
can be reached for almost all juridical areas, it is a fact that this gives
rise to the problem of delineation of powers between the legislative and
the executive authorities, and to the problem of our legal practice as
well, which opens up the following questions:
 whether it is necessary that one customs law should supplant sev-
eral laws,
 whether it is desirable and necessary that these numerous and
lengthy legal texts should be further elaborated by sub-statutory
legal texts taking into account that it would jeopardize the pur-
pose and the spirit of the law.
According to the subject matter, that is, according to the extent of
the customs regulations, we can make a rough classification into the
following groups:
a) Laws which exclusively or in the main regulate issues concerning
customs:
 The Customs Law,
 The Law on Customs Tariffs,
 The Law on the Customs Administration,
 The Law on the Verification of the Customs Convention on the
International Transport of Goods on the MDP Documentation
(form TIR),
 The Law on Free Zones,
 The Law on the Ratification of the International Convention on
Harmonization of the Border Control of Goods, 
 The laws on verification of the free trade agreement.
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b) The laws which do not regulate issues concerning customs, but
the implementation of which is executed or monitored by the cus-
toms service:
 The Foreign Trade Law,
 The Law on Foreign Currency,
 The Law on International Road Transport,
 The Law on the Sales Tax and the Law on Excise Duties,
 The laws regulating marketing of specific goods (medications,
toxic substances, dangerous substances and other).
In the opinion of many authors, the corruption at the customs con-
cerning a wide circle of civil servants is created by lobbying, and in the
nature of things, through the procedure of adopting the regulations
concerning the right to import and export goods as well as the customs
rates. Apart from that type of corruption, the very fact that there is cus-
toms classification of goods with different customs rates, in the cus-
toms procedure gives rise to another two phenomena: the appearance
of petty or moderate corruption (grey economy) and large-scale cor-
ruption (smuggling and organized crime).
Therefore, from the legal point of view, corruption at the customs is:
 a deviant, criminal activity,
 it stems from and it is connected to customs procedure (proce-
dural legal acts regulating customs supervision, customs control
and customs duties),
 it is made possible by decrees stipulating material and legal condi-
tions for foreign trade, customs tariffs, customs basis and customs
exemptions.
 It can manifest itself both as legal and illegal acts, but is always
irregular conduct on the part of the customs officials entrusted
with customs procedure.
Legal apparatus
Legal regulation in this area exhibits two kinds of deficiencies:
 The customs procedure, its forms and stages rests on old-fash-
ioned concepts which do not provide for simultaneous applica-
tion of the two fundamental principles of modern customs servic-
es: effective monitoring and unhindered flow of goods across the
border.
 The language and the format of the legal documents are also
antiquated. So, for example, legal texts do not include precise
definitions of key terms, which make room for discretionary
interpretation in practice. The problem is not negligible at all
having in mind the already mentioned discretionary right in the
actions of the customs officials and the division of competencies
between different bodies which stipulate conditions for the flow
of commodities. Perhaps the most conspicuous example is the
Law on Free Zones, which defines the free zone partially and in a
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roundabout way: it fails to delineate the basic characteristics of a
free zone, what it is, and what it is not, so that it is unclear
whether a free zone is just a territory or an economic and legal
entity. From the aspect of the grammar and the syntax of the
text, the terminology used is inapt, for example the goods are the
subject, instead of the object of an action. Finally, legal texts are
lengthy, since they consist of a great number of articles, which,
in turn, are made up of several paragraphs and points. What
complicates matters further is the fact that the regulations are
written in such a way that the first paragraph or a point states a
rule that is in good measure derogated by the next paragraph or
point (stating an exception to the rule).
We have made an example of several legal texts, the use of which can
create difficulties and open up possibilities for corruption in customs
procedure.
It should be mentioned that this survey does not include the Law on
Customs and the Law on Customs Tariffs, since the application of
these laws is best illustrated through the customs procedure, which is
the subject of section 1.5. The Law on Customs Service is discussed in
detail in order to point out the deficiencies of the current mechanisms
for sanctioning corruption at the customs.
The Law on Foreign Trade
Although it does not have the term the customs in its title, owing
to its importance, the first law under scrutiny in this analysis should be
the Law on Foreign Trade. The reason for this is the fact that customs
regulations stem from the need to control international flow of goods,
services and people, and therefore need to follow that natural and logi-
cal course. 
The law in question regulates the area of foreign trade and econom-
ic activity performed abroad; as for the flow of goods, in its nature and
content it is a complementary (amending) legal act to the Law on
Customs which stipulates the basic points of the customs procedure,
the application of which is obligatory in a concrete customs case. A
subject is granted the right to engage in foreign trade and a status of an
interested party in customs procedure by registering in the appropriate
register in that area. However, Article 9 of the Law stipulates that state
bodies, political parties and other organisations (whatever that may
mean) can also engage in a foreign trade deal for their own needs.
Although it is limited to a single foreign trade deal, in essence it is
unlimited, because the act does not stipulate how many such business
deals are allowed annually. The similar exemption from the rule stating
who is allowed to engage in foreign trade is contained in the clause per-
mitting business enterprises who have not been entered into the regis-
ter of enterprises licensed for foreign exchange business, to engage in
foreign trade deals if the deal is related to their operation, and with
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the approval of the competent federal body for external economic rela-
tions. The complete system based on the registration for foreign trade
can be compromised by this clause, there are many moot issues starting
from the way the operation of such enterprises is to be monitored,
potential enforced payment of the incurred public debts, payment and
collection abroad etc. Also, the provision of the Law that goods com-
plying with the given preconditions for marketing can be imported and
exported, is a basis for many other subsidiary acts passed by executive
administration bodies  in this case the Federal Government, as well as
the bodies and organisations within the Federal Government. There
are fourteen statutory legal acts and as many as 75 sub-statutory legal
acts which regulate this area in detail.
The Law on Manufacturing and Trade in Medications
The Law on the production and trade in medications, which stipu-
lates the conditions for trade in drugs, requires that the import of
medicinal substances be performed by those holding a permit for trad-
ing the drug, issued by the Federal Secretary for labour, health and
social policy for human medicaments, and by the Federal Minister for
the economy and internal trade for veterinary medications.
However, as has already been pointed out as a deficiency in our leg-
islation, there are numerous exemptions from the general rule, which
is both a technical problem in the implementation of the law and a
potential source of corruption. There are still eight groups of medi-
cines (about 300 articles) as well as medical substances for laboratory
and clinical research the import of which must be approved by the
Secretariat. The medications list is subject to constant change and can-
not be controlled by the customs information system (this means that
a customs official has to consult the medications list every time an
importer submits an approval from the secretariat instead of the per-
mit for trading in medications). The danger of potential violation is
high, as it is difficult to organise complete and timely supervision of the
conduct of a customs official in his role as supervisor of the import.
The Law on Money Laundering Prevention
The Law on Money Laundering Prevention stipulates that the
Customs Administration should submit information to the competent
federal body concerning all transfers of cash, checks, securities, pre-
cious metals and stones the value of which exceeds 30,000 dinars (500
Euros) across the state border. At the same time, the Law on Foreign
Currency allows an individual to bring in or take out 2,000 Euros. Is a
customs official breaking the law when he fails to report that a passen-
ger has legally taken out more than 500 Euros but less than 2,000
Euros? To all appearances, probably owing to a simple mistake in fig-
ures, the law itself has left a loophole for a customs official to take a
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bribe not to report a legal action making it out to be dangerous money
laundering. This example might rather fall into a category of petty legal
absurdities than lead to extremely harmful effects, but it is illustrative
of the fact that vagueness, lack of precision and conflicting legal regula-
tion can bring about situations in which a party in a procedure is
forced to pay to realize his right, or, as in this case, in order to escape
the consequences of an action which is neither forbidden nor illegal. 
The Law on Free Zones
The law defines a free zone as a set-up and fenced-in space in which
the conduct of business activities is permitted under more favourable
conditions, such as, exemption from taxes on equipment, raw materi-
als and components imported into the zone and upon the approval of
the Federal Government. Can the territory of a free zone be used for
illegal trade, laundering documentation and legalizing hard currency
by carrying it in and out, bearing in mind the fact that there is a 2.5
meter high fence around the zone and that the goods can only be con-
veyed through gates monitored by a customs official during the work-
ing hours of the zone? The answer is yes, because the Law permits
domestic and foreign individuals and legal entities to conduct business
within the zone but the legal entities do not have to reside within the
zone which means that directing the goods to the business unit in the
zone is done through internal documentation (which makes investiga-
tion of financial records difficult), and this, in turn, means that a cus-
toms official can make out a fictitious clearance of incoming and out-
going goods. 
Secondly, The Law requires that the same rules that regulate crossing
the border should be applied to the individuals who are going in and
out of the zone. Since crossing the border is a concept that is defined by
the Law on Customs, it can be assumed that transport vehicles, goods
and individuals are liable to customs inspection when leaving or enter-
ing the zone. All the while, there is no monitoring of the movement of
hard currency since the Law on Foreign Currency ties this type of
supervision to a persons entering or leaving the country. On the other
hand, the Law on Free Zones allows the users of the zone to make pay-
ments and collect payments freely, as stated in a contract and in agreed
period of time. It virtually means that in one part of the territory of
Yugoslavia, which has not been declared ex-territory, it is permitted to
pay for goods and services completely freely in hard currency brought
in from the other part of its territory where there are restrictions con-
cerning such a mode of payment. 
If to all of this we add the fact that storing the goods liable to excise
duties is the main business in some zones, the economic incentive for
abuse becomes apparent. True, we must point out that rigid rules of
the Law on Customs determining maximum time for the goods to
remain in the custody of the customs force the importers of the
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goods heavily burdened with encumbrances (customs duty, excise
duty, tax on the marketing of goods) to store their goods in the zones
and clear it at the market demand, in this way delaying the payment of
the levies.
Republic regulative
It has already been pointed out that the Yugoslav Customs
Administration, although formally a body of the Federal administra-
tion, has administration only on the territory of the Republic of Serbia,
without Kosovo. We shall not discuss here the potential abuse of the fact
that there are no real border crossings at the administrative borders.
Here we just want to point to some problems in the implementation of
the regulative of the Serbian Government by the customs bodies.
The Decree on the Movement of Oil and Oil Derivates requires that
the movement of these products (import, export and transit) has a spe-
cial approval by the Republic (Serbian) Ministry of Energy and Mining.
We do not want to discuss here whether such administrative regulation
of the market is justifiable since it has had some positive results in gain-
ing control over the movement of these products and collecting public
revenues from them. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the
Decree is in conflict with the Federal Decree on the Classification of
Goods which lists the forms of export and import and according to
which the import of these products is free. No matter which of the two
acts a customs official chooses to follow, he is in direct violation of the
other one. It cannot possibly be beneficial for the development of a
customs officials awareness of the importance has service has for the
community if he is forced to violate the regulations or fail to observe
them, even when this is completely justified by economic reasons. As
we have witnessed in the previous period, duration and sheer number
of such situations in the end give rise to the belief that only personal
economic benefit matters. More to the point, there are many oil
derivates and even more brand names for them. It takes laboratory
analysis to determine whether a product is oil derivate and customs
laboratories are usually unable to perform the tests. Reliability of the
laboratory testing is questionable due to the way the samples are taken
and submitted for analysis as well as the lack of supervision over testing
procedures outside the customs service.
The Decree on the Public Revenue Accounting and on the Content
and Accounting Methods for Movement of Goods from Kosovo at first
sight deserves the same criticism as the former it is in conflict with the
federal regulation. Nevertheless, as the Law on the Customs allows
interested parties to demand that the goods be sent (and cleared) at the
customs office of their choice, that right should not be denied if a client
demands that the goods be sent to the territory of Kosovo. Therefore
the Decree, from the aspect of implementation of customs regulation
constitutes a form of amendment to them, for there is a tax for such
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transit. Controversy is created by the implementation of the Law on
Foreign Trade, that meets conditions for the import of particular goods
in terms of the regulation concerning standardisation. From the aspect
of legislation, however, the greatest confusion is created by the lack of
definition of the status of domestic and foreign goods entering
Serbia from the territory of Kosovo. The procedure of verification of
the status of the goods has not been defined either, which breeds arbi-
trariness and therefore creates the possibility of abuse.
International conventions and agreements
It is very difficult to give a general judgment on the implementation
of international conventions and agreements in the area of the customs
system. They are numerous and differ according to importance and the
mode and extent of implementation. Firstly, a certain number of con-
ventions and agreements were directly implemented immediately fol-
lowing ratification, that is, adoption. The most important, and certain-
ly the best known is the TIR Convention (a customs convention on
international transportation of goods on the basis of the MDP docu-
ment). Then, there are the Agreement on Import of Teaching,
Scientific and Cultural Supplies and bilateral agreements on mutual
cooperation (general or for particular areas), the agreements on cus-
toms cooperation among them. The Customs Convention on
Harmonizing the System of Goods and the Agreement on Customs
Evaluation (article VII GATT) has been incorporated into the national
legislation. The Convention on Harmonization of the Border Control
of Goods, although ratified as early as 1978 is still not applied in whole,
especially so in the part concerning the leading role of the Customs in
the coordination of the operation of border services. The extent to
which the Agreement on Customs Cooperation is being put into prac-
tice varies, and it is best with the states with which there is a system of
preferential trade regime, owing to the large number of inspections of
the issued certificates on the origin of goods.
From what has been said it can be concluded that every state needs
(often owing to internationally taken up obligation) to control the
flow of specific articles in order to protect the environment or for the
reasons of security. It is also a fact that owing to different competen-
cies of the state bodies proposing normative regulation in certain
areas, the high number of regulations concerning the customs often
cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, what in such cases must be done if
the controlling function of the customs is to take full effect, is to cre-
ate an adequate database on the principle all in one place, available
both to the customs officials and the interested parties. For this pur-
pose the EU states make use of a special customs tariff, called TARIC,
which, in itself, is not a legal document but a synthesis of legal regula-
tion concerning the flow of goods across borders. It is obvious that
accidental or intentional violations of the law, or even the selling the
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information on the legal liabilities and rights of the participants in
the customs procedure cannot be avoided without such a guide-
book through numerous legal regulations.
Disproportion between what is allowed and what is
forbidden
While surveying the regulations concerning the customs, we have
encountered few explicit prohibitions, but since the Law on Customs
uses the term prohibited in cases where the importer fails to comply
with special rules governing the import of particular goods we shall
use the term for all actions and powers for which the Law on Customs
uses it.
It is often said that prohibitions breed the need for them to be violat-
ed, often in cooperation with those whose job is to enforce them. We
shall give some examples of the violations of prohibitions, that is, of
wrongful actions.
1) It is not allowed to use goods stored under customs supervision.
If there is no inspection of the goods stored under customs
supervision, especially if the holder is permitted to store them
on his premises (which is legal), the individual holding the
goods benefits through their use, in reality, delays paying the
customs duties. We do not think that inspection should be con-
ducted frequently, but it is necessary at least once while the
goods are stored.
2) Delaying payment of charges is not allowed. In the short term,
the problem can be solved by delaying sending the invoice to
the debtor. In the long term, the problem is addressed by fil-
ing a legal suit contesting some of the already ascertained facts.
The Law on General Administrative Legal Proceedings deter-
mines the time period in which the decision must be made in
the first and the second instance, but it does not determine
when the decision must be submitted to a disputant nor when
the first instance court must submit the documentation to the
second instance. 
3) It is not allowed to use for other purposes, to sell or give as a gift
the goods imported as exempt from customs duties. The prohibi-
tion is in effect for three years, but the party can dispose of the
goods freely after he has paid customs duty. The prohibition is
vastly disregarded by the people who have returned to the country
from work abroad. 
The examples in themselves offer solutions and modifications of
legal procedure (determining procedural actions and time frames
which customs officials must comply with, limiting customs exemp-
tions and other rights of their beneficiaries), professional and organisa-
tional training in the service for inspecting those liable to pay customs
duties, as well as developing the internal control service.
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High level of discretionary powers
In order to understand the type and significance of discretionary
powers of the customs officials, we must present a short list of customs
procedures (concerning import) from the moment the goods enter the
country to the moment they are put on the market.
The customs procedure includes:
 the customs supervision procedure;
 the customs clearance procedure.
According to the mode of transport of goods, their storing, the type
of the foreign trade deal during which the commodity is imported or
exported and similar, each of the procedures has further classifications.
The main phases of the customs supervision are: reporting the goods to
the customs office, sending the goods to the destination customs house
with specified time span in which the goods must be forwarded, storing
the goods under customs supervision in warehouses and other appro-
priate facilities. It should be noted that from the aspect of the customs
procedure the transit of goods is considered to be a special form of cus-
toms supervision. The customs clearing also has several phases: sub-
mitting the declaration (invoice), accepting the declaration, inspecting
the goods, calculation and collection of duties. The customs procedure
concerning temporarily imported goods has some elements of the cus-
toms clearing procedure, as a rule, without the calculation and collec-
tion of the customs duty, since this problem is tackled later depending
on the outcome of the business deal for which the goods were tem-
porarily imported. It also has some elements of the customs supervi-
sion (determining the place where the goods are, the time span in
which the temporary import is allowed, normative concerning the
quantity of goods to be used and so on).
This short survey of the customs procedures was necessary for
understanding the discretionary powers of the customs officials and
the way they are opposed to the concept that a customs official is sup-
posed to determine the factual state of affairs and apply regulations
concerning the case in question in a proper manner.
The analysis of the customs procedures reveals that there are more
discretionary powers allowed in the customs supervision procedure. So
the customs office, that is, the empowered customs worker can author-
ize the forwarding of goods to another customs house, determine in
what manner the goods will be supervised, the deadline for forwarding
the goods to the destination customs office, authorize the placement of
goods under customs supervision and the time period in which the
goods are to be supervised, ascertain whether the storage areas and
other facilities are appropriate for conducting customs supervision and
similar. The number of the powers is, indeed, high, but they mainly
concern ascertaining the state of affairs on which the actions and deci-
sions made by a customs official depend. It is obvious that the problem
is not the fact that these powers exist, it is, rather, the fact that there is
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no mechanism to oversee how they are used. The normative regulation
could limit these powers by determining time periods in which a cus-
toms official has to take an action, by stipulating that a customs official
should make a note or a record of the action taken, stating the reasons
for it, and so on. Such modifications would enable the internal control
service (on condition that it is well organized and efficient) to detect
deficiencies in a customs officials work and rank them from accidental
mistake or omission to the abuse of position.
However, what needs to be especially pointed out is that major vio-
lations are perpetrated by not reporting the goods entering the customs
area, which is, naturally, done in collusion with a customs official and
also by fictitious reports that goods declared to be in transit have left
the country. Such things cannot be solved by normative change but
rather through more rigorous internal control.
In customs clearance procedure, we cannot talk about the discre-
tionary powers of the customs workers, but rather, of his obligation to
determine the facts (first of all the type, quantity, value and origin of
goods) and subsequently apply relevant regulations.
In the phase of submitting the declaration and relevant documenta-
tion, the most frequent wrongful actions are:
 inaccurately determined quantity of goods. False information
from the invoice of lading is submitted into the customs declara-
tion, and it is up to only one customs official whether the infor-
mation will be checked by counting or measuring.
 inaccurate evaluation of goods on false invoices. The problem of
double invoicing is often encountered here  the invoice with the
lower figure is submitted to the customs and the invoice stating
the real, higher value is used for accounting. Since the invoices
which have not been submitted in the customs clearing cannot be
used for payment abroad through a domestic bank, this paves the
way for further abuse  payment in cash or from a foreign bank
account and similar. If false reporting of the value is not motivat-
ed by the intent to cut down on customs expenses, but rather by
the intent to transfer money out of the country, inflated invoic-
es are submitted, which are extremely rarely checked. Customs
declarations reporting the customs basis lower than usual are sub-
ject to subsequent inspection. However, since the basic principle
of the customs evaluation is the transactional (contractual) value
of goods, the corrupt customs official who had endorsed the false
evaluation, as a rule, justifies his action by claiming that the
invoice was satisfactory (with all necessary elements) and that he
had no cause to doubt the stated information.
 Incorrect classification of goods by customs tariff number
(according to the HS), with the intention of paying the charges at
the lower customs rate or avoiding special conditions stipulated
for import or export (quotas, declarations, approvals, certificates
and similar). Since goods are put on the market after the customs
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clearance, it is difficult later to check whether the goods were
wrongly classified. By analytic monitoring of imports it is possible
to detect some clues pointing to the abuse: after the import
requirements for one type of goods have been made more rigor-
ous, the import of similar goods for which the customs require-
ments are less strict (lower customs rates or more convenient
other requirements) rapidly rises. A warning about the observed
trend can have a deterrent effect on the conduct of the customs
workers.
 Avoiding payment of customs duties or paying them at a lower
customs rate than required can be affected by falsely reporting the
place of origin of goods. The goods exported can also be granted
preferential treatment when put on a foreign market. In both
cases the economic incentive is strong, and the risk that the cus-
toms official will be proved guilty of abuse of position is negligi-
ble. He can always defend himself by the fact that he was not able
to verify the declared place of origin.
Penal legal regulation
The Law on Customs Service was adopted in 1980 and has been
slightly amended in 1987. This is important because among other
things, this law determines the powers of the body for initiating disci-
plinary proceedings and ensuing measures. In the light of the fact that
the law was adopted in the former SFR Yugoslavia for the regulation of
then existing relations, it is not surprising that it does not provide for
significant modification of the disciplinary measures for state adminis-
tration bodies. Adopted at a time when social ownership held sway, the
Law could not foresee the later manifestations of corruption at the cus-
toms. In fact, business enterprises of the period dealt only with social
capital and thus had less incentive to try to violate the regulations for
financial gain. Not that there was no corruption at all, rather, there was
less of it, mostly in customs clearing of passenger traffic, and so the
social consequences of such corruption were less significant. As for the
disciplinary proceedings, we can point out two elementary defects.
First, the proceedings are initiated by the manager of the organisation-
al unit to which the worker belongs, and in the first instance they are
conducted by a commission the members of which are the workers
from the same organisational unit. This fact alone creates doubt about
the objectivity of the initiation and conduct of the proceedings (to the
advantage or disadvantage of the individual it was brought against).
Second, the lack of or inadequate number of the employees trained for
conducting the proceedings often leads to procedural mistakes and the
decision might be revoked by the second instance commission or by
the court in a working relations lawsuit. If we add to this the notorious
slowness of the courts, it is not surprising that final decisions can be
expected as long as several years after the suit was filed.
97Preconditions and Mechanisms of Corrupton at the Customs
It is obvious that this area needs to be fundamentally changed. In
this direction, development of the internal control service, organisa-
tionally independent, would secure that initiating proceedings were
objective and effective and legal regulative which would take into
account the specific character of the service should aim at speeding up
the proceedings and reaching the decision.
Conclusion
In short, we can say that the primary incentive for corruption at the
customs is the intention to avoid paying customs charges altogether or
to pay a smaller amount. Another motive can be to realize certain
rights (import or export of goods for which there are quantitative or
qualitative restrictions, or evading requirements for realization of
rights, for example, for marketing of certain articles). Ultimately, the
incentive is unquestionably financial gain, direct or indirect. The cus-
toms workers accept bribes as a share in the economic profits or as a
reward for a favour.
There are numerous manifestations of corruption; they appear both
during the supervising and customs clearing procedures (including the
phase of collecting the levies, which can be prolonged), most frequent-
ly in the form of sale of a right or as an exemption from some require-
ment/duty.
The number and various legal power of legal acts, the lack of regula-
tions appropriate for the current state of affairs  there are three cus-
toms systems operating on the territory of Yugoslavia (the flow of goods
is not regulated with Montenegro and Kosovo), as well as frequent
changes in the regulations contribute to corruption at the customs. 
THE FACTORS OF CORRUPTION IN THE LAST TEN YEARS
Historical factors
The most important factor of corruption is the dissolution of the
former SFR Yugoslavia in 1991, which brought about several very sig-
nificant changes. Prior to this, border crossings in Serbia were exclu-
sively with the states of the former eastern block, which were quite
uninteresting in the commercial sense in terms of the flow of goods
and passengers. The most interesting border crossings in the commer-
cial sense were those in Slovenia, that is, the border crossings with Italy
(the Trieste route) and Austria (most people working abroad returned
to the country there). It was at these crossings that the economic
ground (demand) for corruption existed, producing, in turn, the sup-
ply of corruption.
With the dissolution of the former SFR Yugoslavia, the borders of
Serbia/FR Yugoslavia, became the borders with the western world, i.e.
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with the more commercialised transitional states. Szeged supplanted
Trieste, and those working abroad did not return home via Slovenia,
but via Subotica. This laid economic foundations for corruption, that
is, for the supply of corruption.
The secession of Slovenia and Croatia and the way it was affected led
to heavy migration of customs officials. The majority of customs offi-
cials posted in Slovenia who were not Slovenians by origin, decided to
leave the country but to continue to work in their profession. That
brought to Serbia/FR Yugoslavia, people who had had a different way
of working, which is to say, who were used to commercially attractive
border crossings. These people were not unfamiliar with the idea of
providing a service of preferential treatment, which created a supply
of corruption at our border crossings. The seed of corruption quickly
took root and the newcomers successfully spread their ideas on the way
things should be done among those who had scrupulously performed
their duties before.
Political factors
Since the early 1990s the most significant political factors of cor-
ruption in our customs administration were the wars in the neigh-
bouring states and the perpetual state of emergency. The most
important international factor of corruption was the sanctions
imposed by the international community (the Security Council
Resolution 757), which included the ban on trading with the FR
Yugoslavia. Virtually all import (except for food and medicines)
became illegal, and every imported shipment of goods was consid-
ered to be an instance of breaching the blockade and therefore could
be presented as a patriotic act. In this way all dealings bringing goods
into the state (smuggling, corruption and so on) were not viewed as
breaking the law but rather as a holy patriotic mission. As long as
goods reached the country, everything was allowed. The second con-
tributing factor was the fact that the country had been banished
from nearly all international organisations and association, suspend-
ing cooperation with the neighbouring countries, that is, their cus-
toms administrations as well as with multilateral organisations for
fighting corruption. This was especially true for the exchange of cru-
cial information.
International factors of corruption at the customs at the beginning
of the 1990 found fertile ground in Serbia, that is, in its customs. The
principal domestic political reason for this is the fact that the former
ruler chose to use the customs administration to achieve his two
main objectives: for his personal benefit/wealth (and for the benefit
of his family) and for retaining the power. In keeping with this, we
can say that corruption at the customs in Serbia and in the FR
Yugoslavia is a typical instance of institutionalised corruption; it
appeared as a natural consequence of the character of the political
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regime in the state. On the one hand, through complete privatisation
and corruption of the customs administration that state service was
used for controlling the flow of money, which meant that customs
revenues were not channelled into the budget but into financing var-
ious personal political projects. On the other hand, the fact that a
large number of people were involved in criminal dealings (with the
silent approval by the ruler and his clique) made all those people
hostages to the regime. Their wrongful actions could easily have been
documented if they had stopped cooperating with the regime, and so
they all had good reasons to stay loyal and in this way uphold the elite
and the ruler.
The process of turning the Federal Customs Administration into a
corrupt institution was completed by appointing a new director in
1994. The new director, who had had long experience working for the
State Security Service, reorganised the Custom Administration so as to
achieve the mentioned objectives. He brought with him many new
people  trustworthy people. Even today, the majority of the employees
of the Federal Customs Administration are those hired between 1994
and 2000, that is, during the mandate of that director. Staff hired in
that period was not trained for work at the customs, but were well-
versed in corruption. If they were loyal and cooperated in big corrupt
deals, which, as a rule, were always in the interest of the state, they
were allowed a share of the proceeds. The interest of the state simply
meant that businessmen supporting the regime profited in an illegal
way, agreeing to pay back to the regime whenever the need arose to
finance what it had been decided to finance. Naturally, it never
occurred to them to oppose the regime. 
Organisational factors
Almost all current organisational factors of corruption in the Federal
Customs Administration have been inherited from the previous peri-
od. This just shows how difficult it is to eliminate certain organisation-
al factors, that is, how unsuitable the institutional framework is for an
effective fight against corruption. 
The first significant organisational factor concerns the cooperation
between the customs service with the other services that control the
border, that is, which are entrusted with upholding the law. This is,
above all, the border police. The lack of clear separation of powers
necessarily leads to confusion in work and mutual accusations. There
are also strong indications that the border police are corrupt as well.
First, such conduct of the police creates an incentive for the customs
workers to engage in corruption. Second, the inertia (often intention-
al) of the police inevitably limits the customs administration in their
fight against corruption. Finally, an effective and uncorrupted police
force would act as a strong deterrent on the behaviour of the customs
workers contemplating whether to engage in corruption. In many
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ways, if the police are not corrupt there is less chance that the cus-
toms will be corrupt.
The existing legal framework and mechanisms for its implementa-
tion indirectly contribute to corruption. Consistent application of
strict penal measures serves as a deterrent for the wrongful act of cor-
ruption, and thereby lowers the possibility of its occurrence. However,
the criminal proceedings in cases of corruption at the customs are not
very effective, thus constituting a most important factor for corrup-
tion. Criminal charges brought against several customs officials a year
and a half ago still have not been completed. True, it is difficult to file a
criminal suit in such cases, as direct material evidence on the received
bribe often does not exist. There is just circumstantial material evi-
dence such as personal property of the customs officials, vastly dispro-
portionate to their income. The example for this is a Crooks Valley
in Subotica, full of family houses worth several hundred thousand
Euros with expensive cars and luxurious SUVs parked in front of them.
This is all circumstantial evidence, however, which cannot serve as
proof in a criminal case.
There is a Service for the Prevention of Smuggling within the Federal
Customs Administration, but there is no standard internal control.
Therefore, the Service also performs the work of internal control, the
situation which, presumably, cannot be considered favourable. There
are various forms of smuggling that do not rest on corruption, and
their suppression requires the engagement of a high number of people.
In the organisational sense, focusing on the fight against corruption
probably does not require that a special internal control unit should be
set up, but it certainly does require that such a unit should have exten-
sive resources and broad powers.
As for the organisation of corrupt dealings, in most cases there is a
more or less organized group of people  a customs official cannot suc-
cessfully engage in corruption by himself; he needs at least acquies-
cence from his colleagues. In other words, a corrupt customs official
works within a well-organised group with the individuals from the
border police or with his co-workers in the customs administration
(his subordinates or his superiors). It was easy to set up such groups in
the 1990s; they were even set up at the very centre. As there was wide
acceptance of corruption, such groups were easily maintained; poten-
tial rotations did not have any effect since the groups would be quickly
organized at the new border crossing.
In the last two years, tolerance of corruption has been drastically
reduced which reduced the willingness of the customs officials to join
corrupt groups. Larger groups have lost their appeal since they can-
not endure as easily as before. Now one needs to work alone, which is
very difficult and inefficient (except, perhaps, in passenger traffic), or
in small groups where individuals engaging in corruption trust each
other. As the penal regulative becomes more strict, and especially,
more effective in its implementation (in the phase of exposing the
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perpetrators as well as in the phase of bringing actions against them),
so it will serve as a further obstacle for setting up such groups and
speed up their dissolution.
On the organisational level, it is important to notice that corrup-
tion rests on permanent relationships and on sustained agreement
between corrupt individuals and their clients. In other words, it is
necessary that they establish and maintain the bonds of trust. In such
a case, the transactional costs, that is, the costs incurred by corrup-
tion are considerably lower. For example, very often, a corrupt deal is
paid later, which lowers the costs of a transaction since it lowers the
risk that a wrongful action will be exposed and brought to court.
When the policy in this area becomes stricter, the bonds of trust
between corrupt individuals and their clients will break, which, in
turn, will raise the transaction costs and the probability that corrup-
tion will be exposed.
MECHANISMS OF CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL CUSTOMS
ADMINISTRATION
Passenger traffic
Customs clearing and the flow of goods in passenger traffic have
several important characteristics which make them different from the
cargo traffic. First, the clients of the customs service, that is, the
individuals liable to pay customs duties are individuals (natural per-
sons) and not legal entities. Second, customs clearing is performed by
direct application of the regulation in a short procedure and (current-
ly) at a single customs rate of 10% regardless of the type of goods the
individual imports. Third, the flow of goods in passenger traffic does
not involve documentation; documentation is only produced if the
goods have been cleared at the customs, that is, in cases when the indi-
viduals were liable to pay customs duties for the imported goods. The
lack of documentation means that there will be no traces of any-
thing illegal, that is, no evidence which can be used for subsequent
ascertaining and prosecuting of corruption. Finally, in passenger traf-
fic the selective inspection of passengers has always been used so that
every customs official has a discretionary right to choose a passenger
he wants to inspect and let through the passengers who do not merit
such attention.
In principle, corruption in passenger traffic has a low value per unit,
in other words, the amount of corruption per transaction is relatively
small, but, on the other hand, the number of transactions is very high
so that the total amount of corruption, that is, of the bribes paid, is very
high. There is no reliable information on the proportion of corruption
in passenger traffic in total corruption at the Federal Customs
Administration, but it is estimated at 20 to 60% and even as much as
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70%.1 So, regardless of the relatively small value of corruption per unit,
it appears, at least by most estimates, that the total amount of corrup-
tion in passenger traffic is rather high.
An indirect indication of the extent and significance of corruption in
passenger traffic is the fact that there is a large demand of the customs
officials for posts at passenger terminals; being relocated from the pas-
senger terminal is considered to be a harsh punishment and a personal
failure of a customs official. Such attitude to work at the passenger ter-
minal indirectly points to how convenient these workplaces are in
terms of the expected profit from corruption. The loss of such a work-
place means the loss of income providing a pleasant life style; the cus-
toms official and his family were free from poverty and even able to
climb up the social ladder with the money from corruption. Many of
them find it difficult to adjust to a normal, honest life.2
Large demand for workplaces at the passenger terminal inevitably
generates induced corruption in the customs administration as well.
There is an incentive to the workers to try to corrupt their co-workers
in the personnel department in order to secure a desirable workplace
and gains from corruption. In such cases bribes paid to secure an
appropriate workplace is a sort of investment, paid from expected
income from corruption in passenger traffic.3
Junior customs staff especially generates a high demand for posts at
the passenger terminals. They usually do not possess much knowledge
and cannot take part in relatively complex corrupt deals at the cus-
toms, especially in cargo traffic  that is the reason why they spend a lot
of energy fighting to secure themselves posts in passenger traffic. It is
an indirect proof that mechanisms of corruption are relatively simple
in passenger traffic, that they do not require particular knowledge and
that they secure a rather small (per unit) gain both for the corrupted
officials and for their clients. This type of corruption seems to be the
favourite among the customs staff because it is simple, there is no need
to work hard on designing a plan how to bring it off, the risk is small
(no documents are left for further inspection of regularity).4 In view of
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1 The wide range of cited estimates points to their relatively low reliability. Nevertheless,
most estimates determine the proportion of this type of corruption in overall corrup-
tion at the customs at over 50%.
2 It has been shown that in some cases greed becomes so strong that it causes psychologi-
cal difficulties in corrupt customs officials; they display a specific kind of kleptomania
when corruption in itself, independently from the benefit from it, becomes a necessity
of life to such people.
3 Such situations are especially to be expected if a large number of customs officials lose
their jobs on operative tasks at passenger or goods terminals, as it happened in the sum-
mer of 1999 when our customs bodies retreated from Kosovo. The Pristina customs
house was virtually dissolved and many customs officials found it to be their vital inter-
est to manage to get relocated to passenger terminals at the border with Hungary. Some
of them were, no doubt, willing to pay what it took for their wish to come true.
However, it remains unclear to what extent this form of internal customs corruption
has lingered on since the change in management in FCA in the autumn of the year 2000.
4 In the slang of the customs, the bribe, especially in passenger traffic, is called putting
the patients in a vise
this, relocation (being taken off as the customs slang terms it) from
the passenger terminal is felt to be a harsh punishment. There are,
however, significant exceptions from this attitude which we shall dis-
cuss later.
In general, corruption connected with the flow of goods in passenger
traffic can be divided into several typical cases. The following survey
concerns mostly road border crossings, since corruption and other ille-
gal customs practices in passenger traffic are for the most part per-
formed at that kind of border crossings. The same or similar mecha-
nisms are to a certain extent used in other kinds of passenger traffic.
Allowing the shipment through (avoiding the inspection)
This is the simplest and the least sophisticated method of avoiding
customs clearing and payment of duties. The shipment can be allowed
to pass through the customs border cross point without stopping the
vehicle and the passengers. The whole thing can be arranged and often
paid in advance if the shipment is of considerable value; the whole
service boils down to waving  the corrupt customs official just
waves to the passenger vehicle or a van through without inspection.5 In
this case we have total separation of the provision of the service and the
payment. Naturally, not all cases of letting a vehicle through should be
considered to be a symptom of corruption since the customs inspec-
tion is selective and every customs official has the discretionary right to
choose the vehicle he will inspect.
The mentioned method usually concerns allowing valuable goods
through the customs. The shipment is usually light and of small vol-
ume, but valuable. This includes personal electronic equipment,
telecommunications equipment (mobile telephones and similar)
and expensive clothes (designer clothes). In this way the goods are
completely exempted from charges which gives them a competitive
edge on the market and their retailers a large rent. Sometimes a ship-
ment of this kind can be worth as much as 150,000 Euros.
Sometimes, especially in cases of very expensive clothes, the goods
have been stolen in western states and the transport across the bor-
der without customs clearance is just a link in the business of steal-
ing in the western states and reselling the goods in Serbia. Apart
from the incentive to customs duties, in these cases it is even more
important to cover up the illegal activity.6
Far more frequently the shipment allowed through is smaller; the
van or the passenger vehicle are usually stopped. If the quantity of
104 Corruption at the Customs
5 This type of corruption when a vehicle is allowed through by waving is in the customs
slang called YAMAHA (the pun meaning I waved)
6 Since the purchase price of the nicked goods is negligible (although there are some
costs incurred), the customs duties could easily be paid and the goods could still be
resold at competitive prices and high profit for the retailers. Presumably, the incentive
for corruption is concealing the stolen goods.
goods is small, most often extended personal luggage, the whole deal is
performed on the spot, with the client usually offering a smaller
amount of bribe to escape examination (20 to 100 Euros); this demon-
strates that the value of goods is relatively small and that the customs
duty, without corruption, would not be significant.
Both types of corrupt dealings involving allowing the shipment to
pass through the customs without inspection of the goods are much
more easily done if the customs border cross points are crowded, that
is, if everyone at the crossing is tired and tense. It is much easier to
engage in corruption if there is a crowd of people waiting. More to the
point, when there is a crowd some of the passengers might offer a cer-
tain, usually smaller, sum of money just to get ahead of the others
waiting in line for at the customs; they do not intend to avoid inspec-
tion, just to cross the border as quickly as possible. It is understand-
able why a traffic jam or a long queue is sometimes created on purpose
to make an appropriate atmosphere for corruption. For example, one
shift finishes and the next one delays the inspection till the crowds and
queues pile up.
It is certain that in such an environment there is no incentive to
establish law and order. If it were to happen, not only the corruption
would become more conspicuous but also it would become obvious,
which of the workers are good at their job and which are not. To
those who are less capable, that is, those who do not know enough to
do their job properly, the establishment of order presents a threat,
and the others often do not have enough incentive to battle for better
conditions. 
Failing to charge the customs duty
Another subgroup of the previous method of corruption is failing to
charge the customs dues; the goods have been examined but the cus-
toms official decides that there is no basis for charging customs duties
for the goods carried across the border. This type of corrupt work is
performed in cases when the value of the shipment, the goods, is small-
er; the payment is done on the spot or in the immediate vicinity and
the corrupt official and his client usually do not know each other. In
other words, there is no need for any previous arrangement, that is, for
any special organisation of this type of corruption.
The corruption of this type is usually done directly; there are no
intermediaries in the flow of money from the corrupt individual to the
client. As for the clients, they are mostly passengers who relatively
rarely cross the state border (people working abroad coming home for
holidays), they are not involved in chains of smuggling and re-selling
goods and the amount of the bribe per transaction is, as a rule, relative-
ly small. Sometimes the corrupt customs officials collect the payment
for the service provided in goods; they take part of the shipment which
they, illegally, failed to charge.
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Charging a flat rate
Charging a flat rate is a special form of biased customs procedure by
which the customs encumbrance is reduced for the passengers who
carry goods using corruption. This mechanism of corruption in pas-
senger traffic is most often used in cases of busses full of passengers and
goods. The clients, i.e. the passengers are usually petty smugglers who
legally cross the border at the same check point. They know very well
all customs officials at that crossing and the customs officials know
every one of those passengers as well. In this case one of the customs
officials makes a deal with one of the passengers representatives (it is
usually the bus driver or the group guide  tourist guide). The con-
tact negotiates a flat rate of the bribe (for the bus as a whole  for all the
passengers) along with the flat rate of the customs duties. The amount
of the bribe together with the customs charges is then evenly distrib-
uted among all passengers. Sometimes, the customs dues are not
charged at all, and the passengers pay the bribe in order to evade cus-
toms examination.
This mechanism often involves separation of the service and the
payment; the examination and charging or failing to charge the duties
are paid for in advance. The payment is usually done in a nearby coffee
shop, or in a coffee shop in a nearby town, the representatives of both
sides often being the only people present. It is important that the pas-
sengers, that is, their representatives and the customs officials, that is,
their representatives trust one another and maintain a solid, long-time
cooperation. All this involves some fixed costs  the costs incurred till
the parties have got to know each other and learn to trust each other.
This done, corruption becomes routine.
The value of the goods in the bus can amount to 250,000 Euros.
However, the value of the goods can vary from case to case, the average
value per passenger being between 1,500 Euros and 2,500. The amount
of the bribe at the flat rate of charge, or failing to charge the customs
duties is in proportion to the mentioned values.
In the case of air passenger traffic, that is, the passenger border cross-
ing at Belgrade airport, the most interesting articles in terms of corrup-
tion are electronic equipment (computer components, personal equip-
ment and so on) along with textiles, especially the articles which the
owners of boutiques try to bring into the country as personal lug-
gage/belongings. With an appropriate bribe it will be treated as a per-
sonal luggage, or charged at the flat rate which is much more
favourable for the importer than the regular customs rate.7
In time, corrupt customs officials at all passenger border crossings
create an informal database of smugglers in order to get to know who
trades which goods, what is the value of their goods and how much a
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other airport staff.
client can pay in bribes. At the same time, the smugglers as well create
databases of customs officials with all relevant information, starting
with the preferences of a customs official concerning corruption to
details of his private life. Not that it is difficult to gather information on
the private life of the customs officials. It is enough to learn basic infor-
mation on the wealth in vast disproportion to what he/she legally
earns. All information can be effectively used in two ways. First, a cus-
toms official can be offered the bribe most to his/her liking. Second,
potentially compromising details of his/life (besides the fact that he/she
is corrupt) can be used to blackmail him into further cooperation in
corrupt dealings.
Special cases
There are several special cases of corruption at the customs concern-
ing passenger traffic. One of them is the so-called dividing of the
shipment. The procedure is as follows. The shipment is usually trans-
ported by a smaller lorry or a van to the border crossing and then
divided up and reloaded into a relatively high number of cars. The
reloading can be done on the territory of the neighbouring state (so
that the goods can leave the country under the conditions for passenger
traffic), or between the two border crossings, in the so-called no
mans land. The divided up shipment is no longer considered to fall
under the cargo traffic regime entailing regular customs procedure, but
under the passenger traffic regime and reduced customs procedure. In
this regard, it is important to note that all citizens of the FRY have a
right to a duty-free allowance for personal luggage along with articles
for personal use and the use of their family to the amount of $100.
When divided up and reloaded, the complete shipment can legally
enter the country. Of course, the reloading itself must be done in secret
so that customs officials do not suspect what is happening. Besides cus-
toms workers, the members of the border police must also be included
in corruption so that the shipment can be divided and reloaded covert-
ly. If a customs official at the passenger terminal, even an official of
average ability and memory, is to overlook the same vehicles carrying
the same passengers and the same commodities, carefully sorted
according to all regulations, it is necessary to bribe him.
In its original form, dividing the shipment is usually done with
expensive clothes, stolen, as a rule. It can also be used for personal elec-
tronic equipment and miniature electronic components. The main aim
of this corruption mechanism is to evade the regular customs examina-
tion and complex procedure which leaves traces in copious documen-
tation and bring in the goods with a short procedure which leaves no
traces, that is, no documentation of any kind. This is especially impor-
tant for a certain number of cases when the goods in question have
been stolen and it is vitally important to cover the tracks of the move-
ment of such goods.
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Some instances of corruption in passenger traffic involve very valu-
able articles stolen in burglaries; i.e. they are connected with interna-
tional crime. The stolen things are usually valuable or designer articles
such as Rolex watches (hot stuff as they are called in customs
slang). The bribe is often paid in goods (since the commodities have
still not been put on the market or sunk as the professionals in this
area say). As it involves high risk, the bribe in such cases is agreed on in
advance, through an intermediary, but the actual payment can be done
on the spot (giving away one or two of the watches, for example). The
only material proof remaining in such a case is a very valuable item,
such as the mentioned Rolex worth so much that no customs official
in Serbia could afford it on his salary.
A special opportunity for smuggling goods, that is, for corrupting
customs officials in order to carry the goods across the border without
paying customs charges is when someone is moving house. The people
who temporarily work abroad (usually in European countries) occa-
sionally return to the country to stay. Then they move all their proper-
ty including furniture and various electrical appliances. In such cases,
the consulate in the country where they temporarily resided issues a
certificate of permanent departure from the state; the certificate means
that the passengers will have preferential treatment at the customs 
most of their property is considered to be duty-free allowance.
As for the technical part, the property is usually loaded on a truck,
that is, in a single truck container. Very valuable other goods can be
loaded together with the property of the people returning home; it is
most often brand new restaurant equipment or electronic equipment.
As there is no customs charge on import of personal property, the cus-
toms officials do not perform the inspection as thoroughly as they usu-
ally do. However, it is safest to bribe a customs official, which is easy, as
for a long time nobody was interested in the household objects being
moved across the border. After some very valuable shipments had been
discovered hidden among personal property, this method of smuggling
became riskier and so the tariff of the bribe to be paid probably rose. 
Finally, let us mention another type of petty corruption in customs
passenger traffic where a customs official performs a real or a fictitious
service to the passenger crossing the border at the road customs cross-
ing. If it is real, the favour usually involves granting the passenger a flat
rate or failing to charge him for goods of relatively small value; howev-
er, it often happens that a customs official manages to persuade a pas-
senger that he is doing him a favour by not charging him for personal
luggage. Quite often the passenger offers a reward to the customs offi-
cial for the service. The customs official refuses the money but sends
the passenger to the nearby coffee shop or a restaurant to pay for a
round of drinks or a meal for the whole shift and to bring him a receipt.
While there were duty free shops at the border crossings, the reward for
a service was usually a box of cigarettes or a bottle of whiskey; now they
ask for prepaid cards for mobile telephones, later sold on the black
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market.8 The victims of such corruption are, naturally, the passengers
who obviously cannot afford more.
There are some articles and substances which must not be brought
into the country at all. They are, first of all, narcotic drugs and
weapons. In the light of everything that is known about it, carrying
these articles and substances across the border is not connected with
corruption of the customs workers. True, this type of trafficking is also
done through passenger terminals,9 but the individuals carrying them
do it at their own risk, hoping to avoid the customs inspection which
will discover their more or less well-hidden cargo. An attempt to bribe
a customs official to overlook the passage of such commodities is too
risky both for this type of smuggler and their organisations and for cus-
toms workers as well. The bribe received to let a shipment of clothes
through cannot, from the aspect of penal regulative, be compared with
the bribe for letting through a shipment of heroin. Considering the
high risk a customs official would have to take and the benefits he can
get if he reports a shipment of narcotics or weapons, there is a minimal
chance that a customs official will deliver a service of this type and
allow such a shipment into the country unhindered. Since this type of
smugglers, individuals who trade in drugs and narcotics, know very
well what the incentives to the customs workers are, they do not
attempt to make corrupt deals with customs officials.10
Cargo traffic
Customs clearance and the flow of merchandise in cargo traffic are
different from the discussed passenger traffic in several significant
ways. First, the clients of the customs service, that is, entities liable to
pay customs duties are not individuals but legal entities. Sometimes it
is difficult to trace back legal entities as a certain number of enterprises
engaging in foreign exchange business are fictitious companies.11
Second, customs clearing is based on indirect application of regula-
tions, on a regular customs procedure and on various customs rates
according to the goods in transit. Third, the flow of goods and its cus-
toms clearance entails copious documentation produced every time
goods cross the border regardless of whether they are liable to customs
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8 It seems that this type of petty corruption was imported from the outside; Macedonian
customs officials were the first to practice it and later our customs workers, especially
those at the border with Macedonia, followed suit.
9 Besides passenger terminals, shipments of narcotics and weapons also enter the country
on goods terminals, and in a certain number of cases outside border crossings, that is,
on those parts of the border that are outside the Customs Administrations jurisdiction.
10 The conclusions concerning drugs and weapons trafficking were based on the available
information from the Federal Customs Administration. It must be taken into account
that these conclusions might not be true for other customs administrations, perhaps
even for the customs administrations of the neighbouring states.
11 Certain foreign exchange enterprises are sometimes set up for a single business deal, for
a single transaction.
duties or not. Therefore, there is a paper trail on the basis of which sub-
sequent investigation of the (ir)regularity of the customs procedure
may be investigated, determining the accountability of all concerned.12
The existence of a permanent record and the possibility of the subse-
quent disclosure of the traces of corruption present an added risk both
to the crooked importers and to the potentially corrupt customs work-
ers. This in itself lowers the likelihood of corruption and requires thor-
ough preparation from the parties involved and well-reasoned plan-
ning in order to reduce the likelihood of being found out later.
Finally, for a long time there has been a rule that every shipment
must be examined (it is beside the point whether the rule was consis-
tently observed), and it was only in 2002 that the principle was sup-
planted (only in part, at several border crossings) by the regime of
selective shipment inspection, so that every customs official has a dis-
cretionary power to select the shipment he wants to inspect. It is up to
him to assess whether the documents submitted correspond to reality
and allow through the shipments he does not consider worth the trou-
ble of inspection so the customs clearance can be performed on the
basis of shipment documents. 
Unlike corruption in passenger traffic, the corruption in the cargo
traffic is far more complex, almost sophisticated and requires consider-
able knowledge and experience as well as thorough planning and prepa-
ration. In other words, only the senior, experienced customs workers
who possess enough knowledge and practice can successfully bring off a
corrupt deal of this type and make a profit on it. Junior, novice customs
officials, lacking the adequate knowledge of the customs procedure itself
are simply under-qualified for this type of corruption and are forced
to concentrate on passenger traffic. It is easy to understand their disap-
pointment when taken off the passenger terminal  no more of that
easy, simple and straightforward corruption; if they want to keep prac-
ticing it, they must work a little harder at it.
In principle, corruption in the cargo traffic has a high value per unit;
the amount of profits per transaction is relatively high. On the other
hand, the number of transactions is far lower compared with passenger
traffic. The result of this fact is that the profit (rent) on a transaction,
that is, on a corrupt foreign trade deal can be very high. In other words,
high potential profit in such deals allows the corrupt importer or the
shipper in his role as the importers intermediary to offer a customs
official a relatively high bribe. It is really important that the bribe be
high enough if a corrupt arrangement is to be made since it is complex
and risky from the point of view of corrupt customs officials. 
There is no reliable information on the proportion of corruption in
cargo traffic in the total corruption at the customs. According to some
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12 According to the internal regulation of the FCA, documentation in the electronic form
or on paper is kept for five years for the former and ten years for the latter form. The
right to routine subsequent control is in effect for two years after the date of the cus-
toms clearing, that is, the inspection of goods.
estimates (the reliability of which can, naturally, be dubious), it makes
up nearly 80% of the total corruption in terms of its worth in money.
However, regardless of the real (still unascertained) proportion of this
type of corruption at the customs, it should be noted that this is the
case of serious, often termed high voltage corruption which entails
the existence of criminal networks and organisations. Also, it is the cor-
ruption in cargo traffic that seriously cuts down on budgetary revenues
and compromises the foreign trade policy of a state.
Generally speaking, corruption in cargo traffic can be classified into
several characteristic types. The following survey mostly concerns road
border crossings since corruption and other irregularities in customs
procedure concerning the cargo traffic in most cases concern this type
of border crossings. It seems that shipment of goods in railroad traffic
is not attractive for corruption since this type of transport is not flexi-
ble and that besides customs documentation it also requires the rail-
road documentation which considerably hinders corruption. Finally, it
is usually the bulky and commercially unattractive goods of inferior
value that are transported by train. There is no incentive to try to bribe
customs officials in this type of transport since the goods themselves
are not attractive enough to be put on illegal markets.13
Consequently, like the corruption at passenger terminals, that is,
corrupting the customs officials in charge of passenger traffic, in the
case of cargo traffic there are also several basic mechanisms and types
of corruption.
Allowing the shipment through
The least sophisticated mode of corruption in cargo traffic is allow-
ing the trucks through the customs border cross point without customs
inspection and without customs clearance. On the one hand, this type,
that is, this mechanism of corruption is a breach of customs and for-
eign trade regulations  blatant law breaking. On the other hand, how-
ever, it brings the client of the corruption huge economic benefit (rent)
owing to the fact that he evades paying customs charges on the import-
ed goods. As the transactions involve large sums of money (large rent
on goods), a corrupt client is willing to set aside a considerable amount
for the organisation of the corrupt deal  for the bribe for customs offi-
cials and other civil servants.
The large amount of money the corrupt client is willing to pay is an
important precondition for this type of corruption. Many people must
be involved in this type of corruption, besides customs officials the
border police is usually involved since the driver of the truck when
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13 The fact that railroad transport is not relevant from corruption at the Customs con-
cerning cargo traffic does not mean that smuggling goods by freight trains cannot or
does not happen. However, such smuggling does not fall under corruption at the
Customs.
entering the country makes the first contact with the border police.
According to the regulation, that is, the usual procedure, after the
inspection of the personal documentation of the driver and documen-
tation for the truck, the vehicle is directed into the parking lot of the
customs cargo terminal for inspection. Nevertheless, in certain cases
the truck is not sent to the parking lot but crosses the border freely and
heads straight for the motorway into the country. While Mihalj Kertes
was the director of the Federal Customs Administration, trucks would
sometimes be actually given a police escort to cross the border  the
escort began between the two borders, right after the shipment left the
neighbouring state; the customs office would just be notified that the
shipment was of national importance. The police would escort such
a shipment all the way to its final destination. The full escort was very
important since it entailed the fact that goods allowed through in this
way would leave behind no documentation of any kind. If a truck did
not have an escort while crossing the border, and the full cooperation
of the traffic police had not been secured (which was a complex task
since it involved a lot of people), it was necessary that the shipment
should reach the warehouse as soon as possible to be reloaded and dis-
tributed in much safer surroundings.
This type of corruption at the customs is nowadays increasingly rare;
indeed, it has virtually disappeared. The main reason for it is the break
in the chain linking high customs officials, police and well-organised
corrupt importers. Owing to this, it is nearly impossible to successfully
bring off such a scheme  it entails an unacceptably high risk.
Besides the discussed mechanism, the allowing of a shipment
through the customs can also be performed by manipulating the pro-
cedure of entering and leaving the parking lot of the goods terminal. It
takes perfect coordination, that is, corruption of the customs worker at
the entrance and of the one at the exit of the terminal so that the cus-
toms clearance can be performed without inspection. Besides, at the
border crossing at Horgos, due to inappropriate infrastructure, there is
an opportunity for a truck to pass unhindered into the country, com-
pletely getting round the customs cargo terminal. It is necessary that a
considerable number of customs workers and policemen be involved
in such an operation. As the number of people who need to be involved
increases, so does the cost of a corrupt deal as well as the risk. More to
the point, this mechanism involves another significant risk  the truck
and the shipment do not have necessary documentation which means
that the goods must be reloaded relatively quickly; it is necessary that a
safe warehouse near the border crossing should be secured, which is
not always easy.
Machinations concerning passing the truck through the customs
clearance are mostly achieved by registering the trucks to fictitious
(phantom) companies; the registration plates are usually changed
between the borders and it is not rare that false traffic documentation is
used. All this lowers the risk that the corrupt importer will be discov-
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ered later. Nevertheless, owing to the high risk involved in letting a
truck through the customs, this type of corruption is not as frequent as
it was up to a few years ago.
Empty trucks are a special case of allowing the shipment through
the customs. Naturally, an empty truck is not liable to customs examina-
tion since it carries no shipment. All it takes is to ascertain whether the
truck is really empty. Of course, none of those concealing a shipment will
declare a full truck as empty but rather use a not quite empty truck to
conceal a valuable shipment (usually of relatively small weight and vol-
ume but high value per unit). Double floors and double walls of the
truck are ideal for such a purposes. All it takes is to bribe a customs offi-
cial to do a superficial (with intentional lack of interest) examination,
and after a five second inspection declare the truck empty. If the corrup-
tion is organized properly, the truck will also escape its weight being
measured, since the discrepancy of the declared and the actual weight of
the empty truck will raise suspicion of a concealed shipment.14
Considering different forms of allowing the shipment through, the
method of an empty truck is gaining in popularity. The method owes
part of its attractiveness to the fact that there is no documentation, that
is, no written trace, of an empty truck crossing the border, which
reduces the likelihood of subsequent inspection. The spread of this
method of allowing the shipment across the border compared with the
other methods discussed is certain advancement as it concerns relative-
ly small quantities of goods and therefore the decrease in corruption.
Finally, there is another specific form of allowing the shipment to
escape customs clearance, but there is not reliable information on its
extent and frequency. It concerns escaping the inspection by tampering
with the electronic databases of FCA by illegally accessing the comput-
er system of the customs and deleting the entire electronic documenta-
tion concerning a particular shipment. For example, a truck is admit-
ted at the customs, inspected and sent for customs clearance to anoth-
er inland customs house. The complete documentation on the proce-
dure is entered into the computer system of the Federal Customs
Administration. The importer (or his forwarding agent), a customs
official and a hacker in collusion then destroy without trace the entire
electronic documentation, the truck disappears from the records of the
FCA, the truck driver (the forwarding agent) destroys all written docu-
mentation and the truck is sent to a warehouse inland for reloading.
Concerning customs administration, such a truck has never entered
the country. As pointed out before, there is still no reliable information
on all details and the extent of this type of corruption at the customs.
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the scales used for measuring the weight of trucks at the border crossing at Kelebia were
out of order and the trucks, whether full or empty simply were not measured. The
weight of an empty truck is specified in the traffic documentation and experienced cus-
toms officials know by memory the weight of various types of trucks. The scales at
Kelebia were put in order as late as the end of the year 2000.
Exemption from paying customs duties
The exemption from paying customs duties after a regular customs
inspection brings a corrupt importer the same benefits as allowing the
shipment into the country without customs clearing. However, this type
of corruption is different from the latter in that it has the appearance of
legality  the customs procedure is performed in full, only a false reason
is stated for exemption from the duties. Exceptional situations are con-
venient for this type of corruption (such as a trade embargo on all or
certain articles), complex domestic customs and foreign trade regula-
tions and procedure, numerous exemptions from customs duties of
various kinds as well as a large proportion of humanitarian aid in the
flow of goods across the border.15 From the aspect of a corrupt importer
the disadvantage of this type of corruption is the need to involve a rela-
tively large number of people in the deal, especially higher ranking cus-
toms officials, that is, those whose duty is to supervise the customs pro-
cedure. Another major drawback is the existence of documentation
which is solid proof of corrupt dealings by which goods were exempt
from duties. The subsequent inspection can, at the least, determine that
the exemption from customs duties was irregular, leading to the request
that the charges be paid. The corrupt importer bears double costs then:
both the bribe and the full amount of the customs duties.
In the period prior to the October 2000, this type of corruption con-
stituted a considerable part of total corruption at the customs and in
traffic of goods. It seems obvious that practicing this kind of corrup-
tion demanded thorough planning and a security system which
ensured that all involved in the process kept quiet about it. The extent
of this corruption mechanism can best be estimated on the informa-
tion of the level of the collected customs dues on nominal customs
rates. That is to say, the considerable discrepancy between the nominal
(calculated on the basis of the nominal customs rates) and the actually
collected customs dues is the result of tax exemption. According to the
data for the year 2000, the discrepancy was about 1,400 million dinars
or about 30% of the nominal customs duties.16 A certain number of
exemptions are by all means legitimate. However, since the total
amount of exemptions from customs charges at the time was almost
one third of the total nominal amount, it must be obvious that many of
those exemptions were the result of corruption of the customs officials
and other state officials involved in the foreign trade business.
In the last two years, however, there has been a drastic fall in this
type of corruption. Several factors influenced this. Corrupt dealings
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15 Humanitarian aid, that is, goods sent as humanitarian aid is exempted from customs
duties, therefore large proportion of humanitarian aid in total import facilitates various
machinations, that is, completely commercial shipments are declared to be humanitar-
ian aid.
16 The proportion is certainly bigger since the calculation of the total nominal custom
duties was not done by using the same multipliers which had been used for violations of
the general and particular quotas for the articles on such regime at the time.
can no longer be organized by high ranking officials from the Federal
Customs Administration or the Ministry of the International
Economic relations; the economic embargo on our country has long
been abolished; the proportion of humanitarian aid in total imports
has gone down; the foreign exchange regulations have been modified
and to a great extent simplified and the exemptions from the customs
duties considerably limited. As a result, the discrepancy between the
nominal (based on nominal customs rates) and the actual customs
charges has been radically reduced. According to the data for the first
half of the year 2002, the difference is as little as 6.7% of the total nom-
inal customs duties, which can be considered acceptable.
A special type of corruption involving exemption from customs
duties is corruption in temporary imports. The temporary import,
most often of raw materials or components, is the import of compo-
nents to be used for manufacturing commodities which, ultimately,
will be exported. For example, in the case of clothes manufacturers,
textiles (fabrics) are imported and ready-made clothes exported. In
such cases, import of the appropriate quantity of cloth for making suits
which are going to be exported is considered to be a temporary import,
and that quantity is exempt from customs duties. When the suits have
been exported, the temporary import of cloth stops and the manufac-
turer is free from all other obligations.
Naturally, the key element of corruption is the real amount of cloth
needed to manufacture a unit of product for export. The customs
administration, that is, the customs officials verify  sanction the
norm determining the quantitative proportion of the material and the
finished product. It is to the advantage of the importer-manufacturer
that the normative are generous, that is, that it authorises a larger
quantity of raw material per a unit of finished product than is really
necessary. This is an incentive to the importer to corrupt the customs
officials who determine and verify the norm. It is to be expected that it
will take a lot more cloth to make a suit than the production actually
requires. The remaining textiles in the duty free allowance will be put
on the domestic market in retail or as a finished product (a suit), and
the corrupt importer will be privileged compared with his competitors
(other importers) and therefore appropriate the rent. 
False transit and the return of goods
The false transit of the cargo (sometimes called fictitious passage)
across the territory of our country was for a long time a popular
method of customs duties evasion, that is, a mechanism of corruption
at the customs control in cargo traffic; to a certain extent it still plays a
significant role in corruption in cargo traffic. Naturally, the basis for
this type of corruption is the fact that goods in transit are exempt from
customs duties. In principle, false transit means that a truck entering
our state (for example, from Croatia, the border crossing at Batrovci) is
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declared to be in transit; according to the drivers statement and the
documentation (naturally, false) the final destination of the shipment
is, for example, Bulgaria. The customs control checks whether the ship-
ment is sealed (or seals it if necessary) and issues a surveillance docu-
ment  a document which certifies that the truck has entered the state
and that it will in a certain (reasonable) period leave the country at a
border crossing specified in the pass. The copy of the pass (electronic
and on paper) is forwarded to the border crossing in question, where
the truck in transit is expected.
The corrupt customs official at the exit border crossing performs a
false clearance of the pass and the false transit is successfully brought
off. In other words, the corrupt customs official issues a certificate that
the truck has left the country even though it never appeared at the bor-
der crossing, in reality, its cargo was off loaded somewhere in the state.
For complete coordination it is necessary that both customs officials
are in collusion (the one at the entrance point, the other at the exit
point)17; the exchange of information between the neighbouring coun-
tries must also be prevented18. False transit is used as a technique for
evading customs duties and other encumbrances; it is done in cases of
attractive commercial goods, especially goods for which the excise
duties are to be paid, such as cigarettes, as the potential rent for the cor-
rupt importer is very high.
Very often, in order to cover traces, when entering the country, in
the area between two borders the registration number plates of the
trucks are changed, and then changed once again when the domestic
border has been crossed. In this case, the truck is registered under three
different registration numbers. The first was recorded at the border
crossing when leaving the neighbouring state (Croatia, in this exam-
ple), the second time at our border crossing and the third time in case
it is for some reason stopped by the traffic police during the transit.
False transit is a very effective operation, potential rent is very high,
but so are the risks undertaken by corrupt customs officials. Presumably,
that is why the amount of the bribe in such cases is very high.
A specific sub-type of false transport is the false transport of goods to
Montenegro, since a few years ago Montenegro established its own for-
eign trade regime, customs policy and customs administration.
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17 Theoretically speaking, the collusion of the two customs officials is not necessary in all
cases. However, since false transit is done for commercially attractive goods, such as cig-
arettes, the corrupt customs official at the entrance customs point usually issues a false
pass, that is, he specifies that some commercially unattractive goods are being shipped
by the truck in transit. It has been recorded that some trucks caught in false transit of
cigarettes had passes specifying soybean meal as its cargo.
18 Of course, it would be easy to ascertain that the truck which has allegedly left our territo-
ry (according to the documentation) never entered Bulgaria by tallying our and
Bulgarian documentation on entering and leaving the state. Direct cooperation of the
two states at every border crossing would considerably curb corruption of this kind. In
order to successfully perform a false transit it would be necessary to corrupt a large num-
ber of people in different customs administrations. This, in turn, would raise the costs
incurred by bribery and lower the likelihood that the corrupt deal will be successful.
False return of goods is still another sub-type of false transit as a
form of corruption at the customs. The importer, or the shipper on his
behalf, imports a certain shipment of goods. After the regular customs
inspection at the border, it is established that the documentation sub-
mitted for customs clearing is incomplete. According to the existing
regulation, in this case the truck is sealed and sent to a customs office in
the provinces for customs clearing. The shipment is unloaded into the
customs warehouse of the customs office and the importer is obligated
to complete the documentation so that the customs procedure can be
finished. If the importer does not comply in the stated period of time,
it is considered that he has given up the import of the shipment and the
goods are subsequently returned to the country of origin without cus-
toms clearance. This is exactly what the corrupt importer intending to
perform a false returning of goods wants. When the goods have been
loaded in the customs warehouse, in the documents such as a pass it is
specified at which border crossing the shipment will leave the country.
The same procedure as in false transit is then applied  a corrupt cus-
toms official at the border performs a false clearance by sealing the doc-
ument whic h falsely certifies that the shipment has left the country.
Meanwhile, the truck is unloaded in a warehouse inland, and the ship-
ment is put on the market without paying the customs duties, sales tax
and excise duties.
Although it does not have to be directly connected with corruption,
a specific case of real transit should also be mentioned in connection
with typical smuggling. In this case, there is a false specification of
goods in transit across our territory. For example, a truck from
Macedonia, bound for Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Serbian Republic)
arrives at the Macedonian / Serbian border and according to the bill of
lading the shipment is shoes or other goods of low profitability, that is,
goods which are not attractive for smuggling. However, it turns out
that shoes are only part of the shipment, and that the other part, per-
haps bigger and certainly more valuable are cigarettes. The truck in
transit, absolutely legally, passes through our state and exits it, breaking
none of the regulations concerning transit. When the shipment reach-
es the Serbian Republic, the corrupt customs officials in their customs
house perform their part of the task (perform the customs clearance
for the shoes); the cigarettes, on the other hand find their way back to
Serbia across the Drina river, not via an official border crossings.
Misrepresentation  misclassifying the goods
The form of corruption called misrepresentation, that is, reclassify-
ing the goods and falsely declaring their type and identification, is a
mechanism by which customs encumbrances can be considerably
reduced. There are several ways of doing this. The first is to report a
lower value of the goods and consequently lower the customs duties
basis. This method of reducing the encumbrances will be discussed in
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the next subsection. The second approach concerning misclassifica-
tion, far more important in terms of reducing the customs encum-
brances, is the selection of the lowest customs tariff rate for the given
value of the customs basis  the one that is most advantageous to the
importer. This type of misclassification of goods is especially conven-
ient in states which have a large number and a large range of customs
tariff rates for similar articles. For example, in Serbia, before the Law
on Customs Tariffs was adopted in May 2001, the customs rates had a
wide range (0%  40%), even for very similar articles, and there were as
many as 37 customs rates. Considerable differences in customs duties
on similar products almost inevitably lead to corruption by misclassifi-
cation, that is, false identification of the goods. The technique usually
involves changing the tariff number of the HS in the documentation;
when inspecting the shipment, a corrupt customs official falsely certi-
fies that the shipment is in accordance with the tariff number in the
documentation so that a lower customs rate than the one which the
Law stipulates is applied.
For example, before the above-mentioned Law was adopted in May
2001, the customs rate for ribbed iron bars for reinforcing concrete was
3% and 20% for plain iron bars. The difference was justified by the
intention to protect the domestic manufacturer of plain iron bars
(Sartid) while ribbed iron was not being manufactured in the country
at the time, and so the customs rate was only 3%. Due to corruption in
the Federal Customs Administration, according to the data for the first
half of the year 2000, all imported iron was (mis)classified as ribbed, at
3% of the customs rates.
Since the Law on Customs Tariffs from May 2001 considerably sim-
plifies the customs tariffs itself, the main incentive for this type of cor-
ruption at the customs has disappeared. There is room left only for bla-
tant reclassification of goods when commercially attractive articles,
most often those liable to excise duties, are certified as goods of rela-
tively low value by a corrupt customs official. For example, not long
ago, there was an attempt to pass off a truck (a platform truck) trans-
porting cigarettes across the border as a vehicle loaded with biscuits.
The main motive for the attempt was not so much to evade customs
duties, but, rather, to evade paying excise duties and thus acquire rent
on the shipment. Presumably, reclassification is still economically jus-
tified for corrupt importers, first of all for the goods liable to excise
duties.
In other words, the reform of the customs tariffs, maximal simplifi-
cation and lowering the number of the customs rates, as well as techni-
cal attests of the articles within the same customs rate are the best way
to prevent this method of corruption at the customs. More thorough
monitoring of the flow of goods liable to excise duties, especially at an
international level, along with harmonization of the regulations of
neighbouring states concerning the flow of such goods would almost
completely abolish corruption by misclassification of goods.
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A special class of corrupt reclassification of goods are the cases not
motivated by the desire to pay lower customs encumbrances but,
rather to evade various legal regulations requiring certificates and tech-
nical attests of certain import articles. In a certain, perhaps even con-
siderable number of cases, such certificates and technical attests are
unnecessary (for example, for the articles which have already had cer-
tificates and technical attests from the EC), and the fact that they are
still required presents an incentive to the corruption of customs offi-
cials in order to evade these procedures which are more expensive in
time than in money.
Decreasing of the customs basis
Corruption by misrepresenting the customs basis is today one of the
basic mechanisms of corruption aimed at reducing customs encum-
brances for the corrupt importer. The customs basis can be reduced in
several different but complementary ways: 1) misrepresenting the actu-
al quantity of the shipment; 2) reclassifying the shipment as a less valu-
able type; and 3) false invoices (bills) and false documentation indicat-
ing the lower value of a shipment (while the quantity and the type of
goods are accurate). Every instance reduces the customs basis and the
customs encumbrance of the importer.
Misrepresenting the quantity of goods in order to reduce the cus-
toms basis does not happen very often. The reason for this is quite sim-
ple  in many cases it is easy to determine the actual quantity of goods,
and so corrupt customs officials are not willing to undertake the risk of
being easily found out. In other words, for this type of corruption it is
necessary to involve a certain number of customs officials to intention-
ally overlook the obvious facts concerning the weight of the truck
together with the shipment. However, there are some specific circum-
stances in which this type of corruption can be efficient from the point
of view of a corrupt importer. This is when a shipment is measured by
the number of units, when the number of units is high and the value
per unit is also high. This is mostly the case with electronic equipment.
For example, if the shipment is telephones, false documentation
declares that there are 1,500 items and the real number is 1,800. It is
relatively easy for the corrupt team (usually of three inspectors) to
accept the misrepresented number from the declaration and in this
way reduce the customs basis. More to the point, if the discrepancy
between the declared and the actual quantity of goods are not drastical-
ly high, it is very difficult to trace the corrupt deal later, even though
complete documentation on the customs clearance exists.19
119Preconditions and Mechanisms of Corrupton at the Customs
19 Small discrepancies are usually not conspicuous at subsequent inspection. On the other
hand, no experienced corrupt importer or customs official is naïve enough to lie in an
obvious way  to submit, or to accept documentation reporting, let us say, ten tele-
phones in a platform truck.
Lowering the customs basis is also done by reclassifying goods, that
is, using a false tariff number of the HS for identifying goods as of
poorer quality and value than in reality. Corrupt customs officials ver-
ify the false specifications of the imported goods and considerably
reduce the customs basis and the amount of dues to be paid. The dis-
crepancy between the specification and the actual goods to be import-
ed can also be moderate or drastic. For example, in 2000, according to
the official information by the Federal Customs Administration, over
95% of the sports shoes imported into the country were simple canvas
sports shoes made in China and worth around 6 Euros. Naturally, the
range of imported sports shoes on our market was quite different:
sports shoes by leading world manufacturers the (retail) price of
which was far above 6 Euros dominated the market. Obviously, this
was a case of blatant reclassification with drastic consequences for the
customs basis and the calculated and collected amount of customs
duties. Currently, there are somewhat subtler methods, for example,
A class coffee beans are declared as C class, and with a bit of help
by corruption, such a declaration is accepted and the customs basis is
calculated accordingly, thus reducing the amount of the levied cus-
toms duties.
Finally, the most important way of reducing the customs basis are
false invoices (bills) submitted by importers and accepted by corrupt
customs officials. Such an invoice specifies a lower value for the ship-
ment than it actually has; in this way the customs basis and so the
amount of the customs duties are reduced. It is essential that corrupt
customs officials should accept the invoice at its face value, that is, they
should not try to establish the value of the shipment during inspection
but accept the false amount reported in the invoice. In other words,
according to the current, in the world widely accepted customs regula-
tions, the customs basis is the market value (price) of the goods being
imported and the customs officials have a discretionary right to contest
an invoice as proof of the market value (and the purchasing price paid
by the importer) of the shipment undergoing customs clearance taking
into account all the available relevant information on the market value
of the goods.20 The burden of proof is on the customs official, it is
he/she that must contest the accuracy of the submitted invoice, that is,
information concerning the goods in question.21 In this way the
amount specified in the invoice can be corrected, thus raising the cus-
toms basis.
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20 Strictly speaking, the purchasing price actually paid by the importer is not relevant if it
does not tally with the market price. Even when the importer has received the goods as
a gift, he is still under the obligation to pay the customs duties on the basis of the full
market value of the goods.
21 There used to be an information center with the Federal Customs Administration
which collected information on the world prices of almost all commodities imported in
our country for the needs of customs clearing at all border crossings. In terms of col-
lecting information of this kind, at present, every border crossing is on its own.
The opportunity for corruption is exactly there  customs officials
receive bribes so as not to exercise their right of correction, i.e. to
accept the false invoice and lower the customs basis and customs
encumbrances to be paid by a corrupt importer. Unfortunately, the
current regulations are advantageous for the corruptors as a customs
official can correct the estimated value of the shipment only once; a
corrupted official can make a compromise with the importer and
only partially use his right of correction.22
There are several methods of obtaining a false invoice. One method
is that the manufacturer who sold the goods to the importer issues two
invoices; the one on which the goods were paid for is accurate, the sec-
ond reports considerably lower value of goods. On the one hand, it is
very difficult to prove that the invoice is false as the manufacturer in
question will assert its authenticity if asked. On the other hand, howev-
er, reputable companies do not engage in such transactions since issu-
ing false invoices is detrimental to their reputation; there is no direct
profit for the company, but rather the risk of material loss.
The other method of obtaining a false invoice is forgery. In such a
case usually all information in the invoice is false: the value of the
shipment, the country of origin, specification of the quality of goods
etc. There is, naturally, the possibility that the later inspection of the
invoice will reveal that the company issuing it does not exist at all,
proving that the invoice is a forgery. However, such an inspection
takes a lot of time and cannot be used in the field, at the moment of
customs clearance, but only during potential later revision of the cus-
toms procedure.23
Very often there are several invoices for a shipment; different
invoices are used at different points of the transport. Real invoices are
used for the transit of goods across states on the way to the final desti-
nation, the others are used at the border of the final destination coun-
try. This is especially true when the clearing of the shipment in transit
is necessary for the release of the money paid in by the forwarding
agency as a banking warranty, which, in turn, must be done on the
original invoice.
It has been noticed that false invoices are especially used at those bor-
der crossings where the inspection of goods is difficult due to poor tech-
nical equipment. For example, it is virtually impossible to perform an
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22 For example, if a shipment is worth Eur 20.000 and the invoice reports Eur 5.000, a cus-
toms official can correct it by Eur 5.000 raising the customs basis to Eur 10.000. This
facilitates the transaction for the corrupt customs officials. First, they appear to be seri-
ous (honest) as they have raised the value of the shipment by 100%. Second, their deci-
sion is virtually final as there is no legal possibility for further raising the value of the
shipment concerning the customs basis. Third, the corrupting importer is also satisfied
as he pays for just a half of customs duties. These are the reasons why this type of cor-
ruption is one of the most effective methods of corruption in the cargo traffic.
23 In the case of one of our large foreign trade partners, the member state of the EC, the
investigation which proved that the company in question does not exist took three
months.
inspection of a refrigerator truck shipping flowers; if the truck were
opened at the border crossing, there would be a high risk that the ship-
ment would perish and then the Federal Customs Administration
would have to pay damages. Both the importers and their shippers are
well aware of this and take advantage of the fact to submit false invoices
specifying considerably lower values of the shipment. There are indica-
tions that invoices for 10,000 Euros are submitted for shipments of
flowers from one EC state worth around Eur 35,000 Euros. In such cases
corruption further lowers the likelihood that the shipment will be
inspected and its true value, and thus the value of the customs basis,
ascertained. The customs officials just need a little encouragement to
accept a false invoice.
In all cases of false invoices and the corruption connected with them,
it is necessary to establish good coordination between the chief of the
shift and the team which performs the inspection of goods as well as
with other customs officials who are in any way involved in the proce-
dure. The shipper who acts as a go-between between the importer
(since the shipper represents the importer before the customs adminis-
tration) and the customs administration plays a key role here. This
does not exclusively apply to cases of false invoices, but rather to all
types of corruption at the customs in the traffic of goods. At many bor-
der crossings, especially at those which are attractive in terms of the
traffic of goods, there is a certain division of labour; everybody knows
which shipper works with which customs official, that is, with his
team. Bonds of trust are established in this way which is a precondition
for making long term corrupt deals.
In the traffic of goods, corruption at the customs is especially fos-
tered by situations in which the customs officials are at the same time
the shippers, that is, the owners of forwarding companies. Naturally,
the companies are never registered in their names, but rather under the
name of a wife or relative. Such a forwarding agency is in a position to
provide special services in one of the ways discussed. A corrupt
importer gets the full service in a single place: the shipping and the
easy way across the border.
Special cases
There used to be a special kind of corruption at the customs involv-
ing inflating the customs basis, that is, the value of the goods import-
ed. So, there is also a false invoice involved, but with the specified
value of goods increased. This was usually done for goods with rela-
tively low customs rates. The main reason for this mal practice was
buying hard currency at the official, depreciated rate of exchange. It
was necessary to create as big as possible a basis in order to buy as
much hard currency as possible. Corrupt customs officials cooperate
in this transaction by refraining from asking embarrassing questions
(for example why a ton of paper costs as much as 20,000 Euros).
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When the policy of double rate of exchange was abolished and sup-
planted by the policy of a single exchange rate of the Dinar, the eco-
nomic incentive for this type of corruption at the customs vanished,
so there have been no instances recorded since the autumn of 2000.
Another special case of corruption at the customs is so-called
office corruption involving staff working in the customs offices.
That is to say, there are many importers, especially those who are
new in business, who are not familiar with customs and foreign trade
regulations, and also incapable of learning it due to the lack of basic
working habits. The office staff and their specialized go-betweens
offer to such individuals a consulting service of authentic inter-
pretation of the customs regulations and selecting the best solu-
tion for the importer. The service is, of course, charged and the
money is divided between the go-betweens and office workers in a
certain proportion. Besides the fact that offering basic information is
a regular part of the job of the customs officials, giving elementary
information is often delayed (It is a complex problem, we need
some time to work it out.) in order to increase the payment. The
go-betweens often initiate such transactions (I know a man in the
FCA, he can take care of it for you.), but it is a well-organized oper-
ation in which the office workers play an active role and take a larger
share of the profits.
Strictly speaking, this phenomenon is not a proper corruption, but
rather the abuse of position. Nevertheless, in the case of office workers
there are also forms of typical corruption such as taking a bribe to delay
collecting already calculated customs dues as well as performing cus-
toms clearance without all necessary documentation. It is a case of
smaller misdemeanour as the documentation itself is not tampered
with (the documents are not false, it is just that some of the documents
are not available at the time), and corruption just speeds up the cus-
toms procedure. Compared to other forms of corruption at the cus-
toms, this type of corruption in office workers is not considered to be
of great significance.
There is yet another form of office corruption at the customs the
extent and effects of which are difficult to ascertain, as there is no reli-
able information on them. It concerns customs misdemeanours, that
is, misdemeanour proceedings by official customs bodies. In certain
cases the individuals in charge of the proceedings, on purpose, in col-
lusion with the importer or the shipper called to account, stipulate
inadequately high penalties for the wrongful action, but intentionally
make a procedural mistake in the proceedings. The party, that is, the
importer accountable for the wrongful action who also has bribed the
legal representatives of the department, submits a complaint to the
second instance tribunal, in this case the Federal Misdemeanour
Council, a body outside the Federal Customs Administration. The
staff of the Council at once notice the omission made in the proceed-
ings, repeal the decision and send it back for review. Such a decision
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by the Federal Misdemeanour Council is a pretext for the corrupt
individuals in the customs legal department to cancel the proceedings
and allow the importer, who actually is guilty of a wrongful action, to
escape the consequences. This decision is covered by the decision on
appeal, which is not corrupt, and so the whole transaction appears to
be legal. 
NOW AND THEN: CHANGES IN THE MECHANISMS OF CORRUPTION
AT THE CUSTOMS
Political change in the autumn of the year 2000, along with the
change of the basic role played by the Federal Customs Administration
as well as considerable changes in the personnel of this organisation,
inevitably led to changes in the levels and mechanisms of corruption at
the customs. As for the mechanisms, the main reason for their trans-
formation is to be found in the changes of the role of the Federal
Customs Administration.
At the time when Slobodan Milosevic was head of state and Mihalj
Kertes the director of the Federal Customs Administration, corruption
at the customs was institutionalised and, on the one hand it was used
for controlling the flow of money outside the state budget, and on the
other for establishing a corrupt clique to uphold the existing status quo.
Therefore, from the point of view of the ruler, corruption at the cus-
toms was a method of making a personal wealth and keeping power.
Consequently, the main methods of corruption at the customs rested
on the existence of a centralized, highly organized vertical structure in
which the division of labour was thoroughly well-reasoned, both with-
in the customs administration itself and with other team players such
as the border police. Sharing of profits was in keeping with the division
of labour. The structure involved the use of appropriate methods in
terms of the character of corruption and corrupt individuals. To put it
simply, this structure provided the environment in which all partici-
pants in the game were given appropriate incentives to adjust their
behaviour to the rules of the game.
The corruption at the customs used to employ crude and simple 
unsophisticated methods. There was no need to develop different
methods in the existing circumstances. Corruption was very con-
spicuous, but almost no one wanted to see it  its existence did not
matter a bit. That is the reason why corrupt parties did not even try
to conceal their activities. Within the Federal Customs
Administration the main participants in corruption were the junior
customs staff, mainly the individuals hired in the time of Mihalj
Kertez; they did not have much education and knowledge and were
hungry for quick profits in the golden times, risky in terms of their
future. Many of these people were of criminal bent  in their psycho-
logical make-up, moral principles, brains and knowledge. The type
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of corruption they were involved in left little written traces, so the
risks they undertook, if they played by the rules set up in the hierar-
chy of corruption, were very small. They were in a way hostages to
such a corrupt regime, but their cooperation was the only condition
for survival and making a personal fortune. The low risk of being
found out and slim likelihood that any proceedings would be
brought against offenders meant that there were no changes in the
methods of corruption  a method was so safe that there was no need
to modify it or replace it with another.
Political and other changes in the autumn of 2000 brought about the
crumbling and fall of the centralized and hierarchically organized struc-
ture of corruption at the customs. In terms of corruption, this meant a
whole new set of circumstances which generated new incentives. It all
led to the dissolution of well-organised corrupt gangs which were well
connected outside the customs. The risk that corruption would be
exposed and punished increased and there were no more orders to
engage in corruption, which inevitably led to changes in basic methods
of corruption at the customs. Obvious corruption was no longer toler-
ated. Consequently, crude, simple, straightforward methods had to be
abandoned. They are still to some extent used in passenger traffic  it is
not possible to practice them in the cargo traffic. Since at present suc-
cessful corruption needs to be inconspicuous and complex, it takes a lot
of knowledge to practice it, far more than before. This led to changes in
the structure of corrupt customs officials. The young Kertes school
with criminal tendencies was taken off the customs terminals; some of
them still linger on at passenger traffic terminals owing to the fact that
they cannot find their feet in new methods of corruption in the traffic of
goods. In a certain sense, they give way to individuals experienced in
customs procedures on the lookout for relatively safe methods to
engage in corruption in the traffic of goods. The exception to this is
some new junior staff, especially those skilled in information technolo-
gies (hackers) given the task to hack the computer system of the Federal
Customs Administration and change the data in it.
The new mechanisms of corruption at the customs, especially in the
cargo traffic, leave traces. Sometimes they are written documents, that
is, copious customs documentation which is kept for years. In other
cases there are traces of unauthorized changes in the information sys-
tem of the customs. Since various traces of corruption generate differ-
ent levels of risk, it is certain that the new mechanisms of corruption at
the customs put the perpetrators at risk of being found out. The high
risk forces the participants of corrupt dealings at the customs constant-
ly to adapt the methods of corruption, that is, to advance their meth-
ods in order to escape being caught.
The state of affairs at the customs today, compared with the state
prior to the year 2000 is characterized by lower levels of corruption;
however, the methods of corruption are far more subtle, much more
difficult to identify and still more difficult to fight.
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Table 1
Comparison of the Methods of Corruption
Before Now
Character of method Simple methods Complex methods
Visibility High visibility Low visibility
Knowledge required Modest Considerable
Cadre Young and inexperienced Older and more experienced
Traces Virtually no traces Written traces left
The risk involved Low risk High risk
Dynamics Little change in methods Methods constantly changing
V The Consequences of Corruption
at the Customs 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS
The first economic effect of corruption is the loss of a mechanism by
which a state implements its foreign trade policy, since the customs
administration is the main instrument of this policy. This is why the
customs policy is often treated as a separate issue from the foreign
trade policy. We will not, for now, address the question whether a for-
eign trade policy that protects domestic manufacturers with high cus-
toms rates is justified. However, it is indisputable that corruption in
the customs administration compromises such a policy and diminishes
its efficiency. The extent of corruption and the quantity of goods which
enter a country illegally are in inverse proportion with the likelihood of
effective implementation of any kind of foreign trade policy.
Moreover, as corruption does not affect the implementation of the for-
eign trade policy evenly, (it does not affect all products and all customs
rates equally), it can result in a considerable distortion of the foreign
trade policy and its desired objectives (specific allocation of resources).
Although states have other instruments to influence foreign trade
(such as foreign exchange rate policies), experience has demonstrated
that foreign trade policies and their proper implementation are of
essential importance for exercising influence on foreign trade flows
and thus on the social welfare. 
For the last ten years or so, in Serbia (and in Montenegro) a policy
has been at work which not only tolerated but also actually fostered the
black market. International sanctions and a sharp decline in produc-
tion within the formal sector spurred the authorities to allow the
spread of informal types of activity, even smuggling from abroad, in
order to help the citizens, especially the unemployed, make enough
money to survive under unfavourable circumstances. What is more,
the import of staple products from abroad was regarded as a beneficial
and significant way to supply the market and maintain standards of liv-
ing. In this way the customs administration became a part of an irregu-
lar economic system, and this is the reason why its functions, and espe-
cially the way they were performed took unusual forms and corruption
became widely accepted. Such a concept or such a government policy
regarding the black market and the customs administration completely
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undermined the official foreign trade policy of the country. Regardless
of whether the foreign trade policy (as set down in the official regula-
tions) was adequate or not, its constant violation cannot be considered
good. For, if foreign trade policy is deficient, it is far better to change it
formally and institute a better one than to undermine the existing one
in an informal way. It remains to be explained why the state did not lib-
eralize imports during the sanctions which would have been beneficial
both from the aspect of supplying the market and offering the citizens
the means to earn a living as well as protecting customs services from
corruption. The answer probably lies in attempts by the political elite
to secure high profits and pay-offs for themselves through a system of
licenses and quotas as well as to bind the customs service to them by
providing the basis for corruption and by tolerating it. 
There are some who entertain the heretical idea that corruption in
the customs leads to informal but necessary liberalisation of foreign
trade. It has already been proved that the higher the customs rates and
the stricter other types of protectionist measures, the more corrupt the
customs services become. In this respect, it could be concluded that
getting round the customs in its role as the principal instrument of the
foreign trade policy leads to informal but effective liberalization of
the foreign trade policy. Numerous analyses have shown that liberal-
ization of foreign trade, which is to say, liberalisation of imports has,
especially in the long run, beneficial effects on a society. Can we then
raise the question whether curbing corruption is justified, bearing in
mind such a potential effect? The answer should be viewed in the light
of other effects of corruption at the customs.
The second effect is a loss of budgetary revenues to the state. In
many countries funds raised as customs dues constitute one of the key
budgetary revenues. This is especially true for developing states  ones
with relatively small fiscal capacity where funds collected from sales
taxes or from value added taxes are meagre (OECD, 2001). In addition,
customs duties usually constitute the principal or at least significant
sources of income for federal budgets in federal states (the USA,
Germany, Australia and other). The majority of direct and indirect
taxes in these states are the taxes imposed by federal units. In case of
corruption in federal states, the corruption of the customs services
undermines the federal budget.
A budgetary deficit brought about by the corruption of the customs
services must be offset in order to maintain the macroeconomic sta-
bility of the state. Taking into account that budgetary expenses are
rather inflexible downwards (especially in the short term), insufficient
funds must be made up with new taxes, for example by raising sales
taxes or value added taxes (naturally, on condition that the tax admin-
istration are not corrupt and that a nominal increase of tax rates does
in fact result in corresponding increases in real budgetary revenue).
New taxes are distorted just like other forms of taxation  the extent of
distortion increases with the increase of the rates, thus undermining
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the efficiency of the allocation of resources. The mechanisms are the
same as in other aspects of economics, sooner or later you must pay
the lunch  there is no lunch.
Customs revenues in the FR Yugoslavia were very low in the preced-
ing decade, thus contributing to the budgetary deficit and inflation.
Low customs revenues were the result of both the low official exchange
rate of the Dinar which presented a low custom base for customs
duties, and the import of goods into the customs territory without pay-
ment of any levies. Greasing of the mechanism was usually achieved
through corruption. In this way money which should have entered
public funds ended up in somebodys pocket. The extent of this phe-
nomenon is evidenced by the rapid growth of customs revenues in the
last two years, since the new customs administration curbed corrup-
tion and started to collect customs duties and taxes more effectively.
Just how rife corruption was can be best estimated upon the data on
the level of customs duties collected at nominal customs rates. This
means that the result of preferential customs duties is a significant dis-
parity between the nominal (official customs rates) and really collected
revenues. According to the data for the year 2000, the difference was
about 1,400 million dinars which is about 30% of the overall nominal
customs duties.1 It is certain that part of this custom duty exemption is
legitimate. However, as the total customs tax exemption ran up to one
third of the total nominal customs duties, it is obvious that many of
these exemptions were due to the corruption of the customs officials,
as well as other public servants involved in foreign trade dealings.
Nevertheless, there has been a significant change in the last two
years. The change was brought about by several factors. Corrupt deal-
ings can no longer be organized and coordinated by high officials of the
Federal Customs Office or Foreign Trade Ministry; the economic
embargo has long been abolished, the proportion of humanitarian aid
in overall import is lower, the foreign trade regulations have been
transformed and largely simplified and customs duties exemptions are
limited. As a result of all this the disparity between the nominal (based
on official customs duties rates) and really collected customs duties
revenue has been drastically reduced. According to the data for the first
half of the 2002, the difference is only 6.7% of the total nominal cus-
toms revenue, which can be considered satisfactory.
The third economic effect is the cost of corrupt transactions at the
customs. It has already been mentioned that corruption produces its
own transaction costs. As corruption is a kind of informal contract
between the person who offers the bribe and the person who receives it,
the carrying out of that contract produces considerable costs. This is
exacerbated by the fact that the contract is illegal (it is in direct viola-
tion of the law), and thus cannot be resolved in regular courts in case of
a contention. That is the reason why the transaction costs of such a
contract are exceptionally high. First, it is necessary to find a customs
official who is willing to provide such a service. Second, the parties
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must reach an agreement on all the details of the deal, who gets what,
and, especially, in what way the operation is protected, warranty that
the contract will be fully honoured. Therefore, transaction costs are
necessarily high. This is particularly true for big operations  a
10-deutchmark, dollar or euro bill is not a typical case of corruption at
the customs.
All the costs referred to are real costs, all the activities call for real
resources, and the opportunity costs of these resources constitute
transaction costs. They must be covered from real sources, which
means raising prices of products and the growth of the total profit of
the importer. Thus corruption at the customs, regardless of the actual
amount of the payment, results in the increase in the costs borne by the
importer. When the amount of the bribe is added to it, the result is an
overall rise in the cost of the product. The actual amount can even be
greater than the customs duty itself.
The discussed distortions of the price of products have a twofold
effect on economic welfare. The first is that the rising of prices while
the demand remains the same leads increased costs, and so to greater
production inefficiency due to the rise of real costs (partial and general
equilibrium). The other is that corruption brings about allocative inef-
ficiency  and the transfer of economic profit from the importer to the
customs official. That kind of transfer does not compensate for the loss
suffered by the importer and the consumers.
For another thing, such increases in the cost of import, ultimately
shouldered by the consumers (as overall cost and thus the increase in
cost is also transferred to the consumers), necessarily tips the balance
of the consumption of imported goods and so disturbs the balance of
imports in general. At a given national product this decreases the
amount of the foreign trade and the proportion of the foreign trade in
the national product  the share of the observed state in the interna-
tional division of labour. In this way, in the long run, the economic
welfare in question is harmed, especially if it is a small and open econ-
omy. Therefore, regarding integration of the observed economy into
the world, corruption can have the same effects as protectionism. It is
especially dangerous for small economies such as Serbia, which has
only one way open to it  integration into the international economic
community.
Now we can return to our heretic idea that corruption in customs
can be an effective means of the liberalization of foreign trade. Bearing
in mind the analysis of the transaction costs, it is certain that it is high-
ly improbable that such liberalization would ever occur. In fact,
transaction costs of corruption and the amount paid for the transfer
itself lead to a considerable increase of import costs, so it is highly
improbable that corruption can replace regular liberalization of foreign
trade. This could only happen if the state were to impose extremely
high customs rates or other types of protectionist measures and if the
transaction costs of corruption were small.
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The indirect conclusion of this analysis can be that liberalization of
foreign trade is beneficial in several ways. Liberalization in itself leads
to integration of an economy into the world market and in the long
run enhances the social welfare. 
The fourth effect of corruption concerns foreign investments into
the observed country. It has already been shown that widespread cor-
ruption decreases the amount of direct foreign investment. It can easi-
ly be shown that increased production costs (whether they are transfers
which must be paid for or transaction costs) reduce profit rates and the
high risk owing to widespread corruption results in the increase of the
price of capital (risk premiums required by the owners of the capital).
However, it is far more interesting for this research what are the effects
of the specific corruption in the customs on foreign investment.
It is highly probable that corruption in the customs will result in
lower direct foreign investments compared to the same average level
of corruption in the state. Namely, direct foreign investment and
business enterprises based on them depend on foreign trade to a larg-
er extent than domestic companies. This is particularly true for devel-
oping and transitional countries. The domestic market for the goods
in question is usually too small and so the companies attempt to
export while taking advantage of certain local advantages (cheaper
labour for example). Large amounts of export can, if the customs
service is corrupt, lead to considerable increase in business and there-
fore export costs, losing them the competitive advantage on the mar-
kets in target states. That is the reason why direct foreign investments
do not come to states with corrupt customs services and leave the
countries where corruption within the customs service has signifi-
cantly spread.
Corruption can have even more harmful effects on the input mar-
kets. Direct foreign investments, that is the multinational companies
behind them are not satisfied by domestic input markets in the devel-
oping and transitional countries into which they have entered. In
other words, it is necessary to import numerous components for the
production of articles conforming to the standards of the multina-
tional company in question as well as to high standards of export mar-
kets. It is usual that foreign or multinational companies import far
more per production unit than is the average in developing or transi-
tional countries. Thus, foreign or multinational companies are at far
greater risk from corruption in customs than domestic enterprises.
On the other hand, these companies are more at risk from corruption
in the customs than from other types of corruption (court system,
police, tax office and so on). For the stated reasons corruption in cus-
toms has an extremely harmful effect on foreign investment. Setting
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ing the extent to which general or special quotas for articles on that regime had been
breached were not used for calculating the total nominal customs revenue.
up a global capital market offsets the vulnerability of direct foreign
investment to corruption. Direct foreign investors choose a country in
which to invest their capital and so states compete with each other,
among other things by trying to curb corruption (in general and par-
ticularly at the customs). Widespread corruption in a country
inevitably results in capital redirected to other countries. This vulner-
ability will increase in the future. Although we can already talk about a
high level of globalisation, that is, about significant abolition of obsta-
cles to the flow of capital at a global level, it is to be expected that the
next decade will see the elimination of most current obstacles. This, in
turn, means that decisions made by potential foreign or multinational
investors will be still more at risk from corruption in a state and espe-
cially at the customs. 
Finally, experience and empirical research have shown that the rate
of growth, that is, the dynamics of the economy of developing and
transitional countries depends heavily upon direct foreign investment.
One of the factors causing this is obvious lack of capital in developing
and transitional countries so that the level of investment based on
domestic capital (and its high price due to its scarcity) is far below
desired. Nevertheless this is not only a question of the capital which is
obtained in this way, it also concerns the extensive transfer of knowl-
edge which provides for the growth of capital and total factor produc-
tivity. This concerns a new quality of growth because it is not based
solely on the growth of the quantity of resources engaged but on the
advancement of their productivity. Therefore, corruption in general,
and especially corruption in the customs leads to a decrease not only in
the growth rates but also in the quality of economic growth in develop-
ing and transitional countries. From both aspects, progress in social
welfare is slowed down, or, in the worst-case scenario, stopped.
It might be said that countries lacking in capital have at their dispos-
al the international capital market and the possibility to take loans
there. Among other things, globalisation means removing the obstacles
to access to the international capital market. All the same, if the cor-
ruption in customs had scared direct foreign investors away, the access
to the international capital market cannot present a substitute for those
investments regarding its contribution to the economic growth of the
country concerned. First, the capital borrowed on the international
market does not entail the transfer of knowledge, so there is no signifi-
cant increase in the factor productivity, which, in turn, reduces poten-
tial growth rate. Second, widespread corruption (in general as well as
corruption in the customs) makes the country which incurs debt a
higher risk, which raises the interest rates and risk premiums that the
country has to pay. Higher interest rates (the price of the borrowed
capital) eliminate investments with lower expected profit rates and
thus results in lower growth rates.
Finally, many developing countries and some transitional ones
have fallen into a debtor crisis. Some of them, which have already
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been burdened by large debts, or are long overdue in repaying them,
do not have the access to the global capital market. Others have
solved the problem of overdue debts (arrears) by formal rescheduling
or have been granted partial write-off. If the debt is written off, the
risk that the country represents increases and with it the premium of
risk  the interest rate that must be paid. 
In the light of everything that has been said it is obvious that bor-
rowing capital on the world market is not a realistic alternative to
direct foreign investment. It also becomes apparent that in complex
economic relations between economic entities and in the situation of
entangled mutual relationships, there are connections between some
phenomena which, at first glance, seem to be totally unconnected.
Who would, at a glance, find a link between a debtor crisis and corrup-
tion at the customs? And it turned out that there is indeed a connection
between them.
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS
All widespread corruption, including corruption in the customs
service has serious repercussions both at the political and the social
level. Its effects are not always visible, they are often entwined with
other factors, but not less serious for that. 
Corruption weakens institutions and compromises political
progress as it spreads from the economic sphere into politics, infecting
politicians, parties and institutions. It is tempting since it brings profit,
and since it is rampant and up to a point organised, there is no fear of
punishment as it is generally believed that the risk is negligible. Many
corrupt politicians believe that they wield enough political power to
defy the risk or at least that they will be able to find even stronger pro-
tection. The lack of fear of punishment strongly fosters corruption
since moral scruples are few in politics. Therefore, corruption natural-
ly weakens the political will necessary for efficient reform, including
the effort to curb corruption.
Then newly rich dishonest state officials and civil servants endeavour
to protect their own positions and are ready to influence political
processes  starting from exerting influence over local elections,
through cooperation with high state officials and exerting influence on
the form of new laws and other state regulations to influence the out-
comes of local elections. Democracy, the democratic life style, is liable
to fall the first victim to corruption. In other words, if a society is rife
with corruption dishonest politicians and the corrupt lobby support-
ing them can greatly influence the results of elections. It is easy for
them to invest large amounts of money into election campaigns,
engage dependent or paid media to influence the voters or even to
directly manipulate the election procedure to their personal or collec-
tive advantage. There were many such processes in Serbia in 1990s.
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After elections political life is not free from the evil influence of cor-
ruption, and democracy continues to suffer. The decision making
process in parliament becomes important then  the concept of serving
the public good and state interests is forgotten and the financial inter-
ests of individuals and groups become dominant. The question of con-
cession grants is always on the agenda, and many do get them. Voting
becomes a battlefield on which interest groups fight for their piece of
the pie, and direct bribing of independent members to vote as some-
body desires can become an everyday practice. The winners, naturally,
find ways to pay back to their party, group or important individuals in
it. In this way parties in countries with widespread corruption turn
into organized groups which pluck and plunder the state.
The country where political life is heavily infected with corruption
loses its real political reputation and credibility, both in the country
itself and abroad. Its leaders are discredited and its regime is consid-
ered to be temporary. Cooperation with such states can be terminated,
as it happened to Kenya where corruption was rampant in 1997. When
the International Monetary Fund stopped credit, the Kenyan govern-
ment issued an interesting statement claiming that: This morning the
Government established an anticorruption squad to supervise the
work of the anticorruption committee, which controls the anticorrup-
tion work group, established to revise the work of the governments ad
hoc committee established earlier in the year, to address the problem of
high corruption among corrupt government officials.
The customs service as well can be directly involved in political cor-
ruption, can serve and abet it. In the 1990s revenues from customs
duties were not paid into the federal budget in whole, as required by
law, but were pooled into a large secret fund administered by the for-
mer director of the Federal Customs Administration (Mihalj Kertez).
What was done with this considerable amount, what it was spent on is
still unknown.
Corruption certainly favours some people at the expense of others
and so generates inefficiency. This can present a problem especially in
developing countries such as Serbia, as domestic enterprises get pushed
out of business by financially stronger foreign companies which do not
shy away from corruption.
When we consider corruption in the customs, we usually think
about domestic firms or individuals offering money to customs offi-
cials in order to import goods at lower customs rates or free of charge.
Nevertheless, this is a simplification of reality and an even greater sim-
plification of possible scenarios. There are various opportunities for
foreign involvement in the game of corruption, the successful realiza-
tion of which depends on domestic political players and their strategy.
A country which decides on furtive opening to the world is at high
risk of becoming a breeding ground for corruption. Tolerating and
encouraging secret bank accounts or even opening so called offshore
banking accounts without control of the origin of the money, fostering
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inadequacy of border and customs control, taking provision for medi-
ation of consignment of goods, establishing a tax haven or promoting
poor legal regulation of particular business activities  all these are loud
invitations for questionable money and goods from the whole world. It
also puts the state in a vulnerable position due to the presence of for-
eign crooks who are on the lookout for a way to launder money or
goods and protect them from taxation, detection, regulation or confis-
cation. In the worst-case scenario, corrupt interest groups can gain a
strong position within the state and use its leaders and institutions for
their own purposes.
A payment for the services rendered by a domestic politician can be
made directly in money paid into a personal account, or it can be made
in a more sophisticated way as a donation for the election campaign.
Campaign donations from foreign sources are problematic and are for-
bidden in some countries (the USA), and permitted in others (Great
Britain). An important question here is whether large donations
should be made public or not. In the former case the damage is proba-
bly smaller for the criticism by the media and other parties renders
abuse more difficult, while in the later case there is a real danger of
serving foreign interests for pay. 
Fortunately, Serbia has not entered the circle of countries which
offer a haven for dirty goods and capital, while there have been some
indications that this might be happening in Montenegro. In Serbia we
have (had) a common case of smuggling and corruption at the customs
which at one time was encouraged or at least tolerated by high govern-
ment officials, but more as a way of obtaining loyalty of the employees
and executives in the customs administration than as a method of
making a fortune by selling out the country.
The effects of corruption are extremely harmful at the social level as
well. The first effect is a redistribution of income in favour of privileged
groups and the classes holding public offices and positions, burdening
everyone else, especially the lower classes who do not have the neces-
sary influence and access to the state apparatus. Among the privileged
are also customs officials who gain amounts of money inconceivable to
common citizens.
Corruption therefore brings about an unjust redistribution of
income and in this way weakens devotion to justice in a society. When
injustice is widespread and when the responsible state organs make a
weak or no stand against the perpetrators, a signal is sent to the citizens
that there is no justice and that anything goes, if one has a little cunning
and business acumen. Similarly, widespread injustice and violation of
the law in connection with corruption gives rise to juridical anomie
and ultimately to the destruction of the principle of lawfulness  the
rule of law. When state officials and civil servants break the law with
impunity, and then citizens do not see why they should obey it. 
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VI Anticorruption Strategy in the Customs
Corruption at the customs in Serbia has been curbed to a great
extent in the last two years, but it is still present and it represents, on
the one hand, a legacy of the deep crisis in the Customs Authority dur-
ing the preceding decade, and, on the other, a serious limitation of the
functioning of the Customs Authority now and in the near future. The
roots of corruption run deep and it is necessary that a comprehensive
program be formulated and enforced so as to uproot it.
THE CAUSES OF CORRUPTION 
All elements of corruption in the customs must be clear before the
foundations of the anticorruption strategy are laid. 
The basis for all corruption is the estimate made by state employees
of the costs and benefits of engaging in a corrupt deal. If they find that
the cost-benefit ratio (including the risk of punishment) is more
favourable compared to honest work, he will decide on corruption.1
On the other hand, no one likes paying customs duties and so the
importers (and passengers) are also ready to save on duties by bribing
customs officers. The readiness of importers to engage in corruption
also depends on the expected benefit in terms of the amount of money
to be saved (which, in turn depends on the customs tariff rates) and
expected costs comprising the bribe and the risk involved. In this way
both the demand and the supply for corruption are brought into exis-
tence. Naturally, the outcome of the calculation referred to depends on
external circumstances  on factors neither the customs official nor the
importer (or the passenger) can totally control, but have to adapt to.
Of course, not all positions within the customs administration are
equally lucrative in terms of corruption. Posts on classification, evalua-
tion and inspection of the goods are especially profitable, then there are
anti smuggling squads, administration of confiscated goods, control of
customs warehouses and making decisions on complaints. For these,
and not only for these posts there was strong competition which was
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1 To put it more precisely, the decision to what extent a customs officer will get involved
in corruption depends on the point at which marginal benefits and expected marginal
costs (including the risk) meet.
often resolved with financial or (political) influence, which, in turn,
meant a pay-off in cash or an illegal act.
As we have already discussed the elements of corruption in the above
chapters we shall just list them here:
 Complex and/or restrictive foreign trade policy;
 Relatively high and diverse customs rates;
 Numerous exemptions and customs duty exemptions;
 Legacy of corruption from the preceding period;
 Complex and vaguely defined customs procedures;
 Inadequate system of control in the customs;
 Inadequate disciplinary measures;
 Lack of professional attitude;
 Low income of the customs employees;
 Inadequate computerization at the Customs Authority, etc.
GENERAL STRATEGY
Corruption at the customs is not an isolated phenomenon but part
of general corruption in a state and it tends to exhibit the same or sim-
ilar manifestations due to similar causes and mechanisms. Therefore,
the fight against corruption at the customs should be:
 integrated into the general fight against corruption; for only the
synchronized and wide-ranging effort of state and social institu-
tions yield adequate results; otherwise, results can be only partial
and temporary.
 Based on the same or similar principles as in other domains,
naturally taking into account the specific characteristics of the
customs.
The strategy of the struggle to check corruption always rests on three
basic principles:2
1. Legislative reform, including deregulation and liberalization,
limiting the area that can be infected with corruption or weaken-
ing the incentives for corrupt dealings. For example, since quanti-
tative limitations to import (quotas and other restrictions) have
been abolished, a large source of corruption has vanished; or
when customs rates are considerably lowered potential profit
from corruption is also lowered to a large extent which, in turn,
will somewhat curb corruption,
2. Transparency, that is, the functioning of a customs administra-
tion should be more in the public eye making both positive and
negative aspects, including corruption more visible so that the
public can react and exert pressure in order for the situation be
improved and the individuals responsible be called to account,
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3. Modification of the system of motivation, a satisfactory combi-
nation of measures can raise the costs of corruption for an indi-
vidual and discourage undesirable behaviour. Examples of such
measures are: raising the salaries of the employees which are at
present low; more rigorous control and stricter penalties for the
offenders and promotion of ethical principles; the aim of these
and other measures is to change the equation: small risk, large
profit into large risk, small profit.
The struggle against corruption must not be one time or sporadic,
but sustained and aimed at maintaining the achieved goals and attain-
ing new ones. It is a part of a wider strategy to combat corruption in
Serbia, and, on a wider plane, the strategy for establishing efficient and
just governance.
The anticorruption struggle must be comprehensive. Partial meas-
ures at particular points and segments of the customs, even when ener-
getically enforced, can only yield temporary results, as has been clearly
demonstrated by experience the world over. The reason for this is that
corruption simply relocates or flares up at other points and the pos-
sible positive effects of the action quickly vanish. If other circumstances
remain unchanged, it has been shown that, for example, a system of
pay incentives (Philippines), the purge of corrupt middle tier officials
(Pakistan) or engaging foreign private companies to work on the eval-
uation of goods (Bolivia) do not yield results.3 Therefore every ambi-
tious program of fighting corruption must be systematic  it must
attack the problem along the whole frontline, resting on three classic
elements: the strong and enduring will to uproot corruption, raising
the risks involved in corrupt dealings and serious repercussions for
perpetrators.
THE REFORM SYSTEM FOR THE CUSTOMS
The problem of corruption in the customs is a world-wide phenom-
enon, especially conspicuous in developing countries. So, practically all
states in the world fight corruption, some more successfully than oth-
ers. The World Customs Organization participates in the fight in its
role as a body which brings together national customs services and
which addresses problems faced by all. 
In 1993 in Arusha the World Customs Organization adopted a dec-
laration on the fight against corruption in the customs services, the so-
called Arusha Declaration. The declaration stems from shared experi-
ence of customs administrations with corruption and offers sugges-
tions by eminent experts on the best ways to combat it. It is therefore a
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good starting point for the formulation of an anticorruption strategy
for the customs services in Serbia and Yugoslavia.
The measures that have been proposed in the annex of the declara-
tion are primarily directed at combating corruption, but at the same
time they also constitute a program which necessarily raises the effi-
ciency of the customs in our country. It is only natural because, as well
as being in itself an obstacle to the proper work of the customs author-
ity, corruption also feeds on weaknesses of the customs authority.
An anticorruption strategy must be comprehensive and include
reforms at all points where corruption is manifested and on which suc-
cess depends. Among them is the external environment of the customs
authority (the public, politics, the Assembly, judiciary, anticorruption
strategy, social attitudes, media, civil society), organization and man-
agement of the customs authority (management, strategic manage-
ment techniques, organization, supervision and evaluation, human
resources management, internal control anticorruption mechanisms)
as well as the technical, procedural side of the work at the customs
(processing goods, logistics and infrastructure).
The following table displays a comprehensive survey of measures
and actions that would help to curb corruption in the Customs.
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Table 1
Integrated Strategy of Anticorruption Fight in the Customs
EXTERNAL FACTORS
Trade  lower customs duties and requests for licenses,
policy  lower the number of exemptions from customs duties,
 strive to harmonize excise duties and taxes with 
neighbouring countries,
 simplify the rules for import and export,
 raise the capacity of the Customs
Potential  raise the capacity of the Customs to fight increasingly
offenders resourceful fraud and smuggling,
 establish good relations with the formal sector of the
economy in order to obtain information on illegal 
activities,
 improve cooperation with the border police in order
to step up patrolling and ensure the personal safety of
customs employees.
Political Reach a consensus within the political elite in order to:
influence  abolish politics when appointing individuals to posts 
within the customs,
 stop exercising influence on appointing to posts and 
relocating,
 give an example by observing the customs regulations 
when travelling with other politicians, family and friends,
 create a professional customs authority founded on 
merit, where individuals are employed on open
competition,
 give the director of the Customs full discretion to hire,
appoint and relocate the employees, observing clearly 
stated regulations.
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The Parliament  lobby among the members for the spread of obligations
in fight against corruption in the customs,
 consider the possibility of alternative workplaces for
individuals actively engaged in corruption.
Judiciary  convince the judges of higher courts how important
the fight against corruption in the customs really is,
 require the courts to analyse verdicts in corruption cases
so as to identify institutional weaknesses,
 require the courts to monitor the judges closely and
ensure that only the judges with impeccable reputations
try corruption cases,
 develop a witness protection program to encourage
people to bear witness.
Anticorruption  adopt an Anticorruption Act and consider the solution
institutions that mere suspicion is enough grounds to file a suit and
that the defendant has to contest the charges himself,
 impose stricter penalties,
 establish anticorruption investigating bodies and
strengthen their capacity for investigation,
 direct the resources of these institutions and of the  
public prosecutor into a small number of high 
corruption cases with the participants in high echelons
in order to enhance the deterrent effect.
General  connect anticorruption activity in the Customs with
environment the general anticorruption strategy.
Social attitudes  launch a broad anticorruption campaign,
concerning  nclude anticorruption topics into educational system.
corruption
The media  Publish information on the Customs performance,
 Ensure that requests by the media for information are
promptly answered,
 Publicize through the media punitive actions against 
corrupt customs officials and traders
Civil society  Establish cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations,
 Publish information on the movement of goods so that 
NGOs can monitor  it.
INTERNAL FACTORS
(I) Organization and management
Management  abolish politics from the process of appointing
to posts in the Customs,
 set up qualification criteria for top management,
 engage people of impeccable reputation and tested 
competence,
 minimize changes in management so as to provide for 
long term institutional progress.
Strategic  set up a concept of orientation towards results
management at the Customs,
 set down clear strategic objectives and expected
performance,
 give the executives independence in operational,
personnel and financial matters,
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 make the top management accountable concerning
expected objectives,
 introduce strategic planning,
 keep operative policy focused on top priorities.
Organizational Reorganize the organizational structure of the Customs 
structure so that:
 the number of customs officers is in keeping with the
quantity of work and the risk of fraud and smuggling,
 a new Internal Control unit is set up with the director
of the Customs,
 duties, responsibilities and needed qualifications of all 
are clearly determined.
Coordination, Tighten control over customs officers by:
control and  sudden visits by higher officials,
evaluation  Internal Control inspections,
 Turning over the work at a customs office to a
mobile anticorruption unit for a short while,
 Extending control powers held by supervising bodies,
 Strengthening coordination and exchange of 
information between different levels of the Customs by 
the use of information technology and modern 
communications,
 Strengthening the supervision and evaluation system.
Human  create a professional customs authority,
Resources  improve the earnings of the employees,
management  set down clear rules of personnel recruitment,
relocating and appointing to posts,
 rotate customs officials on a regular basis between
different customs offices so that they do not get too
familiar with the customers,
 abolish political influence,
 demonstrate the readiness of the customs to protect
its employees threatened by corrupt clients.
Inner control  improve systems of inner control,
systems
Internal  Strictly observe the Code of Conduct:
Anticorruption  include instruction in the Code of Conduct in customs
mechanisms officers training,
 require honest higher officers to act as mentors
for the younger ones,
 hold the executives accountable for attaining and 
maintaining high levels of integrity through supervision
and disciplinary actions,
Establish Internal Control in the main and branch 
customs offices to:
 supervise customs officers,
 consider complaints of the clients concerning 
harassment and corrupt dealings by the customs officers,
 take disciplinary measures,
 energetically investigate cases of suspicion of
corruption and illegal gain,
 establish effective mechanisms for filing 
misdemeanour suits.
(II) Technical operations
Procedure with  revise and improve the Customs Law,
commodities  set down clear and simple regulations,
Detailed discussion of the most important measures for fighting cor-
ruption at the customs will be presented in the following subsection.
Customs regulations
Customs regulations must be clear and well defined. Only then can
they serve as a foundation for a rational and efficient customs proce-
dure, based on rules which do not leave room for later interpretations
and discretionary decisions by any level of the customs authority.
In the preceding decade customs regulations were not clear and
well-defined as we have seen in the preceding chapters of this study. On
the contrary, there was a constant need to multiply by-laws of various
levels in an attempt to closely define procedures in certain cases. These
regulations were enforced sporadically, sometimes wholly and some-
times they were soon forgotten. Yet, even such proliferation of regula-
tion could not solve all the dilemmas produced by imprecise laws in
the everyday activity of the customs bodies. That is the reason why
there was room for discretionary decision making, far more room than
had been intended or was necessary.
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 revise and simplify customs procedure, limit 
discretionary rights and raise efficacy,
 put together a booklet of rules,
 ensure that the procedures are uniform for the
whole state territory,
 publicize standards of service concerning the time
needed for completion of different tasks,
Introduce modern information technologies so as to:
 make critically important procedures automatic, speed
up processing and lower administrative discretion,
 integrate independent processes such as process of 
declaring, paying and storing,
 assign tasks concerning declaring and physical control 
tasks to customs officers by random selection,
 improve detection of inaccurate classifications of
commodities and underestimation of value,
 raise capacities of the higher levels to supervise
the work of lower levels.
Ensuring   modify the Customs Act to raise the level of executive
performance powers in a struggle against corruption and avoidance
of payment,
 develop risk analysis systems, 
 reduce physical examination of goods down to 10  30%
of arrivals, using the risk analysis,
 improve pooling of all information,
 establish exchange of information with other,
especially neighbouring customs offices,
 improve infrastructure at border crossings,
 strengthen mobile anti-smuggling teams.
Based on: J. S. B. Gill - Developing an Integrated Strategy to Tackle
Corruption in Customs   
Since the establishment of the new governance in October 2000, for-
eign trade policy has been reformed, but the regulation concerning the
customs authority and customs procedure has not, in essence, been
changed. The new Customs Law has not been adopted yet. It has  been
prepared but is still at the proposal stage.
Serbia is facing a customs service reform. The reform will, necessari-
ly, be comprehensive, that is, it will not only deal with corruption but
also with all other aspects of customs procedure and customs service.
Its task is to contribute to the creation of a new customs authority
which functions efficiently and which presents the least possible obsta-
cle to trade flows between Serbia/Yugoslavia and other countries. 
In order to modernize the customs authority and improve its effi-
ciency, it is necessary that the regulations be precisely and clearly for-
mulated. Experiences of other countries and international conventions
can help greatly, but the experience of the Yugoslav customs authority
and the specific traits of our state organization must also be taken into
account. The legislation of the European Community (EC) is of special
relevance for Serbia due to its ambition to join the Community. That is
the reason why it is necessary to harmonize our customs regulations
with those of the EC. Apart from that, an important source of world
experience and practical courses of action is the International
Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of the Customs
Procedures, the so-called Kyoto Convention, adopted in 1973 and
amended in 1999.
Import customs duties should be moderate whenever possible. As
high customs tariff rates breed corruption, their lowering is by far the
best way to fight corruption. As soon as potential gain from corruption
is reduced (which happens with lowered customs rates), importers
have less incentive to get round paying customs duties, thus reducing
the demand for corrupt services.
The fight against corruption is, naturally, not the only factor for
determining customs rates  the most important element is the foreign
trade policy  and that is the reason why the customs policy will always
be in keeping with the economic needs of the country or with the
notions of what the objective needs of the country are.
During the preceding decade in our country the concept of so-
called import substitution was dominant. It claimed that it was nec-
essary to protect the domestic economy from competition from
abroad through customs and even more through other kinds of pro-
tection in order to stimulate it. Over the same period, completely
opposite ideas and politics have gained influence in the world, in
other words, modern attitudes towards economic progress are
increasingly prevalent, accentuating the crucial importance of
open/more open foreign trade policy and integration of the country
into world trade. Only recently has our country made some impor-
tant steps towards reducing the level of customs protection of the
domestic market in an effort to open up the domestic economy. In
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this way both the concept of the liberalization of foreign trade and
the anticorruption struggle have contributed to the need to reduce
the customs rates.
Changes in the customs tariffs from May 2001 brought reductions in
a large number of customs rates.4 The average (not weighted) rate is
now about 11% while the weighted one which takes into account the
structure of imports is about 9%. Further reduction was not possible
due to the opposition of domestic industry but it is inevitable in the
future. Harmonization of the customs policy with Montenegro, and
later with the European Community, which have considerably lower
customs rates compared to Serbia, will lead to further reductions of
customs rates in Serbia. The ultimate objective of the customs tariffs
reform is harmonization with the European Community, the customs
rates of which are mostly at the level of 2 to 3%. At such a level of rates
motivation for smuggling common, commercial and legal commodi-
ties and bribing customs officers almost vanishes, and so the overall
level of corruption would be radically reduced even without other anti-
corruption measures.
The number of customs rates should be limited. The average cus-
toms encumbrance is not the only important characteristic of a cus-
toms duty policy. The other characteristics are the number of rates and
their range which is not unimportant for the stimulation and manifes-
tation of corruption. 
The Customs duty policy in Serbia comprises six customs rates5
ranging from 1 to 30%. Such a range of rates fosters manipulation con-
cerning the type of commodity  one type of goods is reported as
another type in a customs declaration so as to reduce customs duty. As
we have seen before, this way of saving has gained considerable pop-
ularity in our country recently since less sophisticated, blatant manipu-
lations were halted. Now it probably constitutes the most important
channel for illegal transactions and corruption in the customs.
In order to reduce or eliminate this type of violation of the Customs
Act, it is necessary to further reduce the number of tariffs. A single cus-
toms rate would be ideal  intentionally misclassification would thus
be completely obliterated - rendered pointless.
Some may ask whether the process of reducing the number of cus-
toms rates is reasonable from the aspect of foreign trade and general
economic policy. The answer is yes. The present structure of customs
rates is based on the old, in principle superannuated concept of export
substitution, that is, selective protection of domestic production. So
the rates fall into one of two categories: those which are favourable,
applied to the goods and especially to raw materials which are not pro-
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duced in the country or not produced in necessary quantity, and those
which are higher, applied to the goods produced in the country and
luxuries. Such logic clashes with the concept of wide integration into
world trade flows and is necessarily opposed to the idea that strong
competition on the domestic market is a good thing for the manufac-
turers, not a bad thing. So it is to be expected that in the near future the
number of the customs rates will be reduced, and their range limited,
not just in order to curb corruption, but also in keeping with modern
views on customs protection and its economic effects.
Foreign trade restrictions must be brought down to the lowest
possible level.6 Preferential customs rates are not the only form of pro-
tection of domestic manufacturers from competition from abroad;
there are also numerous non tariff barriers such as various precondi-
tions which an importer must fulfil, quotas and quantitative restric-
tions, licenses and similar.
The main attribute of several forms of foreign trade restrictions is
selectivity  not everyone can be an importer or exporter but only the
one selected and licensed by the state government. In this way the state
not only chooses the companies which will perform an export  import
transaction but, even more important, also approves or forbids import
or export of a product. Widespread non-customs protection leads to a
high risk from corruption, for it is completely natural that there will be
a demand for papers permitting business. And when there is a demand,
it is inevitable that it will be answered by the supply, that is, state offi-
cials will engage in trading the rights for personal gain.
The former foreign trade regime in Yugoslavia, which was in force
from 1993 to the beginning of 2001, rested more on foreign trade
restrictions than on customs protection and it gave rise to enormous
corruption. This, admittedly, was not a classical type of corruption at
the customs as it was carried out in other state (competent federal min-
istries) and pseudo-state bodies (chambers of commerce and similar).
Still, it was connected with the work of customs and therefore relevant
to this research.
Only recently has there been some advance in reducing non-tariff
barriers to freer trade flows. At the end of 2000 limitations (applica-
tions, permissions) were abolished for companies which wanted to
engage in foreign trade business, and now everyone is free to do it.
More to the point, in May 2001 import of almost all commodities was
liberalized and now only the customs authority remains to protect the
domestic market and manufacturers. The only exemption in imports is
granted to the steel industry which was cut some slack.
Further deregulation of foreign trade is a natural process, founded
on the rules stipulated by the World Trade Commission and the
European Union, which our country wants to join. Thus the World
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Trade Commission explicitly requires that all candidate states discard
the systems of non customs protection, except perhaps during the tran-
sitional period and in time of serious balance of payments difficulties. 
There should be as few as possible exemptions (reliefs and deduc-
tions) from the standard rules. Every exception to the standard rule if
not actually encouraging them, opens up the possibility for manipula-
tions including corruption. Namely, with the exceptions there is always
doubt whether the commodity being imported is really intended for the
purpose for which it was given preferential treatment under the law, or
if it will be turned to other uses for which the legislative body did not
grant the right. One possible roundabout on this road is the customs
authority, where a dishonest employee can tamper with papers, natural-
ly at a certain risk of being discovered if they are later closely scrutinized.
Custom tariffs relief and tax deductions are stipulated by the
Customs Act and the Law on Foreign Investments for the import of
equipment, both on the basis of the investment of a foreign individual
and when the equipment is not being manufactured in the country or
is used in the activities of a special social concern as well as import of
raw materials and semi-finished products to be used for production for
export or from foreign investment.
Abolishing exemptions from the standard rules, customs duties
relief and deductions for the commodities for particular purposes or of
a particular kind, would certainly leave less room for discretionary
decision making and in this way corruption in the Customs.
Nevertheless, the foreign trade concept must be given precedence  if it
is in the economic interest of the country to have rules which do not
conform to the usual standards, then that is the way it should be. Yet,
from the economic standpoint as well, it is good policy that there be as
few exemptions as possible for there are no particular reasons why
preferential treatment should be granted for particular uses of import-
ed goods. Current exemptions are more a consequence of the former
concept of import substitution and resistance to change put up by
lobby groups than of a deliberate foreign trade policy. That is the rea-
son why abolishing exemptions and relief still presents an important
option for the struggle against corruption in the customs authority.
All proposed measures are parts of the process of liberalization of
foreign trade, and one of the by effects is always curbing corruption in
the Customs. At least, that has been experience in the world at large.7
Customs procedures
In the modern world two, somewhat different, approaches to admin-
istration are applied: the first one is based on strict adherence to given
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administrative procedures, mechanisms of control and detailed rules on
what a civil servant is supposed to do, in what way he is supposed to do
it and what he must not do. The other approach rests less on a given
procedure but rather on the principles and objectives of the organiza-
tion and it counts on the professionalism and conscience of a civil ser-
vant, strengthened by encouragement and incentives for proper behav-
iour. Our customs authority is characterized by the former, traditional
approach due to the high risk of corruption which would, at least in the
transition period, be brought about by the latter, modern approach.
The customs authority must not experiment too much lest it risk com-
promising the work. It is necessary, therefore, that it adhere to tradi-
tional principles until the right time, until the service itself has reached
the maturity needed for significant innovation in the work system.
The reform in the work of customs and customs procedures should
be, in keeping with the Kyoto Declaration, based on the following prin-
ciples:
 adoption and implementation of the program intended to
increasingly modernize customs procedures and practices in
order to raise the efficiency of work,
 apply procedures in a predictable, consistent and transparent way,
so as to facilitate the business dealings of its clients,
 providing all necessary information on all customs laws, regula-
tion, administrative directives, procedures and practices for all
interested parties,
 adoption of modern techniques such as risk management and
inspection through auditing financial records, as well as the maxi-
mum use of information technology,
 co-operation with other state bodies, other Customs and industry,
 providing accessible administrative and judicial protection to all
participants in the customs procedure.
Efficiency of customs procedure. Raising the efficiency at the cus-
toms is an objective in itself, but indirectly it is also an important
means of fighting corruption. When the customs procedure is complex
and when the customs authority is inefficient (long delays of goods at
the border, a lot of red tape and similar), that is, when the customs
becomes a fortress to be taken, and when it significantly interferes with
the normal, fast, flow of commodities, corruption inevitably appears.
For under such circumstances even a most honest importer or an
exporter will consider greasing and speeding up the procedure by
bribing a customs officer so as to avoid loss of time and other costs.
More to the point, it is possible that customs officials complicate and
slow down the customs process on purpose, just to provide an oppor-
tunity for themselves to profit by speeding up the process after they
have received a bribe.
In order to curb corruption therefore it is necessary to permanently
modernize and advance customs procedures and the customs authori-
ty in general. That means:
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 strict implementation of current customs procedures, with tighter
supervision, higher accountability and using both rewarding and
disciplinary measures.
 advancing customs regulation in a narrow sense in accordance
with local experience and the experience of other customs services
such as advancement of the techniques for evaluating goods, more
precise methodology of goods classification, better control of
goods in transit, providing better mutual control of the customs
officials, creating a database on world prices, providing available
information on Customs as fast as possible (real time is the objec-
tive) and so on.
 organizational changes at the Customs such as establishing a spe-
cial, independent internal control unit, revising the number of
customs offices and similar.
 technological modernization of the Customs and the use of con-
temporary technological devices.8
Predictability and transparency of the customs procedure.
Customs procedure must be predictable for the client familiar with
the customs regulations. If this is not the case  when the same prin-
ciples or regulations are put into practice in different ways at differ-
ent customs offices, or when different customs officers at the same
customs office act and solve the same situations differently  the
client will encounter unnecessary complications during the proce-
dure or yield to the temptation to bribe the customs officer in order
to simplify matters. On the other hand, when an honest trader or
shipper knows all customs regulations and is able and willing to
observe them, it will be easier for him to refuse illegal proposals by a
corrupt customs officer.
The predictability of the procedure means:
 supplanting as far as possible discretionary decision making by
automatic rules: for example, the rules for the evaluation of goods
when the submitted declaration is justifiably suspect need to be
more precisely defined,
 harmonizing the practices in situations demanding discre-
tionary decision- making through directives issued by the
authority, exchange of experience, joint training of the employ-
ees and similar,
 avoiding frequent changes in the customs procedure.
Well-informed clients. Availability of relevant information on cus-
toms regulation, directives, procedures and practices to all interested
parties is a necessary precondition if we want the clients of the customs
to be well-informed, which would facilitate the work of the Customs
and thus restrain corruption. When the client knows precisely what to
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expect at the border, he will certainly be better able to fulfil his obliga-
tions at the Customs and deal with attempts by the customs officials to
demand bribes.
More thorough informing of the clients means that internal regula-
tions and directives at the Customs will no longer be kept top secret
and that the old game of cops and robbers will no longer be played by
secret rules and hidden customs regulations and procedure, but by their
consistent execution. A normal precondition for the customs clients to
be well informed is publicizing the complete customs regulations,
including the rules in the Official Gazette and on the Internet. For
example, the Singaporean customs authority displays everything that its
clients need to know on its Internet site (www.gov.sg/customs/).
Selective control (risk management). The problem of the customs
employees being overworked (the amount of work at the customs
office exceeds its capacity) or the weaknesses of the customs authority
itself (corruption, low professional level and other) can be addressed
not only by improving the traditional organization of the service but in
other ways as well. One of them is risk management reflected in the
selective monitoring of goods (vehicles) at the border, and the other is
dislocation of a certain number of customs functions through the so-
called inspection before shipment and later inspection.
Every customs authority faces two conflicting objectives: the first is
to facilitate the flow of goods, vehicles and people so as to hasten for-
eign trade and traffic in general and thereby accelerate economic activ-
ity, and the other is to monitor as thoroughly as possible these flows so
as to effectively implement customs and other laws. As the traffic gets
easier and faster, so the control  becomes weaker and more superficial
and the implementation of the customs laws becomes compromised;
and vice versa  the more thorough the control is, the slower the traffic,
and the greater the harm done to foreign trade. This conflict obviously
calls for an innovative approach in order to attain both objectives as far
as possible.
The problem of the conflict of objectives of facilitating the flow and
exercising control can be addressed through the use of a method called
risk management. The underlying assumption of the method is that
the risk of offence varies according to the type of situation at the cus-
toms, which calls for different procedures under different circum-
stances. The situations of higher risks will be brought to closer atten-
tion compared to less risky situations. In this way the general risk of
customs violation will be minimized. Risk management is used in
numerous areas of the private sector such as banking, insurance and
similar, so it is possible to borrow not just the idea but also the existing
methods of risk management practiced in other areas. The main objec-
tive is, always, to minimize risk with limited resources. This means that
a balance is sought between cost and benefit where the benefit is pre-
vention of offences at the customs and the cost is the use of limited cus-
toms capacities.
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An alternative to the risk management, and with limited customs
capacity, is the method of spot checks in the belief that it will prove a
sufficient deterrent for potential offenders. In any case, it is obvious
that random control the spot check method is a better and more effi-
cient type of risk management as it improves the chances of uncovering
an offence and therefore serves as a better deterrent.
Risk management at customs can be carried out on three levels:
 strategic level, where it is determined which areas of the cus-
toms are high risk: collection of levies and other charges, breach
of import-export restrictions, health safety breaches, social
issues (drugs, white slavery etc.) and similar. Risk analysis ranks
different domains by the extent of the risk, which is extremely
useful information providing a broad outline for lower levels of
risk management  it brings to closer attention the areas of
higher risk.
 operational level, where a level of control necessary for effective
risk management is determined for a particular customs task. In
this way the customs is changed from an overall monitor into a
service which acts selectively during the customs procedure, inter-
vening directly only when a higher risk is expected.
 tactical level, where a customs officer directly puts into practice
risk management in concrete situations. He uses his knowledge,
experience and stipulated regulation to determine which ship-
ments are at higher risk than others and  examines them.
Selectivity, profiling and targeting are the three aspects of risk
management. The criteria for selection of goods permitted to cross
the border include the history of the importer and the exporter, the
shipper, the forwarding agent, the country of origin, the transport
route and restrictions on import or export of goods. The indicators of
risk are specified in selection criteria such as type of commodity,
country of origin, value,  company, type of vehicle, the reason why
the goods are being brought into the customs territory and similar.
The risk profile is a result of a risk analysis and it is a comprehensive
document of a customs authority detailing the risk involved in partic-
ular situations. Its purpose is to supplant the current complete con-
trol blanket coverage of all goods crossing the border or random
specimen inspection with  inspection in accordance with the risk car-
ried by every individual shipment. In order to estimate the level of
risk, that is of compliance with customs regulations, numerous
sources of information are used; regularity of tariff classification by
the traders, accuracy of declared value, whether the state of origin tal-
lies with the labels on the goods, import and export, transit opera-
tions, storage and free trade zones, accuracy of paid clearance
charges, whether the quantity of declared goods is accurate, whether
the commodity is accurately described in the bill of lading, accuracy
of description of declared containers, compliance with health and
safety regulations and similar.
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In this way the customs authorities can determine through risk analy-
sis which individuals and which goods as well as vehicles should be
examined and to what extent. For example, for authorized legal entities
who meet the criteria of the Customs including prior compliance with
customs regulations and adequate maintenance of commercial and
accounting records, the Customs can:
 let the goods through with minimal information needed simply to
identify them, with the customs declaration completed at a later
time;
 effect customs clearance in the facilities of a client or some other
approved by the Customs;
 issue a single import or export bill of entry for a specified period
of time when a single individual frequently imports or exports
goods;
 Use the  financial records of an authorized person (alone) to cal-
culate his customs and tax obligations and similar.
The individuals who in the past did not completely comply with the
customs regulations will be treated in more strictly, depending on the
level of prior compliance with the regulations.
Pre-shipment inspection refers to verification of the price per unit
of goods and declaring its quantity and quality in the exporting coun-
try, that is, outside the territory of the importing country (Serbia).
These services are provided by trustworthy private companies in
exporting countries and in this way the customs authority of the
importing country receives information it does not posses or saves the
effort and time needed to provide it. Pre-shipment inspection prevents
invoicing either too high or too low prices, misleading customs classifi-
cation of importing goods, concealing the real quantity of the goods,
concealing the country of origin of the goods (important owing to the
existence of free trade zones) and similar.
Basically, this method is a sort of pseudo-privatisation  the state
customs authority makes contracts with private companies for particu-
lar tasks. The customs would first ascertain the trustworthiness of the
companies and list the ones it is wiling to contract with. As the idea is
not new, such firms already operate and such lists already exist in
numerous customs authorities in the world. The reliability of these
companies is based on their wish to maintain their place in business
and keep making profit in this way, as the first instance of wrongdoing
on their part would ruin their reputation and therefore run them out
of business. And owing to the trustworthiness of the companies which
deliver the service of pre-shipment inspection, only reliable import
companies seek their services  those which do not try to break the
import laws of importing countries; the others stay clear of them. The
cost of inspection is about 1% of the value of the goods. 
Pre-shipment inspection can be an effective tool for fighting corrup-
tion at the customs for it reduces the room for discretionary decision
making by customs officers. Nevertheless, the main purpose of this
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technique is to facilitate and hasten the flow of goods across the border
by completing a part of the procedure in the exporting country.
Pre-shipment inspection has existed for a while, but it really began
to flourish after 1993 when the World Trade Organization adopted and
ratified the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection. In 2001, 37 devel-
oping countries in the world used this method.9
All the same, liberalization of foreign trade and movement of capital
as well as institutional strengthening of the customs authority remain
the basic and the best methods of facilitating and improving the transit
of goods across the border. Pre-shipment inspection can, in part, sup-
plant them and serve as an  additional tool  certainly very useful
before serious reform has been completed or in the transitional period
of its implementation.
Subsequent control is another way of dislocating part of customs
authorization. It reduces the amount of work done at the border itself
and in customs warehouses and speeds up traffic. To a certain extent
subsequent control exists now through the activities of mobile teams
and inspection on the roads and in customs warehouses, but it is not
sufficient and could be considerably expanded.
All the same, our customs still focus on the physical inspection of the
goods at the border. Such inspection does have some deterrent effect
and plays a positive role for the verification of the quantity of goods,
but it is less effective for the verification of tariff classification, country
of origin, value, return and exceptions.
The main form of subsequent control is inspecting documentation
and financial and other records of the traders, shippers and others, for
they give clear and comprehensive picture of the transactions relevant
for the Customs.
There are two types of audit:
 first, the monitoring of transactions with the Customs, which is
done after the goods have  cleared the customs. The idea is to
speed up the customs procedure by completing some of the
administrative work later, using the commercial and accounting
documents which every trader should posses and keep;
 second, the inspection of the accounting and commercial system
in the business facilities. The objective of this type of control is to
ascertain whether the enterprise keeps adequate records of the
transactions, and in this way rank the enterprise according to the
customs risk it presents. On the basis of this information, the
enterprise will receive more lenient or more strict treatment at the
customs later.
In order to implement auditory control in Serbia/Yugoslavia it is
necessary to change some customs regulations and grant the customs
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officials the authority to inspect documents belonging to import-
export,  forwarding, transport and other companies.
The value of goods. One of the more significant problems which
customs officials face in their work is estimation of the value of goods.
The problem is created by traders who invoice for a reduced amount in
order to pay less duties, in which they can be aided by a corrupt cus-
toms officer. As was pointed out in chapter five of this study, tamper-
ing with the value of imported goods has been on the rise recently in
Serbia, since formerly predominant mechanisms (such as unregistered
border crossings) were abolished.
The present situation concerning estimating the value of goods is
not favourable as there is neither adequate methodology of calculation
nor developed database on prices which could aid the valuation.
Our customs authority must modernize the procedure for estimat-
ing the value of goods by adopting an appropriate methodology in
keeping with international standards and agreements, and above all
with the relevant agreement by the World Trade Organization.
According to this agreement, the main method of valuation must be
based on transaction value, calculated on the actual, real price of goods,
perhaps adjusted for certain items allowed for by this agreement. If it is
not possible to ascertain transaction value, there are five other ways to
determine the value, listed below by priority.
The other method of evaluation is transaction value of identical
goods, on condition that physical and other characteristics are identical,
that the commodity has been manufactured in the same country by the
same manufacturer. Two exceptions are allowed for: that the commod-
ity does not have to be completely identical but that the differences are
negligible, and that the manufacturer does not have to be the same but
it must come from the same country.
The third method is the transaction value of the similar goods. It is
determined in the same way as the former, on the condition that the
commodity must be similar in significant measure to the commodity
being evaluated in terms of components and materials, to serve the
same purposes, that is commercially interchangeable, and that it has
been produced in the same country as the commodity being evaluated.
Besides, it is necessary that the commodity be imported into the same
country (because of the possible differences in manufacturing price
policies towards different countries).
The fourth method is evaluation by deduction. When it is not possi-
ble to calculate customs value on the basis of transaction value of the
given, identical or similar commodity, then the value will be calculated
upon the price for which identical or similar goods were sold to a dis-
interested buyer from the importing country in the highest quantity, in
the same period. 
The fifth method is the method of calculated value, and it is used
when none of the previously mentioned methods can be used. The
value of the imported goods is by this method determined by calculat-
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ing production costs (the value of the material and production) and
adding to them the profit and overall costs as well as the costs of trans-
port and handling from the place of production to the ultimate desti-
nation. This method is rarely used.
The last, sixth method is the method of reasonable opinion, taking
into account available information. It is not in keeping with this
method to use the retail price in the importing, exporting or in some
third country as a point of reference.
A large database on commodities and prices must be available if we
want to use successfully this method of value calculation. It is conven-
ient that basic and most important information used for evaluation
through methods of higher priority is already available at the Customs
(it comes from import transactions), and it can be processed in an
appropriate way.
Automatization (the use of information technology)
Over time, the way the customs authority operates has changed
considerably. In bygone days the commodities, usually transported by
ships, were examined. This was later supplanted by examining the
papers and so customs declaration with a number of original docu-
ments gained in importance; the actual examination of goods became
less frequent. When they appeared, new information technologies
came into use at the customs. Nowadays, customs offices in the world
are in a transitional period  in most of them computer systems are
just used as an equivalent for paperwork (for example sending an elec-
tronic version of a customs declaration), while in a few there have
been radical changes.
The converging development of computer and telecommunications
technology has created vast opportunities for the use of information
technology in different areas, at the customs and in customs proce-
dure among them. The advancement in information technology has,
firstly, considerably speeded up processing information in compari-
son with traditional paperwork and secondly, introduced new meth-
ods of work which had not been either known or possible in the peri-
od of paperwork. Broad perspectives have been opened in this way for
the advancement of the customs authority, and many customs in the
world have taken advantage of this. So some of them, in Singapore, for
example, have completely changed over to computer processing of all
documentation in the customs procedure and have completely aban-
doned paperwork.
The Federal Customs Administration also uses information technol-
ogy in its work but not to any great degree, and far less than other cus-
toms services. Computer processing of documentation is still second-
ary to the main method  work with documents on paper. As a result,
the vast possibilities of information technology are not used for poten-
tially great advancement of the customs operation.
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From the aspect of the fight against corruption, information tech-
nologies are a large step forward. The main characteristic of the com-
puterization of the customs procedure is the fact that there is no
direct contact between a customs officer and a client, which forestalls
corruption. Since a considerable part of the customs procedure is
automatic, discretion is significantly reduced and the rest of the
process becomes impersonal. The most important elements of
automatization are electronic declaration of goods and computer
processing of customs declarations, selective control, compulsory
payment of duties through the bank, automatic verification of pay-
ment, computerized clearance of goods and subsequent monitoring
and similar. The customs procedures which have not been made
completely automatic can be assigned to customs officers using the
random numbers method, which forestalls potential deals with
clients. On the whole, all these things drastically limit the possibility
of corruption.
Informational strengthening of the Customs does not mean just
comprehensive coverage  of internal activities by information tech-
nologies, but also information exchange with others  first of all with
the clients on the Internet in its role as the official means of communi-
cation, and then with other state agencies and customs offices from
abroad for the exchange of information through EDI (Electronic Data
Interchange) systems. 
When introducing and setting up a computer system at the Customs
it is necessary to protect it from possible tampering. For example, it s
important that there should be personal passwords for each user, and
that each user should have access only to a specified part of the system
needed for his tasks; that programmers should not have access to oper-
ative databases and that they should be the only ones authorized to
make changes in the software and similar.
The fact that the Federal Customs Administration need not develop
complete software for customs administration is very convenient; with
certain adjustments, it is possible to use computer software for the cus-
toms of ASYCUD, developed within UNCTAD. This program covers
most foreign trade and customs procedures, from customs declara-
tions, through orders for selective inspection to accounting. It provides
for interactive communication with clients and other state bodies. It
offers commercial information for statistical and economic analysis. It
uses international codes and standards issued by ISO (International
Standards Organization) and WCO (World Customs Organization).
Our legal procedures (customs regime, tariff system, customs rates and
similar) can be incorporated into the program. More than 80 states in
the world use this program.
The main challenge for progressive customs and in future for ours as
well, is the fact that almost all information the Customs needs is
already stored in the information systems supporting business transac-
tions in the private sector. It would be cost-effective for the Customs to
156 Corruption at the Customs
rely on those systems, naturally, with special monitoring. In future,
lowering of customs duties and restrictions will make things easier as it
will significantly lower the motivation of businessmen to conceal or
falsify information.
Division of work and rotation
In order to reduce possibilities for corruption in the customs, the work
of the customs can be made more flexible than is usual in other areas.
Firstly, strategic separation of functions, such as work with documents
(customs declarations etc), physical inspection, evaluation, tariff classi-
fication and other. Such separation of functions (and people) at cus-
toms offices would be accompanied by vertical organization of the
Customs with strong directorates at the expense of management on a
territorial principle. The underlying idea of the concept is to preserve
at least some functions from infectious corruption and in this way pre-
vent the creation of chain corruption throughout the whole customs
authority.
Secondly, rotation of work. Based on the assumption that many pro-
cedures at the customs are similar to each other it is possible to swap
people around in order to prevent their staying too long on the same
tasks and making connections in order to engage in corrupt dealings.
In this way, the individual doing the paperwork in the customs could
be transferred to physical inspection, and vice versa.
Thirdly, task assignment by the random choice method. On this con-
cept, an individual would be assigned tasks within his job description
not on his immediate superiors or his own discretion or by the order
of consignment arrival, but by execution orders issued randomly, by
the computer. In other words, a customs officer on the physical inspec-
tion of the goods, for example, would receive an order to examine the
second, the twelfth and the twentieth truck and not the one he wants or
the one which is available at the moment when he has finished with the
previous one or the one assigned to him by his immediate superior.
The underlying idea is to prevent an understanding between a client, a
customs officer and (perhaps) immediate superiors.
Finally, relocating customs officers to other customs houses/customs
border cross points in order to prevent the development of friendships
with both regular customers and other customs officers.
In general, the central idea of this proposal is that a customs officer
should be working on the same task or in the same territory only tem-
porarily so that he will not be able to make, develop and maintain cor-
rupt relationships.
Although these are suggestions from the Arusha Declaration for
the Fight Against Corruption by the World Customs Organization, it
is questionable whether they should be put into practice. This would
certainly be beneficial for fighting corruption, but it would also harm
the efficiency of the customs work. The customs officials need a cer-
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tain amount of time to gain experience of the procedures, commodi-
ties, clients and trade sectors and in this way attain maximum effi-
ciency in their work. Rotation of work severs the old, often useful ties
between customs officers and their clients; strategic separation of func-
tions violates important management principles such as principles of
coordination, mutual assistance and interchangeability; random
choice, when set up badly, can compromise the effectiveness of selection
based on risk analysis; relocating customs officers breeds dissatisfaction
and incurs social and financial costs. 
The answer to the question: should we apply the aforemen-
tioned systems? can be found only after another question has been
answered: is the level of corruption at the customs very high? If
the answer to the latter question is affirmative, then the answer to
the former is also affirmative. And, really, if the level of corruption
at the customs is exceptionally high, then all these radical measures
must be enforced as benefits from lessened corruption will out-
weigh losses in efficiency of the customs authority. The analysis put
forward in this study leads us to believe that there is considerable
corruption at the customs, but that it is not exceptionally high and
that it is on the decline. So, presumably, the above mentioned flexi-
ble methods of work at the customs should be kept in reserve and
used if other systems do not yield adequate results in the near
future, or in particular situations with constant monitoring of the
balance between cost and benefit.
Internal and external auditing
It is easy to make a mistake in customs work, on purpose or unin-
tentionally. That is the reason why a system of internal and external
audit should be set up and developed to inspect the past work of the
customs officers. The main reason for audit is the suspicion that some-
thing has not been done according to the current regulations, but the
reason can also be an attempt to inspect the work of the customs or
some customs officers by randomly auditing selected procedures which
have not been suspect. The aim if discovering offences is not simply to
punish the perpetrators but also to act as a deterrent.
Audits can be internal, performed by  the appropriate body within
the customs authority, or by an ad hoc commission, and external, per-
formed by professional auditing houses.
Audits are mostly performed by analysing paper or electronic docu-
mentation, but interviewing customs personnel can also be very useful.
Internal audits should be conducted by Internal control as a special-
ized unit for conducting investigations within the Customs.
If it is deemed necessary, taking into account the state of affairs in
the Customs and inadequacies of the Internal control, it is possible to
entrust the inspection to an outside company which has the required
professional resources, and which, on the whole, is disinterested.
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Employment and advancement
Management of human resources in the Customs, apart from train-
ing, which has already been discussed, comprises the treatment of
employees, employment in the future and advancement in career. 
The main question is how to deal with customs employees who have
been or are still involved in corruption. There are three facts of special
relevance here. First, a considerable number of customs officers were
or still are corrupt; second, owing to the surreptitious nature of cor-
ruption, it is difficult or impossible to prove their guilt, although the
customs employees know very well what the others are doing; and
third, the relevant regulations (the Law on Customs Administration
and the Law on Working Relations in Civil Service) are very restrictive
in terms of terminating the contracts of employees. In other words, the
custom service cannot dismiss an official who is known to be corrupt
without a fact-finding procedure, which is virtually impossible to com-
plete. The minimal number of individuals dismissed from work in the
customs in the last two years despite the good intentions of the new
Customs Administration to do more also testifies to the legal restric-
tions and practical difficulties of proving guilt.
On the other hand, the fact that customs officials who repeatedly
engage in corrupt dealings remain in the customs employ, is an incen-
tive for others to join in corruption as it has turned out that the deter-
rent was inadequate and that there is no need to fear the consequences
even when one is found out. In such a situation, rotten apples will
infect the sound ones and all efforts to regain credibility of the
Customs may be irretrievably lost.
It has been asked whether it is 1) good and 2) possible to get rid of
corrupt officials, including individuals in managerial positions in the
present Federal Customs Authority. The answer is:
1) it is good, for by such a radical measure the customs authority
would rid itself of problematic elements which have engaged in
corruption causing inestimable damage to the state for which it
was, ostensibly, working, and to the reputation of the customs
authority itself. Then, getting rid of a (considerable) number of
the corrupt customs officers would, inevitably, curb future cor-
ruption  in other words, it would be good to purge the FCA not
only for the reason of justice but also for the reason of efficiency.
2) it is possible, despite current legal obstacles; in the near future it is
inevitable that the Federal Customs Authority, that is, the customs
authority of the FR of Yugoslavia, should be turned into the
Customs Authority of Serbia. It must be done as a part of the
definitive solution of the issue of the status of the Republic of
Serbia, whether it be in conjunction with Montenegro or as an
independent state. The transformation from Yugoslav into
Serbian customs will secure the necessary legal and political foun-
dations for the changes in customs personnel.
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The proposition is as follows: the transformation of the Yugoslav cus-
toms authority into the Serbian Customs Authority should be done in such
a way that none of those currently employed in the Federal Customs
Authority is automatically taken on by the new, Serbian customs, but that
they all should, together with others, apply for a new term of employment.
This proposal can be realized on condition that the upcoming law on
taking over the customs competencies from FR Yugoslavia by the
Republic of Serbia stipulates institutional discontinuity, that is, dissolu-
tion of the Federal Customs Administration and establishing the Serbian
Customs Administration, together with everything that fact entails.
After the new Serbian Customs Administration has been established
and a new director appointed, at his, and at the proposal of his closest
assistants, public advertisements would be placed for new workers in
keeping with the new systematisation of the work place. Everybody
would have the right to apply and the administration would take on the
applicants with the best qualifications among the individuals for whom
there is no shadow of doubt, indication or clue that they have ever
engaged in corruption or similar activities. In this way the Customs
would shake off the burden which hampers and even completely blocks
the possibility of its recovery, at the expense of the state and overall
economic activity.
The proposed method of addressing the personnel problem in the
customs authority is faced with an obstacle which could easily under-
mine all its effects this is the risk of the customs becoming a breeding
ground for political rivalries and party-political activities, replacing the
old corrupt individuals with new ones. This has happened to many
customs reforms in the world at large.
Later, new appointments should be based on competence and an
estimate of the candidates skills and integrity, taking into account his
personal history and work record.
Advancement within the customs should be solely on the basis of
merit and not on friendly or political relations.
Service regulations, sanctions and code of conduct
When deciding on a case, the customs administration must observe
a stipulated procedure: inform the client about the way his claim will
be handled; listen to the interested party and take into account his
statement and the facts presented; state reasons for the decision;
inform the party about legal measures. Customs procedure must in no
way be casual or based on the discretion of the Customs authority; the
basic procedures of customs administration must be stipulated by law
and the details must be regulated by the Code of Conduct, an impor-
tant document of the customs authority.
The customs employees must be issued a copy of the Code of Conduct
(service regulations), and they must be apprised of the consequences of
non-compliance with the Code, that is, with disciplinary measures.
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Many customs officials think rationally and attempt to act in an
optimal manner, taking into account all circumstances. Thus their
decision whether to engage in corruption depends on a cost (including
the risk of consequences and the amount of fines) -benefit (the amount
of bribe) estimate.
The disciplinary procedure must be strict and the penalty appropri-
ate  starting from a reprimand for lesser offences to dismissal for seri-
ous breaches. Only in this way can the procedure serve as an effective
deterrent to corruption and other violations.
Naturally, appropriate penalties cannot, in themselves, contribute to
curbing corruption. They must be accompanied by rigorous supervi-
sion of the customs officials work (sudden visits from senior officials,
internal control inspections, more activity on the part of immediate
superiors, thorough investigation into customer complaints and so
on). The internal control unit should play a large part in this  it would
be independent in its work, possess adequate manpower and material
resources and broad powers. 
On the other hand, there are both the possibility and the need to
promote positive ethical norms and the spirit of belonging in the
Customs (esprit de corps) which is a standard recommendation for
fighting corruption.10 Yet, it is questionable to what extent, in an
organization infected with corruption, the campaign for the promo-
tion of ethical principles can succeed and not provoke ridicule and
completely fail. In the long run, after the main sources of corruption at
the customs have been abolished, and when honesty becomes the
norm, promotion of ethical principles will be fully justified.
Training
Work at the customs should be performed by fully trained customs
officials. This commonplace statement is especially relevant for our
country, where the level of training is inadequate and where a consid-
erable number of customs officers worked at the time when observance
of regulations was not adequate and occasionally not even necessary
for everyday work. 
The need for ever-higher levels of training is the result of increasing-
ly complex international commerce and the spread of computerized
systems. This is why our Customs authority should launch a compre-
hensive training program which would allow our customs officials to
execute their duties in the best possible manner, that is, to adequately
satisfy their job requirements. In order to measure up to the tasks of
the modern customs in a modern way, and in order to raise efficiency
of performance, it is necessary that the custom officials should master
many complex skills such as:
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 knowledge of modern customs procedures (the ones yet to be
introduced in our customs) such as selective control, new
methodology of evaluation of goods, ascertaining the origin of
goods etc.
 operating information technology, that is, training in computer
operation and new software,
 familiarity with accounting methods, both domestic and interna-
tional (GAAS - Generally Accepted Accounting Standards),
 familiarity with international commerce and customary business
procedures, including banking procedures,
 familiarity with standards and procedures of auditing (revision), etc.
The former sporadic training of customs officials must be supplant-
ed by a comprehensive and extensive training program. It must not
occur only once in a lifetime, but be permanent, in order to keep
expanding a customs officials knowledge throughout his career.
Training of the customs officials can only yield results in the long
run, but our customs needs it badly owing to the inadequate level of
education of the personnel and probable influx of new people who
know even less.
Wages
Low income of the customs officials is certainly one of the causes of
corruption. The salaries of our customs officials are extremely low, and
seven to ten thousand dinars a month can not forestall corruption;
rather it can nudge the people to try to make some money that way.
The bonus or incentive pay system is not well developed either, it is
sporadic and it is not founded on proper criteria, rather it is obscure
and inclined to be nepotistic.
Legal earnings of the customs officials must be considerably raised if
we want to curb corruption. This is not to say that low income is the
only cause of corruption at the customs, nor that its increase will abol-
ish corruption, but only that wages which do not provide for the mini-
mal existence and which are even degrading, directly motivate customs
officials for corruption. 
Raising salaries will not persuade all customs officers to give up cor-
ruption, because corruption is far more lucrative than legitimate earn-
ings, no matter how much the salaries have been increased. On the
other hand, increased salaries would contribute to curbing corruption
in two ways: first, a certain number of customs officers, those who are
driven to petty corruption to make a living, would stop requesting (or
receiving) bribes and become honest; and the second, the current
moral justification of corruption: our salaries are desperately small
and we are forced to would vanish. This attitude fostered tolerance
of corruption and contributed to its spread; with it gone, the solidarity
with crooked customs officers could be undermined and the attitude of
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the clients towards corruption at the customs would change, which, all
together would bring about long-term results.
Besides raising in salaries, it is also necessary that a bonus system
should be established and developed. Bonuses must be exclusively
given on merit, they must not be granted on private relationships and
nepotism. Criteria for receiving a bonus must be precise and the
amount of bonus must be known in advance and defined by rules. For
example, customs officers can be awarded a certain percentage of col-
lected fines. It could comprise two parts: one for the team and the other
for an individual11. Realized, that is, paid out bonuses should be publi-
cized in the customs office and in other appropriate places, so that they
can be transparent and provide an incentive for desirable conduct.
Another advantage of the bonus system is that it is acceptable for
political circles, always sensitive to the question of raising the salaries of
civil servants (and for good reason, as increase in one domain automat-
ically entails increase in the others). It is easier to justify a reward for
good results of work, that is, performance related rewards, especially
where performance is easily measured, than a general rise in pay for all.
There should be a balance between the salary and the bonus, as nei-
ther extreme is good. If the salary is virtually the sole income, that is, if
there are either no bonuses at all or they are rare and unpredictable,
there is no stimulation for good work and extra effort, and all that is
left are personal conscience of a customs officer and the threat of con-
sequences for inadequate effort, which is not enough. Or, if the bonus
system is too prominent, there is a danger that a customs officer might
become excessively eager in an attempt to uncover as many offences
as possible, harassing the passengers and businessmen and slowing
down the customs procedure.
Customs cooperation
In the modern world of growing commerce and increasingly complex
business techniques, the Customs authority can gain large benefits from
cooperation with its clients, from shippers to traders and manufacturers
(sellers). Cooperation with legitimate clients, keeping in mind facilitat-
ing the trade, risk management, good communication and coordina-
tion, can be vital for striking the balance between effective monitor-
ing/control and facilitation foreign trade. The Customs authority and
its clients can be partners in this task. The basic modes of cooperation
typically include discussions on upcoming changes in the customs pro-
cedure, identification of difficulties faced by the clients and reaching
solutions acceptable for both sides. The customs authority benefits from
such cooperation in that it gets to learn more about the commercial
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practices of its clients. The possibility of gathering information on prac-
tices violating the customs regulations is also not to be neglected.
The customs authority should also cooperate with other customs
authorities as much as possible, especially with those in neighbour-
ing and the European Union states. This cooperation should first of
all be informational, that is, it should be professional exchange of
information on all relevant happenings concerning the customs.
Then, the cooperation can also be functional  customs services
directly working together on customs procedures  for example,
clearance of a truck leaving the country is not done by that country
but by the neighbouring one, the country the truck enters. This
would mean that the truck could cross the border without having to
change the registration plates, without customs documentation and
invoices, as is the case now. Alternatively it would be possible to con-
struct joint border crossings at which the two customs authorities
would be able to cooperate with much greater ease and speed, to the
advantage of both. The existing low level of cooperation between the
Federal Customs Authority and the authorities of neighbouring
countries leaves fertile ground for the development of corruption
and all other kinds of malpractice at the customs.
Concluding remarks
All discussed programs and measures are important for curbing
corruption. Nevertheless, two programs should be singled out: liber-
alization of foreign trade (especially of imports) and computerization
and automatization of customs procedure. If these were implement-
ed, the level of corruption would be considerably reduced at our cus-
toms, down to a level hardly imaginable today. Yet, we cannot be
overly optimistic, for the realization of both programs will take sever-
al years. Partial liberalization of foreign trade was achieved at the
beginning of 2001, at the peak of the reform, but there seems to be no
intention of following through with that course. Perhaps only the
process of accession to the European Union and joining the World
Trade Organization will lead to further lowering of customs duties
and similar improvement (lowering the number of customs rates and
the number of exemptions and so on). The computerization of cus-
toms procedures can not be put into practice quickly, either. The
experience of other customs authorities shows us that it takes several
years to technically complete the project after it has been decided to
initiate it.
That is the reason why the second echelon measures gain priority
 those measures which will have a strong impact and which can be put
into practice relatively quickly. Among those, the most important are
the measures concerning employment policy (changes in the customs
personnel composition), improvement of the organization (especially
setting up internal control and strict disciplinary procedure), improve-
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ment of the customs procedures (the right to subsequent control,
informing the clients, improvement of the methods of evaluation and
classification of goods and so on) and raising salaries.
Other programs are long-term in nature. It is not to say that they
should be delayed till the right moment, on the contrary, it just means
that the short-time fight against corruption can not rest on them.
THE ACTION PLAN
If curbing corruption at the customs is to be successful the effort
must be comprehensive, based on a coherent program, consistent and
sustained. It must also rest upon responsibilities and rules which are
known in advance. The main elements of the struggle against corrup-
tion are:
1. Political will: The most important precondition for successful
fight against corruption is the firm resolve of the political leaders
of Serbia and top management of the Customs Administration to
check corruption, based on the realization that corruption in the
Customs has a harmful effect on the economic, social and political
life of the state.
2. The responsibility of the Parliament and the Government of
Serbia: the highest state bodies should provide a favourable polit-
ical environment for the effort, through the legislative reform,
supervision over the Customs Administration and personnel
selection within it.
3. Liberalization of foreign trade is the best strategy not just for
economic progress in the country, but also the main lever for
checking corruption at the customs;
4. Building a new and better customs authority should be the main
objective of the transformation of the Federal customs into the
Serbian institution, and not just the simple transference of the
same service from one to the other level. One element of this
process would be the change of the customs personnel, and the
other the adoption of a new, modern Law on Customs authority.
5. Accountability of the Customs Administration: the Customs
Administration is responsible for the operational aspect of the
effort  its task is to set up procedures and programs which are
impervious to corruption as much as possible and which seek to
check it. Curbing corruption must take priority in the Customs
together with facilitating the foreign trade of the state. 
6. Transparency in work and informing the clients on customs reg-
ulations and procedures in order to protect the clients from being
harassed by crooked customs officials.
7. Professional advancement exclusively on merit and qualifica-
tions, free from political influence, private connections and cor-
ruption.
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8. Internal control: a special investigating body should be estab-
lished with the Customs Authority which would, among other
things, deal with corruption in the Customs.
9. Automatization of the customs procedure, through further
development of computerization of the customs system.
10. Improving customs methodology, and especially evaluation and
classification of goods.
11. The development of the subsequent control system, which is pri-
marily based on documentation and therefore forestalls direct
dealings of the interested parties.
12. Introduction of the selective control of goods, based on risk
analysis for particular goods and clients.
13. Raising the flexibility of work by reasonable rotation of tasks,
random choice task assignment, relocation and similar.
14. Cooperation: establish cooperation between the Customs author-
ity and law-abiding businessmen and with customs authorities of
neighbouring countries.
15. Training: innovative training programs for the customs officials
should be developed so that they become thoroughly well-versed
in customs and other regulations, customs procedures and the
practices of the business community.
16. Ethical standards: promote ethical standards of conduct, incor-
porate them into the Customs documents and abide by them in
everyday work.
17. Media: cooperate with the media for they play a prominent role
in creating anticorruption pressure and are the best tools of devel-
oping an awareness on the forms, extent and harmful effects of
corruption.
18. Civil society: develop relations between civil society and the
Customs so that non-governmental organizations can fully con-
tribute to the fight against corruption in the Customs authority.
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